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This dissertation examines the phenomena of the parallel security apparatus in the cases 
of Baathist Iraq, Syria, and Iran.  Parallel security structures are often limited to books and 
articles published on secret police organizations in the broader security literature.  Their research 
often focuses on one branch of the parallel security apparatus rather than examining all the 
parallel security institutions of that particular regime. This body of research attempts to bring 
further light to this particular phenomenon by examining all the parallel security institutions in a 
particular case and to connect and trace the various parallel security institutions to see if there is 
a connection between regime durability and the existence of a parallel security apparatus. This 
dissertation infers that institutional continuity of parallel security structures provide 
organizational incentives to sustain authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and possibly other 
regions of the world.  By examining the cases of Baathist Iraq, Syria, and Iran with their well-
entrenched and extensive parallel security structures, the gap between regime survival and 
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The security literature in the field of political science has touched upon various conflicts 
that have occurred within states and between states in the international system.  During the early 
and mid-20th century, scholarly works focused primarily on interstate conflict within the 
comparative and international relations literature, while the late-20th and 21st century have 
focused primarily on the impact of transnational groups and asymmetrical warfare on state actors 
and governance. While this research has been profound in its findings, by expanding on the 
security literature, little research has been done on the parallel security apparatus and its impact 
on conflict and the role it plays in preserving governance structures within countries.  It is 
important to identify the factors that contribute to regime stability in the Middle East and to 
better understand the durability of authoritarian regimes because parallel security structures are 
one such mechanism that has been indentified as central to authoritarian regime stability in the 
Middle East but the existing literature does not examine the features within these institutions that 
actually lend themselves to regime survival.  Often times, the literature has primarily denoted the 
existence of a parallel security apparatus without actually examining the factors, which affect its 
ability to operate as a check on the military and its role in preserving the regime in power.  While 
scholars such as Quinlivan (1999), Makara (2013), and Nassif (2015) discuss parallel security 
organizations, the overall scope of the phenomenon of parallel security structures is limited in 
the literature. This study represents an opportunity to deconstruct and more closely examine the 
institutional features and framework of parallel security structures in an effort to understand the 
role they play in the survivial of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. As such, in this 
dissertation, I will expand upon this phenomenon and argue that the parallel security apparatus 
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demonstrates its utility by raising the cost of coup attempts and as a result the parallel security 
apparatus also contributes to regime durability. 
Since significant resources are allocated to parallel security structures their effectiveness 
in promoting regime stability is paramount.  However, these same resources devoted to 
supporting the parallel security apparatus, could alternatively, be utilized for the distribution of 
public goods, and/or bureaucratic and military professionalization that reduces the likelihood of 
internal unrest or coup attempts.  As a result, further research will illuminate the need and 
usefulness for such a phenomenon, such as the parallel security apparatus within authoritarian 
countries.   
Conceptualization of the Parallel Security Structure 
The parallel security apparatus can be conceptualized as parallel military forces, 
intelligence organizations, the secret police, and any organization with the sole mission goal of 
ensuring the survival of an authoritarian regime in power. Parallel military organizations are 
regime bound to create a counterweight against the regular armed forces (Quinlivan 1999; Alley 
2010; Bellin 2012; Blanken and Lepore 2012; Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2016, 214; Powell 2014; 
Carey et al 2016; Powell 2017).   This ensures any form of unrest is “stamped out” by raising the 
costs of a coup attempt (Quinlivan 1999; Alley 2010; Bellin 2012; Blanken and Lepore 2012; 
Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2016, 214; Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; Powell 2017).  
Authoritarian regimes attempt to insulate themselves by creating multiple security organizations 
(Quinlivan 1999; Alley 2010; Bellin 2012; Blanken and Lepore 2012; Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 
2013, 336; Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; Powell 2017).  Intelligence organizations that are 
tasked with extreme internal surveillance constitute a form of parallel security structure, as they 
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ensure regime survival by preemptively detecting any form of dissent within a regime, military, 
or within the populace of a country (Quinlivan 1999; Alley 2010; Bellin 2012; Blanken and 
Lepore 2012; Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2016, 214; Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; Powell 2017).  
The parallel security apparatus is often times not institutionalized; therefore, it answers to 
various regime elites, rather than a formal chain of command (Quinlivan 1999; Alley 2010; 
Bellin 2012; Blanken and Lepore 2012; Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2016, 214; Powell 2014; Carey 
et al 2016; Powell 2017).  This can lead to a divide and rule scenario where competing security 
organizations are more interested in counterbalancing one another instead of mobilizing 
resources to instigate a coup against the incumbent ruler (Quinlivan 1999; Alley 2010; Bellin 
2012; Blanken and Lepore 2012; Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2016, 214; Powell 2014; Carey et al 
2016; Powell 2017).   Parallel security structures also hold overlapping jurisdictions for the 
purposes of monitoring other security organizations and dissidents within a country (Quinlivan 
1999; Alley 2010; Bellin 2012; Blanken and Lepore 2012; Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2013, 336; 
Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; Powell 2017).  
Parallel military forces are generally autonomous from the regular military, but possess 
similar capabilities to the armed forces enough to raise the costs of a coup attempt emanating 
from the conventional military (Quinlivan 1999; Alley 2010; Bellin 2012; Blanken and Lepore 
2012; Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2013, 336; Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; Powell 2017). These 
parallel military forces do not have to defeat the conventional military, but simply increase the 
costs of defection (Quinlivan 1999; Alley 2010; Bellin 2012; Blanken and Lepore 2012; 
Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2013, 336; Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; Powell 2017).  Parallel 
security structures can be comprised of the “security services, police, and intelligence 
organizations [which] enjoy surveillance and intelligence capacities that allow them to monitor 
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the regular army and uncover coup plots before they occur” (Makara 2013, 336).  Since their 
primary role is to preserve the regime, they hold a command structure that is largely tied to the 
political leadership in power (Quinlivan 1999; Makara 2013, 336; Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; 
Powell 2017).   Parallel security structures as an institution are afforded budgets and luxuries, 
even in times of economic crisis (Quinlivan 1999; Alley 2010; Bellin 2012; Blanken and Lepore 
2012; Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2013, 336; Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; Powell 2017).  While 
other government budgets are reduced, parallel security institutions continue to be afforded 
resources in order to maintain their effectiveness at preserving the regime in power (Quinlivan 
1999; Alley 2010; Bellin 2012; Blanken and Lepore 2012; Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2013, 336; 
Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; Powell 2017).    
Parallel security structures maintain their strength because of their perceived loyalty to 
the regime. In the Soviet Union, Commissars were utilized to maintain “tight” control over the 
military and its commanders through the countersigning of orders and limiting the influence and 
authority of military commanders (Blanken and Lepore 2012, 336).  In Nazi Germany, the 
Waffen-SS was a parallel force to that of the Wehrmacht or conventional army; it was created to 
ensure the security of Adolf Hitler’s regime against potential coup attempts emerging from 
within the military (Blanken and Lepore 2012, 337).  
The parallel security apparatus functions as a buffer against internal threats that may 
impact the survival of the political regime.  These structures operate in terms of intelligence 
gathering, detection of dissidents, and hold enough personnel and material resources to raise the 
costs of a coup attempt or insurrection from the population.  The security structures of the 
parallel security apparatus maintain their control of authoritarian regimes by not only preserving 
the state, but also by ensuring the survival of the political establishment.  Parallel security 
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institutions allow countries to have large regular militaries in order to project power, while 
parallel security structures protect the internal leadership and preserve the territorial integrity of 
the state1. Also, factions within that security apparatus are exclusively dedicated to the protection 
of the leader in power and his closest associates within the political establishment (Quinlivan 
1999, 141; Alley 2010; Bellin 2012; Blanken and Lepore 2012; Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2013; 
Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; Powell 2017).  Parallel security structures do not need to be 
larger than the armed forces, just loyal enough and capable enough to combat the regular military 
(Quinlivan 1999, 141; Alley 2010; Bellin 2012; Blanken and Lepore 2012; Lutterbeck 2013; 
Makara 2013; Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; Powell 2017).  In addition, there is the notion of 
social prestige. Thus, the parallel security apparatus is afforded the best weapons and tools, and 
its soldiers are provided luxuries outside of other government positions that ensure their loyalty 
to the state and the political establishment (Quinlivan 1999, 153; Alley 2010; Bellin 2012; 
Blanken and Lepore 2012; Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2013; Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; 
Powell 2017).    
The regular military, in this case, will possess older weapons and is generally less capable 
in any coup attempt they instigate (Quinlivan 1999, 155; Alley 2010; Bellin 2012; Blanken and 
Lepore 2012; Lutterbeck 2013; Makara 2013; Powell 2014; Carey et al 2016; Powell 2017).  For 
example, the Syrians were “unable to bring their best units and best equipment to the opening 
battles of recent wars” due to those “best units” constituting the parallel military force for the 
Syrian regime (Quinlivan 1999, 158).  In contrast, “The Iraqis [did use] their best-equipped 
forces [but] only in carefully planned offensives and to redeem badly broken defenses” 
                                                          
1 Some parallel security forces are large enough to preserve the borders of a state, while others are small enough 
to preserve solely regime institutions.  However, most parallel security structures are able to work side by side 
with the conventional military to ensure the security of a country’s state borders. 
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(Quinlivan 1999, 158).  The majority of parallel security institutions primarily exist in countries 
located in the Global South, where authoritarian regimes are prevalent.  However, because 
parallel security structures are largely financed by a state’s capital resources and tend to be 
highly institutionalized, the best examples of these institutions can be found in the Middle East.    
One of the significant differences between parallel security structures and the military is 
their mission sets and chain of commands.  The military for the most part has a chain of 
command that falls under the Ministry of Defense, while parallel security structures can have a 
direct line to the leadership and stakeholders or fall under another security based ministry such as 
the Ministry of the Interior.  Parallel security structures also differ in their missions compared to 
the regular military.  While the regular military is focused on external defense, parallel security 
structures are geared more towards internal defense.  It is only in times of war between two state-
actors that parallel security structures not only have an internal security mission but are put on 
the frontlines with the armed forces to aid in their external mission of protecting the country 
from outside threats. In addition, while the regular military has a primary mission of external 
defense, the military still holds a secondary mission of internal defense to assist the parallel 
security structures during periods of internal unrest.   
Parallel security structures can either be large organizations or small forces acting to 
preserve the regime and its stakeholders.  When a parallel security structure holds a small 
number of personnel compared to the military, that parallel security organization can be 
privileged over the military and other security organizations in order to garner their loyalty. In 
other cases, parallel security structures with a higher number of personnel on par with the regular 
military or exceeding the regular military tend to have less military-based training but more 
ideological training to ensure their loyalty to the regime and its stakeholders. 
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Scope of this Study 
This dissertation will examine three cases, which include the countries of Baathist Iraq, 
Syria, and Iran. These cases will be used in order to observe their respective parallel security 
apparatus.  In doing so, the research question for this study will ascertain how effective are 
parallel security structures at ensuring regime stability?  And when do parallel security 
institutions stop performing their duties?  These questions will illuminate the effectiveness of the 
parallel security apparatus in handling internal threats and preserving the regime. 
The case of Baathist Iraq will examine the effectiveness of parallel security structures in 
both internal defense such as protecting regime institutions and stakeholders and external 
defense, the protecting of the country’s borders alongside the regular military. In the case of Iraq, 
parallel security structures were involved in both roles during different periods of time under the 
reign of Saddam Hussein.  While under al-Bakr, parallel security structures were primarily 
utilized for internal defense.  This dissertation will trace various events of internal unrest as well 
as external conflict in order to better capture the effectiveness Iraq’s parallel intelligence 
organizations and parallel military structures had in preserving the Baathist regime in Iraq. 
For the case of Syria, parallel security structures will follow the various agencies and 
parallel military organizations as they preserve the regime’s elites and institutions.  Under both 
Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad, the parallel security structures within the country have 
primarily focused on their primary mission of internal defense, preventing coups from 
overthrowing the regime as well as stamping out internal unrest.  Despite being provided the best 
equipment, Syria’s parallel security structures have remained within the country even during 
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periods of intervention in neighboring countries.  This case will be examined to determine the 
success of Syria’s parallel security organizations in preserving the Syrian Baathist regime. 
Iran as the last case will examine the utility of parallel security organizations under the 
Shah focusing primarily on the Savak and its success or failure in rooting out internal dissent.  In 
addition, this dissertation will follow the failure of the Shah’s parallel security structures in 
preserving his regime leading up to the 1979 Islamic Revolution.  After 1979, this dissertation 
will examine the expansion of parallel security organizations under the new Islamic regime and 
analyze the benefits the various intelligence organizations and parallel security organizations the 
Islamic Republic utilizes in preserving their regime. 
The parallel security structure, as a concept, is rarely discussed within the academic 
literature of security or the sub-fields of political science.  The concept is further diminished by 
its lack of defining parameters within the literature.  When parallel security structures are 
examined they tend to be examined by their individual organizations such as an intelligence 
agency vital to the survival of an authoritarian regime or a parallel military structure acting as a 
counterweight to the armed forces.  This very much limits the scope and utility in better 
understanding the phenomenon of the parallel security apparatus in the academic literature. This 
dissertation will endeavor to bring to light further the intricate components of parallel security 
structures and how they operate in preserving authoritarianism.  Furthermore, this study will 
highlight the need for parallel security structures in the divided and sectarian Middle Eastern 
cases of Baathist Iraq, Syria, and Iran. 
The following chapter of this dissertation will examine the various dimensions of parallel 
security structures that exist in the literature.  These include coup-proofing and parallel military 
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organizations, intelligence and the secret police, and authoritarian regime types in how these 
various dimensions influence the establishment and creation of a parallel security apparatus.  In 
Chapter 3 of this dissertation I examine two theoretical frames, historical institutionalism and 
organizational theory, in how those theories assist in uncovering the utility of a parallel security 
apparatus and its influence on ensuring regime durability.  In addition, this chapter examines the 
methodology utilized for this dissertation, a descriptive case study.  Essentially tracing the 
phenomena of the parallel security apparatus with in each case to demonstrate how parallel 
security structures function within an authoritarian regime over time.   
The chapters involving an examination of the cases of this dissertation will first examine 
Iraq from 1968 to 2003 under two Baathist leaders, Ahmad Al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein, from 
the Kurdish insurgency in the North in the 1970s, to the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, to the 1991 
Gulf War, to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and internal unrest and coup attempts in-between. The 
chapter on Iraq will trace the establishment and expansion of the parallel security apparatus 
under Ahmad Al-Bakr and the further expansion and utility under Saddam Hussein in preserving 
the Baathist regime in Iraq.  Chapter 5 will examine Syria’s Baathist regime from 1976 to 2018 
in the unfolding events of internal insurrection that transpire.  These events include northwestern 
Syria in the 1970s and 1980s as well as the later Civil War period that began with protests in 
2011 but later evolved into internal armed conflict.  By tracing the parallel security apparatus 
under Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad one can decipher the use of internal parallel security 
structures to preserve the Syrian Baathist regime and eliminate opposition elements within the 
country. Chapter 6 on Iran will first begin by examining the Shah’s reign from 1957 to 1979 and 
how the parallel security apparatus under the Shah fared in dealing with opposition elements 
within the country up to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.  The chapter will further examine the 
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success of the Islamic Revolution which allowed Iranian revolutionaries to establish an Islamic 
regime within the country and further cement regime control with the creation of an expansive 
parallel security apparatus within the country.  From 1979 to 2018 this dissertation will trace the 
utility of Iran’s parallel security apparatus in stamping out opposition elements within the 
country as well as its role in external defense during the 1980s with the Iran-Iraq War. 
In the conclusion chapter, I will draw on events in each case where authoritarian regimes 
were affected by both external and internal threats.  In addition, I will highlight the importance of 
the phenomenon of the parallel security apparatus holds in preserving polity durability in 
authoritarian regimes of the Middle East.  The parallel security apparatus will also be assessed 
based upon their success or failure at preserving the political leadership and territorial integrity 
of each respective country.  The conclusion will also highlight the utility of the parallel security 
apparatus as an intricate part of an authoritarian regime’s coercive apparatus, ensuring internal 
unrest is dampened and authoritarianism is sustained. 
Uncovering the effectiveness of the phenonomen of the parallel security apparatus and its 
assistance with regime survival is salient from its utility in sustaining authoritarian governance in 
countries that possess parallel security institutions.  The research questions for this dissertation 
attempts to determine the effectiveness of such institutions with respect to preserving 
authoritarian regimes and maintaining stability.  Very little of the security literature devotes 
research to answering the questions posed in this dissertation.  More or less parallel security 
institutions in the literature discuss their existence and roles as individual institutions rather than 
their composition in the wider umbrella of the parallal security apparatus utilized by 
authoritarian regimes.  Through a comparative descriptive case study method combined with 
process tracing, one can track the institutional developments that uncover the effectiveness and 
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institutional utility of parallel security structures under the umbrella of the parallel security 
apparatus in authoritarian regimes.  As a result, this dissertation is important in that it contributes 
to the literature on authoritarian regimes in the Middle East by elucidating the relationship 





















 The literature on parallel security structures is often divided into individual parts focusing 
on one aspect of the regime security apparatus.  This can be an intelligence service or an 
extension of an intelligence service commonly termed the secret police.  Other components of a 
parallel security apparatus found within the literature include parallel military forces as well as 
other coup-proofing institutions.  The literature on coup-proofing examines not only 
authoritarianism but the various mechanisms that ensure regime survival. This literature review 
will examine authoritarianism, coup-proofing, and the various components of parallel security 
forces.   
Coup-Proofing and Parallel Military Organizations 
Examining the literature on the parallel security apparatus can highlight the relevant 
aspects of parallel military forces that promote stability both within the institution and the 
regime.  Quinlivan (1999) focuses on parallel military control and coup-proofing strategies in the 
countries of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Iraq. The National Guard in Saudi Arabia exists as an 
example; it’s a force that parallels the military establishment in the Kingdom and utilizes a coup-
proofing strategy by recruiting from the most loyal tribes in the Kingdom.  And if unrest occurs, 
parallel military organizations are deployed to quell social protest or any internal threat. 
Generally, these organizations are also positioned in key areas of the country (Quinlivan 1999, 
143-144).   
Quinlivan contends parallel military forces do not need to be larger than the regular 
military, only loyal enough and adequately effective in raising the costs of a coup emanating 
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within the regular military.  Other security structures may hold similar roles of coup-proofing to 
that of parallel military forces. Countries such as Saudi Arabia possess a Public Security Police, 
the Special Security Force, the Coast Guard, and the Frontier Force, which are vital to the 
protection of authoritarian interests and regime survival (Quinlivan 1999, 144).   
Other literature on parallel military formations examine the different functions of those 
organizations.  Golkar’s (2012) and Ostovar (2013) illustrate the wider dynamics and the utility 
of the basij as a parallel security structure in regime survival.  The basij, as a parallel military 
force, was instituted to recruit from all sectors of society in order to create a popular militia that 
was loyal to the regime and its ideals (Ostovar 2013, 348). However, the outbreak of conflict 
between the countries of Iraq and Iran, led to the use of the basij in a more external role.   
Regime preservation came in the form of preventing an external army from removing from 
power the Ayatollah and his regime in Tehran (Golkar 2012, 627).  Golkar clearly shows that 
parallel military structures are utilized in external conflicts when the need arises, however their 
internal role becomes the focus once again when an external threat is abated.  The basij in its 
current form maintains order over the Iranian population from one of its 40,000 bases throughout 
the country in order to preserve the post-1979 revolutionary regime (Golkar 2012, 627).   
Lutterbeck (2013) and Carey et al (2016) examine parallel military organizations of 
authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Parallel military structures draw from both tribal sub-
state actors and from populations within a country that are ideologically aligned with the current 
regime in power (Lutterbeck 2013, 31). In Lutterbeck’s analysis of Libya, he illuminates the 
broad dimensions of tribal affinities and to a lesser extent ideologically driven forces. It was the 
elite units within the Libyan army under Qaddafi that provided a counter-coup force which 
included the Khamis Brigade, ideologically aligned Revolutionary committees, and tribal groups 
14 
 
that were most loyal and fought to preserve the Qaddafi regime during the Arab Spring of 2011 
(Lutterbeck 2013, 41). The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, on the other hand, according to 
Lutterbeck, does represent an ideological force as it views itself as the guardian of the 1979 
revolution (Lutterbeck 2013, 31). Carey et al claims one of the reasons Muammar Gaddafi 
created a militia called the Revolutionary Guard Corps was to counter the regular armed forces 
as well as fend off any potential coup attempt emanating within his security forces (Carey et al 
2016, 59). In this case, “this group proved its worth in 1986 and 1993, when it successfully 
crushed army uprisings” (Carey et al 2016, 59). Carey et al point out that such forces tend to be 
more difficult to control since they reside outside of the hierarchal structure of the regular armed 
forces (2016). The use of parallel security forces creates overlapping responsibilities among the 
security services and a marketplace for such security can lead to competition for resources 
(Carey et al 2016, 61).  
Another facet with regard to militia type forces is the low cost to maintaining and 
equipping them as a force compared to the regular armed forces (Carey et al 2016, 61).   Carey et 
al point out that these militia forces supplement and parallel the regular armed forces.  For 
example, in Guatemala there existed 60,000 service members in the Guatemalan army and 
600,000 in the Civil Defense Patrols (Carey et al 2016, 61). Furthermore, “groups drawn from 
the local population…[and former insurgents]into a semi-official militia…provide a means of 
overcoming the information disadvantage that characterizes counterinsurgency campaigns” 
(Carey et al 2016, 61). In Peru, military commanders demonstrated how local militias were 
useful for defeating the insurgent group called the Shining Path. Militias also provide a form of 
local acceptance if their members are drawn from the local areas where an insurgency is present; 
their tacit support for government operations is an admission of legitimacy of governance (Carey 
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et al 2016, 62). In Kashmir, the Indian government utilized militias to reduce the cost for the 
deployment of its regular military as well as reduce causalities within its military’s conscription 
ranks (Carey et al 2016, 62). Militias that parallel the armed forces provide additional equipped 
manpower that can occupy space that prevents the successful emergence of an opposition.  
Brown et al (2016), Alley (2010), and Powell (2014) examine threats posed by security 
institutions which are tasked with safeguarding an authoritarian regime.  Brown et al call this a 
guardianship dilemma where authoritarian regimes create parallel military forces that ensure a 
check on regular security institutions in order to protect stakeholders of the regime (Brown et al 
2016, 1).  The issue with regard to this form of coup-proofing is its effect on military 
effectiveness and battlefield readiness in combating a neighboring threat, thus creating a 
balancing act (Brown et al 2016, 2).  Brown et al contend that command and control within the 
military and the advancement of military personnel within the ranks are significant to ensuring 
regime survival (Brown et al 2016, 3).  If the regular military is able to mobilize and not be 
impeded by logistical impediments, the costs of a coup attempt decreases (Brown et al 2016, 4). 
Brown et al claim the Iranian Revolutionary Guard represents the best example as a parallel 
security structure since it provides a check on the Iranian armed forces and the populace, which 
prevents the overthrow of the revolution that was implemented in 1979 (Brown et al 2016, 4-5). 
Alley (2010) briefly touches upon parallel military formations in the case of Yemen.  The 20,000 
strong Special Republican Guard in Yemen, like other Middle Eastern parallel military forces 
has a mission to protect the authoritarian leader of the country, while the regular military is 
tasked primarily with defending the country against external threats (Alley 2010, 407).  While 
the Special Republican Guard does not outnumber Yemen’s regular military it raises the costs of 
intervention in the event of a coup emanating from the regular military (Alley 2010, 407).  
16 
 
In the same vein of research as Alley (2010) and Brown et al (2016), Powell states 
structural coup-proofing involves parallel chains of commands that provide a check on the 
regular armed forces (Powell 2014, 175).  In this case, these are ‘border guards, secret police, 
paramilitary forces, militaries, presidential guards, and so on’ [acting] as an armed counterweight 
to the military” (Powell 2014, 175).  Powell states the more obstacles to a coup attempt the less 
likely a coup will succeed (Powell 2014, 175).  In addition, various security branches are often 
pitted against each other as a means to create competition and ensure the prevention of coup 
attempts by a regime’s security structures (Powell 2014, 175). The Mobutu regime, according to 
Powell, had multiple security agencies with identical duties, leading to each security organization 
to be less cooperative among their institutional counterparts (Powell 2014, 175).  In addition, 
under Mobutu “challenges to inter-branch communication were so well established that the 
Zairean Air Force accidentally bombed its own ground soldiers just prior to [the] Shaba 
[conflicts]” (Powell 2014, 176).  Another dimension of the Mobutu regime was the purging of 
capable officers within the military, and replacing them with those deemed more loyal to the 
regime (Powell 2014, 176). Examining Libya, Powell states the rotation of high-ranking officers 
for field commands in Chad made the conflict almost untenable as the Chadian forces gained 
numerous victories while the deployed military command was in disarray at the expense of 
ensuring Qaddafi’s own personal survival (Powell 2014, 176).  
 According to Powell (2017), authoritarian leaders do not intentionally weaken their 
militaries; they essentially shift focus when they perceive their positions to be vulnerable to 
internal threats.  Leaders will often protect themselves at the expense of state interests, which 
garners those leaders a higher chance of survival from coup attempts (Powell 2017, 4). Coup-
proofing also has the issue of removing skilled soldiers from the regular military to parallel 
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military forces, thereby hollowing out those institutions of capable soldiers and commanders 
(Powell 2017, 6). “In Sierra Leone…Siaka Stevens disarmed the army while building up his 
Internal Security Unit,” affecting the army’s capabilities as resources were diverted to the 
Internal Security Unit (Powell 2017, 6).  This creates a problem where counter-coup forces as 
parallel military structures undermine the effectiveness of conventional forces making them less 
capable on the ground (Powell 2017, 7).   Powell claims part of the success of ISIS against the 
Iraqi military was the collapse of the Second Iraqi Army Division which was underequipped as a 
result of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki’s policies to divert resources from the military to his 
own parallel force called the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (Powell 2017, 6-7).  Coup-proofing 
undermines the battlefield capabilities of the regular armed forces (Powell 2017, 7).  Case in 
point Powell draws on Iraq’s war with Iran, where the Iraqi military performed very poorly until 
Saddam Hussein removed some of his coup-proofing structures and allowed his parallel military 
force, the Republican Guard ,to engage against the Iranian frontline forces, leading to several 
victories on the ground (Powell 2017, 7).  
Rabinowitz and Jargowsky (2018), Nassif (2015), and Louer (2013) look at coup-
proofing strategies utilized by authoritarian regimes. Rabinowitz and Jargowsky examine sub-
Saharan African authoritarian regimes and their methods, which include dividing military 
commands as a form of insulating the regime from potential coup attempts (Rabinowitz and 
Jargowsky 2018, 323).  Rabinowitz and Jargowsky primarily examine how African elites foster 
relations with rural elites to safeguard their regimes (Rabinowitz and Jargowsky 2018, 323). In 
this case, “leaders who ally with established rural elites and develop multiregional bases of 
support face lower coup risk than those who cater to urban interests. This is because for a regime 
to survive, it has to withstand incessant urban unrest, curb ethno-regional competitors, and grow 
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the economy so as to prevent the politicization of the military” (Rabinowitz and Jargowsky 2018, 
323).  For African elites the threat stems from urban areas as rebellions are far fewer in the rural 
areas (Rabinowitz and Jargowsky 2018, 324). Economic growth is important, while the top brass 
of the military can sustain economic decline, lower and middle-ranking soldiers feel the effect of 
a declining economy and often are composed of a coup force that attempts to overthrow a regime 
during periods of economic hardships (Rabinowitz and Jargowsky 2018, 325).  African soldiers 
based upon colonial foundations can be affected by ethno-regional imbalances and tensions as a 
result of previous colonial recruitment practices (Rabinowitz and Jargowsky 2018, 326).   
The persistence of ethnic ties in the military is in large part a vestige of colonial 
administrative policies when, commonly, the military rank and file were recruited from 
relatively disadvantaged regions. These legacies persist in African militaries today. 
Throughout West Africa, for example, the dominant pattern was for colonial 
administrations to recruit soldiers from the so-called martial tribes in the relatively 
impoverished Northern Sahel. The officer corps, in contrast, was recruited from the 
better-privileged, wealthier southern ethnic groups (Rabinowitz and Jargowsky 2018, 
326). 
During a drought from 1977 to 1979, the country of Guinea-Bissau became dependent upon 
international food aid which was largely distributed to urban areas (Rabinowitz and Jargowsky 
2018, 327). Since the majority of the rank and file were from rural areas, the ethno-political 
tension of food distribution boiled over into a coup attempt (Rabinowitz and Jargowsky 2018, 
327). African authoritarian regimes attempt to prevent coups by utilizing two mechanisms of 
coup-proofing: ethnically stacked security forces and the creation of rival-paramilitary forces 
that provide a check on the regular armed forces (Rabinowitz and Jargowsky 2018, 327).  
 Nassif (2015) examines the coup-proofing techniques utilized by Middle Eastern 
militaries during the Arab Spring which ensured their loyalty to their respective authoritarian 
regimes. Nassif claims when scholars examine coup-proofing structures the obvious 
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disaggregation is to divide one’s study into a police category and an armed forces category; 
however Nassif claims such an analytical tool can be limited without actually examining 
incentives and action between high-ranking officers and mid to junior level ranking leaders in 
both security organizations (Nassif 2015, 247). As Nassif claims, “field marshals and chiefs of 
staff can order their troops to quell popular uprisings, but they themselves do not open fire on 
unarmed civilians demonstrating in public squares” (Nassif 2015, 248).  Which leads to another 
broader dynamic as to how connected are junior officers to an uprising compared to senior level 
leaders (Nassif 2014, 248).  Nassif argues that when junior or mid-level officers refuse orders 
handed out by senior ranking officers, the rank and file follows the decisions made by junior to 
mid-ranking level leaders (Nassif 2015, 248).  
There is a consensus in the literature that officers typically prioritize maintaining 
hierarchy, discipline, and cohesiveness within the military over any other goal. The risk 
of undermining the organizational integrity of the officer corps can severely constrain the 
military elite’s leeway and alter their line of action. If the bulk of mid-ranking and junior 
officers are not willing to follow orders to suppress the mobilization, senior officers will 
not have the capacity to defend the regime (Nassif 2015, 248-249).  
Nassif contends authoritarian regimes often consider counterbalancing when there is a belief that 
the armed forces could become a part of a coup attempt (Nassif 2015, 253).  In this case, 
autocrats create rival security services that put a check on the armed forces (Nassif 2015, 253).  
Nassif highlights the example of Romania’s secret police under Ceausescu as an example where 
the secret police undertook domestic internal security action while the military was geared 
towards defending the borders of the country from external threats (Nassif 2015, 253). The 
military is often removed from internal security missions and repression while the rival security 
institutions take up that role within an authoritarian regime (Nassif 2015, 253). In addition, by 
keeping the military weak there is less of a likelihood that a coup attempt will be made by the 
armed forces (Nassif 2015, 254).  
20 
 
 Louer (2013) provides an in depth analysis of coup-proofing undertaken by the ruling 
Khalifa regime in Bahrain and its sectarian stacking strategy within the country. Bahrain as a 
country is composed of 70% Shiites and 30% Sunnis; the ruling regime is also Sunni and views 
the majority Shiites as a threat to its rule (Louer 2013, 246).  As a result, Sunnis are recruited 
from within the population and abroad to fulfill vacancies within the security services and armed 
forces (Louer 2013, 246). Louer states the Bahrain Defense Force, the National Guard, the police 
forces partitioned between the Ministry of Interior and the National Security Agency are almost 
entirely comprised of Sunnis (Louer 2013, 246).  Prior to the 1980s, Shiites were recruited into 
the armed forces but generally never rose above a non-commissioned officer rank. Louer claims 
after a Shia opposition developed during the 1980s with the intention of overthrowing the 
Khalifa monarchy, the security services began to recruit almost exclusively Sunni to insulate the 
regime from coup attempts (Louer 2013, 246).  During the Arab Spring of 2011, a majority of 
the Sunnis during the protests from the police and defense forces were comprised of different 
nationalities (Louer 2013, 249). These included:  
Yemenis, Syrians (who would mainly come from the poor and desert region of Deir ez-
Zor in the south-east), Jordanians and Pakistanis[baluchis]. Since the fall of Saddam 
Husein in 2003, Iraqis (all Sunnis) have joined the Bahraini security forces. According to 
the opposition, many [were] ex-members of the Republican Guard, the praetorian guard 
of the Baathist regime (Louer 2013, 249, 252). 
Many of these foreign nationals were provided Bahraini citizenship to ensure their loyalty to the 
regime and increase the Sunni population in the country (Louer 2013, 249).  During the 2011 
unrest, Louer claims the four security institutions that carried out Royal Decree Number 18 were 
the National Guard, Bahrain Defense Force, the Ministry of the Interior forces and National 
Security Agency forces, which were all headed by members of the royal dynasty (Louer 2013, 
254). Louer states the Bahrain Defense Force comprised of 8,000 service members is the largest 
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security institution within the country and with its mandate on focusing on external threats did 
not utilize excessive force for repressing protestors in 2011 as compared to other security 
institutions within the country (Louer 2013, 254).   The National Guard is comprised of 2,000 
soldiers and is utilized for both internal and external threats (Louer 2013, 254). The National 
Security Agency on the other hand has more of a police role which has been granted by the 
monarchy to arrest, detain, and interrogate those deemed a threat to the regime (Louer 2013, 
255).  Overall, the sectarian stacking of the security forces by the ruling regime has been a means 
of preserving the monarchy in Bahrain, according to Louer. 
 Literature on the overlapping responsibilities of security structures in authoritarian 
regimes illuminates the challenges of regime survival when security institutions are pitted against 
one another.  Bellin (2012), Albrecht (2014), Sudduth (2017), and Bausch (2018) examine the 
various implications for overlapping responsibilities of the security apparatus as well as the 
impact of corporate interests of those same institutions.  According to Bellin (2012), the coercive 
apparatus of authoritarian regimes, generally, maintains multiple agencies and organizations 
performing the same functions. In this case, the police, intelligence agencies, the military, and 
other security organizations have overlapping duties that protect the regime from both external 
and internal threats (Bellin 2012, 130).  “Institutional redundancy is the express intention of 
these autocrats who rely on a strategy of ‘balanced rivalry’ to ‘guard the guardians’ and protect 
against insurrection and coups” (Bellin 2012, 130).  The military has three goals, generally, in an 
authoritarian regime, they are to defend the country from external and internal threats, maintain 
security and order within the country, and preserve the institutional interests of its own 
organization, the armed forces (Bellin 2012, 131).  The overlapping of responsibilities can 
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hamper these goals, which can lead to fractures within an authoritarian regime (Bellin 2012, 
131).   
 Bellin states the utilization of repression can hamper a regime’s image and the coercive 
apparatus can at times become intrinsically linked to the regime when sectarian, ethnic, and tribal 
preferences are at stake.  In this case, access to resources and rents are tied to the incumbent 
regime in power and any form or change to that respective regime type would cut off the rewards 
various security elites are receiving (Bellin 2012, 133).  For example, “when the military is 
deeply invested in the survival of the regime because of its blood ties, or its ethnic/sectarian ties, 
or its crony capitalist ties to the regime, that military has significant incentive to shoot civilians 
even if such action violates its other mandates” (Bellin 2012, 133).  In Bahrain, the majority Shia 
population and the pervasiveness of Sunnis in the military reinforced the military’s loyalty to the 
regime to preserve the monarchy.  In Libya, the tribal nature of the coercive apparatus witnessed 
both alignment and defections of tribes in support of the regime and in support of the opposition 
(Bellin 2012, 134).  In Syria, where the Alawites are the elites within the security apparatus and 
the Sunnis are the rank and file, the Baathist regime relied heavily on the Alawite dominated 4th 
Brigade to repress protestors (Bellin 2012, 135).  
 Bellin claims when the Arab Spring of 2011 set in, authoritarian regimes attempted to 
find the right mix of cooptation and repression to sustain their regimes (Bellin 2012, 127).  
During the Arab Spring, the rulers in Egypt and Tunisia were forced to flee as the military in 
both countries chose not to repress the protestors.  In Libya, the military split between the 
opposition and the regime, resulting in a civil war.  In Bahrain, the ruling regime was bolstered 
by Saudi support to ensure the monarch would not be overthrown (Bellin 2012, 130). Saudi 
Arabia escaped protests by enacting reforms to placate its citizens.  In Algeria, unrest was 
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prevented only because the historical memory of the recent civil war (1990s) led to the desire by 
Algerians not engage in unrest (Bellin 2012, 130).   Similar to Bellin (2012), Albrecht (2014) 
further examines coup-proofing and its divisions as it pertains to African and Middle Eastern 
authoritarian regimes.  Albrecht finds that coup-proofing is only partially successful. In fact, 
authoritarianism is the variable, which raises the risk of further coup attempts, nullifying the 
institutional security structure of regime preservation (Albrecht 2014, 660).  
 Sudduth (2017) examines coup-proofing practices where the creation of two separate 
command structures within a security apparatus lead to a decline in corporate interests among 
officers in the military to preserve the regime. During the 1970s, President Diori of Niger was 
ousted in a coup by his own military as a result of a decline in corporate interests among his 
military’s officers; and when Diori created a parallel military force to put a check on the regular 
military, the military subsequently removed him from power (Sudduth 2017, 5).  Sudduth claims 
security institutions attempt to prevent coup attempts by stacking members loyal to a particular 
leader within security institutions, especially when a political leader’s survival appears to be 
threatened (Sudduth 2017, 7). For example, Sudduth states Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam 
Hussein regularly rotated commanders within their militaries in order to prevent those leaders 
from creating power bases to instigate a coup against the current incumbent (Sudduth 2017, 7). 
Sudduth further claims that coup-proofing is a balancing act, as losing on the battlefield can 
mean a leader’s execution.  As a result, the balance between coup-proofing to deal with internal 
threats and ensuring a country’s military is able to fend off foreign invasions is essential for an 
authoritarian leader to sustain his rule over a country (Sudduth 2017, 7).  
 Bausch (2018) further discusses the implications of coup-proofing by authoritarian 
leaders and its impact on military readiness.  Prior to the emergence of ISIS, Prime Minister 
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Maliki of Iraq enacted a policy of coup-proofing and sectarian stacking in order to prevent what 
he believed were coup attempts by former Baath Party members (Bausch 2018, 3). Bausch 
claims counterbalancing involves the separation of units and the existence of multiple security 
organizations with different command structures which compete against one another for limited 
resources (Bausch 2018, 3).  In Iraq, the elite special forces were removed from the military and 
put under the command of the Ministry of Interior which Maliki presided over along with other 
forces including the federal police (Bausch 2018, 3). The special forces prior to coming under 
the control of Maliki had previously been representative of the whole population of Iraq; 
however as part of Maliki’s coup-proofing practices of “shia’fication,” non-Shiites within the 
elite force and military were removed (Bausch 2018, 4).  Many top Sunni officers within the 
military were ousted and replaced with high ranking Shiites (Bausch 2018, 4).  While such coup-
proofing practices may insulate a regime from coup attempts, grievances and diminished military 
readiness can impact the survival of a political leader when parallel security forces are incapable 
of defeating an external enemy or insurgent threat.  
Intelligence, the Secret Police, and Political Police 
 Further literature examines the intelligence services and secret police as a counter-coup 
force. Hashimoto (2017), Lutterbeck (2015), and Zuckerman (1996) examine intelligence 
organizations and their extensions, the secret police, in non-communist authoritarian regimes and 
how they preserve those regimes.  Hashimoto (2017) discusses how Britain’s Military 
Intelligence arm, MI5, was crucial to the establishment of secret police organizations in 
authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes (Hashimoto 2017, 453). According to Hashimoto, the 
establishment of secret police organizations had mixed results in the prevention of coup attempts.  
In Iraq, anti-communist efforts were generally strong, while in Iran anti-communist efforts were 
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conditioned upon domestic politics and the survival of key leaders in order to implement anti-
communist measures (Hashimoto 2017, 455-456).  The secret police in Iran proved ineffective at 
preventing regime change as their methods were excessive which led to mass mobilization by 
large segments of the population to protest and overthrow the Shah (Hashimoto 2017, 459-461).  
Lutterbeck (2015) examines the internal security structures of the authoritarian regime of Ben 
Ali.  The internal security apparatus, which included the presidential guard, the Interior Ministry 
forces (National Guard), and the police under Ben Ali, were privileged over that of the military 
(Lutterbeck 2015, 815-818).   In addition, there included the “Directorate of State Security” 
which acted as a political police force that arrested and interned citizens that were viewed as 
threats to the regime (Lutterbeck 2015, 819). However as Lutterbeck concludes these forces were 
incapable of dealing with the protests that led to the Arab Spring or the support the military 
provided to protestors (Lutterbeck 2015, 827).   
In further examination of secret police organizations, Zuckerman (1996) examines the 
political police of Imperial Russia as a parallel security structure that preserved Tsarist rule.  The 
secret police of imperial Russia were police detectives as well as undercover agents called filery 
and sekretnye sotrudniki, respectively (Zuckerman 1996, 31).  The Tsar’s “first line of defense 
against its people had traditionally been its detective force. The centuries old practice of treating 
the slightest sign of dissent as political subversion [was ever present]” (Zuckerman 1996, 31).  
Zuckerman states those that spoke out or were viewed as dissenters were placed under secret 
surveillance (Zuckerman 1996, 31). Places of large public gatherings were regularly placed 
under surveillance by the secret police (Zuckerman 1996, 31). The secret police would maintain 
surveillance on suspects for a period of two years, if the suspect did not prove to be a threat the 
surveillance would end (Zuckerman 1996, 32). Zuckerman claims those recruited into the Tsarist 
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secret police came primarily from the non-commissioned officer corps of the Russian Imperial 
Army or in times of need, low-level civil servants (Zuckerman 1996, 32). The First World War 
impacted the effectiveness of Russia’s secret police; a good portion of the secret police became 
integrated within the Russian Imperial Army as counter-intelligence officers, and the remaining 
secret police were ineffective at combating the strikes and demonstrations occurring from 1916 
to 1917 which eventually led to the demise of the Tsarist government (Zuckerman 1996, 237).  
Part of the ineffectiveness of the Tsarist secret police were internal politics and a lack of 
realization with regard to the challenges posed on the ground from protestors. In addition, the 
more formal mechanism of control, the Tsarist Army, was war weary and deployed at the front, 
leaving little room to preserve the monarchy or its regime stakeholders (Zuckerman 1996 240-
246).   
Literature on authoritarian parallel security structures in communist regimes has 
predominantly focused on the secret police structures within those authoritarian forms of 
governance.  The secret police in these communist regimes have acted as a first line of defense 
against sedition and dissent and have had the responsibility of preserving regime stakeholders 
through surveillance, and capturing those that would instigate unrest against the communist 
regimes in power or potential coup attempts against the incumbent authoritarian regime.  
Checinski (1984), Adelman (1984), Graser (1984), Bacon (1984), Rice (1984), Vali (1984), and 
Bertelsen and Shkandrij (2014) analyze secret police organizations as a parallel security 
organization in their preservation of communist countries of Eastern Europe. 
Checinski (1984) claims the secret police in Communist Poland were an integral part of 
the political system, they would terrorize dissenters or any form of political opposition, correct 
behavior with regard to political views of the population, and “unify party cliques” (Checinski 
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1984, 18).   Checinski states the secret police in Communist Poland have often broken their own 
country’s laws in order to preserve the regime in power and prevent dissention (Checinski 1984, 
19).  The secret police operates under the framework of the communist authoritarian regime, 
which allows the police force to pressure, blackmail, and utilize corruption to its own advantage 
within the command economic structure of the communist system in Poland (Checinski 1984, 
19). The command economy also benefited the secret police in Communist Poland as corruption 
garnered revenue to expand their operations and provide wealth to stakeholders within the 
regime (Checinski 1984, 19).  Checinski highlights one limitation to the secret police, he states 
the secret police of any state does not hold the power to exercise complete physical control over 
the populace, this lies in the hands of key army units and “principle police” forces (Checinski 
1984, 19). As such, supplemental parallel forces or loyal security forces are needed to crush any 
large insurrection within a state. 
Adelman (1984) in further examination of communist states and their secret police forces 
discusses the use of the Soviet secret police and its evolution over time.  According to Adelman, 
the initial communist forces that would form the Soviet Union relied on a secret police force 
called the cheka which surveilled and arrested political dissidents during the civil war period 
following WWI and years after (Adelman 1984, 100).  This force then evolved into the NKVD 
which worked alongside the GRU (Military Intelligence) to support operations from both within 
and abroad (Adelman 1984, 101-102).  The NKVD under Stalin rose to prominence and 
outstripped the power of high ranking party secretaries within the Soviet regime (Adelman 1984, 
104). In addition, competition was stroked between the two competing rival intelligence agencies 
that provided a form of loyalty to the regime within the Soviet Union (Adelman 1984, 104).  
Adelman states during the Great Purge of the 1930s, thousands of Soviet citizens were arrested, 
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subsequently interrogated, eventually leading to several false confessions (Adelman 1984, 107).  
Many of these same individuals captured by the secret police were executed as a result of the 
false confessions they made under torture (Adelman 1984, 107).  The NKVD during the Soviet 
Union, according to Adelman, surveilled the military and the populace and utilized show trials to 
create an atmosphere of fear to prevent the emergence of opposition (Adelman 1984, 108).  
Labor camps came under the direct administration of the Soviet secret police, which provided a 
form of economic benefit to the regime to eliminate the threat of political dissidents and convert 
their human capital into an economic form of manual labor (Adelman 1984, 108).  A shift during 
the 1950s quickly transitioned the NKVD to the MVD from a power struggle eventually 
culminating into the KGB in 1954, dissolving the MVD (Adelman 1984, 122). Adelman states 
the post-Stalin period witnessed diminished power of the secret police that was once held 
primarily by the defunct NKVD (Adelman 1984, 125-126). However the KGB would expand its 
operations from not only domestic surveillance but increases overseas surveillance on foreign 
powers and perceived enemy states during the Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Andropov eras 
(Adelman 1984, 125-127).  
Graser (1984) in following with Adelman’s (1984) research examines the KGB further. 
Graser claims the KGB hierarchal structure as a parallel force is only beholden to a small section 
inside the Politburo and Central Committee (Graser 1984, 9). This means KGB officers of lower 
rank often ignore orders of higher ranking members within the military, police, and other 
security institutions as a result of their mission to scrutinize the activities of their counterparts in 
the regular security apparatus to uncover anti-communist or anti-regime sentiment (Graser 1984, 
9).  Graser states KGB officers are rewarded for their loyalty and stamping out counter-
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revolutionary activity; they receive lavish salaries and generous perks that only citizens of the 
Soviet Union could dream of (Graser 1984, 9).  For example, 
As a self-contained unit [the KGB has] its own schools, shops, holiday resorts, 
agricultural production centers and training camps, the KGB has virtually no contact with 
the people outside of its official function which include surveillance, interrogation, prison 
administration (although nominally under the Minister of the Interior, the Gulag - 
acronym for prison administration – is under KGB supervision), border control, passport 
and emigration, political and economic as well as censorship investigations, in addition to 
the guarding of the Kremlin and its bosses (Graser 1984, 9). 
According to Graser, the KGB held a massive security apparatus that not only contained officers 
within its organization for surveillance, but contained around 2,000 soldiers of the Kremlin 
Guard as well as five divisions of troops, totaling 75,000 troops, that could be called upon in the 
case of a coup attempt or massive unrest (Graser 1984, 9).   While the KGB engaged in 
significant foreign intelligence gathering operations, its most principle duty was counter-
intelligence back in the Soviet Union (Graser 1984, 13).  According to Graser, the KGB 
performed surveillance on the armed forces to uncover anti-party cells within the military and 
ensure its loyalty to the regime (Graser 1984, 13).   
Bacon (1984) highlights the creation and use of communist authorities in Romania with 
regard to their secret police. Bacon claims that the post-World War II communist regime tasked 
their secret police primarily to root out anti-communist elements within the regime and former 
pro-Nazi government forces still residing within the country (Bacon 1984, 141).  To ensure their 
regime’s security, significant ethnic minority groups such as Germans and Greeks were over-
represented in the security services to include the secret police in Romania (Bacon 1984, 142).  
In addition, the former base of the fascist regime in Romania such as the clergy, journalists, 
democratic politicians, landowners, and industrialists were imprisoned or executed by the secret 
police in show trials during the 1940s (Bacon 1984, 143).  Romanian hardliners during the 1950s 
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gave greater power to the Romanian secret police to utilize arbitrary arrests to prevent succession 
as in the case of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania and political dissidents within the 
populace (Bacon 1984, 145).   
Rice (1984) alternatively examines the role of the Czechoslovakian secret police in 
preserving the communist order in Czechoslovakia.  The Czechoslovak secret police emerged 
out of deliberations of the communist takeover of the previous coalition government post-World 
War II (Rice 1984, 158).  Rice states the small size of the communist party militia and the lack of 
interest among the regular police who resumed their duties after the war led to the creation of the 
Secret Security Forces and the Committee of Defense Security Information within the country 
(Rice 1984, 158-159). During the coalition period, a significant increase in the state security 
police was undertaken compared to the civic police force within the country (Rice 1984, 159).  
“Through these tactics and control…the Communist Party was able to seek out and harass class 
enemies during the period of coalition rule” (Rice 1984, 159). Rice claims during the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, non-ethnic Czechs became targets for oppression of the Czech secret police, 
these included Slovaks and those who were of Jewish descent (Rice 1984, 164). The 
Czechoslovak secret police in subsequent years targeted political dissidents and those deemed as 
political saboteurs to the existing communist regime (Rice 1984, 170). Pucci (2018) in 
continuation of Rice’s (1984) research states the secret police in Communist Czechoslovakia 
modeled their secret police after the Habsburg Imperial Intelligence and translated various 
training materials from German to Czech, including the “Austrian intelligence manual Kriege 
und Instrustrieespionage” (Pucci 2018, 7). Pucci finds their role as a parallel security structure, 
was to ensure the protection of the regime from potential coup attempts and uprisings within 
their respective countries (Pucci 2018, 8). 
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Vali (1984) discusses the utility of the Hungarian secret police of Communist Hungary.  
The Hungarian secret police worked under the control of the Party Politburo in Hungary (Vali 
1984, 177). Vali states the Hungarian secret police utilized mass arrests, deportations, forced 
labor, and executions to diminish the threat of political opponents and dissidents from affecting 
the stakeholders within the Hungarian communist regime (Vali 1984, 180). “In 1945 and 1946 
the terroristic methods of the Hungarian security police were employed mostly to eliminate real 
or alleged pro-Nazi elements and war criminals. In 1947-1948 the terrorism was employed to 
support the Communist Party’s struggle for power” (Vali 1984, 180).  Churches, intellectuals, 
political parties, and anyone deemed a threat to the communist regime was targeted by the 
Hungarian secret police (Vali 1984, 180). The arbitrary arrests of priests during the late 1940s 
solidified the power of the communist regime and established the secret police as a force to 
stamp out alternative views in contrast to those espoused by the incumbent regime (Vali 1984, 
182). Vali states that during the Hungarian Revolution of the 1950s, the weakness of the regular 
police and defections within the military left little for the secret police in Hungary to preserve the 
communist regime (Vali 1984, 188).  It was the intervention of the Soviet Union that preserved 
the power of the communist elites in Hungary, eliminating the counter-revolutionaries (Vali 
1984, 188-189). 
Bertelsen and Shkandrij (2014), similar to Adelman (1984), examine Soviet secret police 
activity during the 1920s and 1930s, but primarily focus on the dimension of Ukrainian 
nationalism in Western Ukraine. Bertelsen and Shkrandrij claim from 1925 to 1931, the Soviet 
Secret Police had a list of influential opposition Ukrainian activists on the Soviet side of the 
border as well as in Poland to be arrested if they were apprehended or attempted to cross the 
border from Poland (Bertelsen and Shkandrij 2014, 39). As Bertelsen and Shkrandrij state, “by 
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1935 almost the entire Galician Ukrainian intelligentsia had been arrested. Maistrenko, who 
survived the terror of the 1930s, noted that in the mid-1930s if there were any Galician 
Ukrainians left in Kharkiv they were collaborating with the secret police or had some connection 
to the GPU” (Bertelsen and Shkandrij 2014, 39).  Some Ukrainians had been recruited by the 
Soviet Secret Police to spy on their fellow Ukrainian co-ethnics in an attempt to subvert 
nationalist ambitions within the Soviet Union (Bertelsen and Shkandrij 2014, 39).In addition, 
“Moscow perceived Western Ukrainians as an ethnic group with a strong sense of national 
identity and internal unity” (Bertelsen and Shkandrij 2014, 39).  While some Ukrainians that 
emigrated from Poland were categorized by the Soviet secret police as communists and as Soviet 
sympathizers, they were none the less viewed with suspicion due to their ethnicity and 
educational background (Bertelsen and Shkandrij 2014, 41). The Soviet Secret Police utilized 
arbitrary arrests, surveillance, trumped up charges, and the destruction of cultural centers in order 
to repress Ukrainian nationalist organizations in the Soviet Union (Bertelsen and Shkandrij 2014, 
47). 
Ring (2016) and Peterson (2001) advance the literature on communist secret police 
entities by examining Stasi practices of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). Ring 
demonstrates the Stasi as not only a secret police organ of detection but one that created an 
informant network for the purpose of what their leader Erich Mielke claimed was the protection 
of socialist achievement in the GDR (Ring 2016, 117-118). Peterson (2001) states the harsh 
measures taken by the Stasi against its populace was for the prevention of dissention (Peterson 
2001, 257). “The perception was that the Stasi had spies everywhere watching, listening and 
keeping track of ideological misdeeds” (Peterson 2001, 257).  However towards the end of the 
GDR, the Stasi witnessed the economic issues and failures of communism first had, beginning 
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with the collectivization of farming and second with the mismanagement of state-industries, 
which resulted in inevitable dissent that was produced from those failures (Peterson 2001, 266).  
Maercker and Guski-Leinwand (2018) examine the tools and interrogation techniques used by 
the Stasi.  Maercker and Guski-Leinwand assert the Stasi was over-bearing in its large scale 
repression of citizens of the former German Democratic Republic (Maercker and Guski-
Leinwand 2018, 108).   According to Maercker and Guski-Leinwand, the Stasi in 1989 had 
around 91,000 employed personnel and around 110,000 informers (Maercker and Guski-
Leinwand 2018, 108).  One of their tools of repression, the Stasi utilized was a form of 
psychology known as Zersetzung techniques, which roughly translates to decomposition of 
personality (Maercker and Guski-Leinwand 2018, 112).  This form of psychological technique 
was adopted in 1976 and replaced the more invasive procedures of physical torture of those 
detained by the secret police (Maercker and Guski-Leinwand 2018, 112, 115).  According to 
Maercker and Guski-Leiwand, these “operative procedures” from the Zersetzung techniques 
were designed to “shake self-confidence, undermine self-esteem, and generate fear, confusion, 
and mistrust” (Maercker and Guski-Leinwand 2018, 113).  This form of no-touch torture, often 
called “white torture” was used to extract information of dissent or convert detained individuals 
to become informants (Maercker and Guski-Leinwand 2018, 113). Maercker and Guski-
Leinwand state “The communist doctrine of the East German government thus implied that harsh 
and drastic measures are allowed and should be taken against dissidents and its so-called 
‘political enemies’” in order to protect the regime from uprisings and dissent amongst the 
population (Maercker and Guski-Leinwand 2018, 114).  
 Intelligence organizations and secret police formations generally go hand in hand as 
secret police entities are often extensions of intelligence organizations or perform intelligence 
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gathering activities on behalf of an authoritarian regime.  These more formal intelligence 
organizations focus primarily on intelligence collection and infiltration as a primary mission 
rather than armed force of counter-intelligence which involves detention and arrests.  The 
literature on this subject is more limited compared to the literature on the secret police, as the 
nature of the work with intelligence collection and detection is fundamentally different.  
However some literature does exist on intelligence agencies and their operations and how they 
are perceived by opposition elements within authoritarian countries.  
Huckabey and Stout’s (2010) represent one example; they examine Salafist views with 
regard to authoritarian intelligence organizations of the Middle East.  Huckabey and Stout claim 
the reason intelligence organizations of the Middle East are successful at countering Salafist 
groups is due to how they utilize their human intelligence and their ability to embed agents 
within transnational groups to eventually eliminate them (Huckabey and Stout 2010, 335).  In 
addition, many authoritarian regimes of the Middle East utilize torture as a tool to extract 
information from adherents of Salafist groups in order to detect high-ranking members within a 
fundamentalist group (Huckabey and Stout 2010, 337). Huckabey and Stout state “The 
intelligence services universally practice intrusive methods and cast wide nets: ‘they research all 
people and listen in on any person speaking against the regime, and who may be your friend or 
neighbor and such’” (Huckabey and Stout 2010, 337).   
Intelligence services such as the Algerian intelligence service has also penetrated various 
Salafist groups within its country and have carried out attacks on behalf of the group in order to 
ferment hostility towards those groups by the population in the hopes those Salafist groups will 
eventually be alienated, leading to their demise (Huckabey and Stout 2010, 338).  During the 
1950s and 1960s, Egyptian intelligence infiltrated the Muslim Brotherhood and began a series of 
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arrests to diminish the Salafist’s group ability to attack the regime (Huckabey and Stout 2010, 
339).  In subsequent years, Egyptian intelligence was forced to react in the wake of terror 
attacks, which led to crackdowns on hideouts for Salafists (Huckabey and Stout 2010, 339).  In 
Saudi Arabia, Al Qaeda’s bombing campaign from 2003 to 2004 led to a large-scale crack down 
from Saudi Arabia’s intelligence service, which subsequently destroyed Al Qaeda’s network in 
Saudi Arabia and left its adherents in prison cells under constant torture culminating in the 
group’s decline (Huckabey and Stout 2010, 348).  
Authoritarianism – Regime Types and Security 
 Other literature has focused on authoritarianism or more recently on the Arab Spring to 
determine the resilience of authoritarianism.  It’s from this literature that parallel military 
organizations are briefly mentioned but never tested to determine their success or failure in 
preserving a regime in power. Scholarship on authoritarianism in the Middle East include 
Haddad et al (2012), Alley (2013), and Lacher (2011) who examine challenges brought forth by 
the Arab Spring. According to Haddad et al (2012), Middle Eastern countries facing uprisings 
have utilized the threat of Islamic fundamentalism as a tool to maintain authoritarian power after 
the collapse of the bipolar era.  However, the surge in unemployment and lack of political 
participation amongst varying groups led to an emergence of endogenous contestation of power 
against the traditional ruling elites.  Alley (2013) determines improper balancing of political 
forces within the country of Yemen brought about protests in the country during the Arab Spring.  
Additionally, declining economic resources under state control limited patronage distribution, 
which could have potentially aided in bringing stability to the country of Yemen during the Arab 
Spring of 2011. Lacher (2011), in his analysis of tribal actors, similar to the findings of Alley 
(2013), exposes the limited patronage and tribal marginalization of eastern tribes within Libya by 
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the Qaddafi regime as the primary contributing factor to civil war in the country.  Economic 
crises as an exogenesis shock have been determined from analyses of authoritarian governments 
to affect regime stability.  For example, research by Teorell (2010) indicates that when state 
resources become diminished and the provision of public goods and material rewards are 
reduced, protests and the advocating for regime change takes hold (Przeworski and Limongi 
1997, Teorell 2010, and Miller 2012).   
 Prior to the Arab Spring various forms of authoritarianism across the Middle East and 
North Africa were used to sustain authoritarian rule and prevent the emergence of an opposition. 
The predominant three authoritarian regime types utilized in the Middle East and North Africa 
countries have been military regimes, monarchies, and sultanistic authoritarian regimes.  Often 
times Middle Eastern and North African authoritarian regimes have overlapping authoritarian 
regime types depending on the authoritarian leader that is in power. Examining the first type of 
authoritarian regime is the military regime.  Picard (1988) examines authoritarian Arab 
Republics and their military rule foundations of Republican regimes in the Middle East. Picard 
claims the countries of Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Algeria gained traction with regard to legitimacy 
from the social-economic reforms created in the agrarian sector that fostered a form of populist 
legitimacy to authoritarianism (Picard 1988, 130).  The military regimes or quasi-military 
regimes further reinforced authoritarianism by a process of conscription which through military 
service citizens of those countries would garner “patriotic values to the nation as a whole” 
(Picard 1988, 130).  Picard states in Iraq and Syria, the badal system was abolished which had 
previously allowed potential conscripts to escape becoming drafted if they paid a fee to the 
government (Picard 1988, 131).  This, according to Picard, led to all cross-sections of society to 
develop an identity and become loyal to the regime (Picard 1988, 131).  Through these attempts 
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of nationalistic solidarity came pan-Arabism ideology which fostered the emergence of 
republican regimes in Egypt and Algeria and Baathist authoritarian regimes in the countries of 
Iraq and Syria to garner a loyal following (Picard 1988, 131).  
For countries such as Iraq, “the Iraqi armed forces became involved in civilian tasks and 
responsibilities, [however] they still acted primarily as the defender of the land and state 
legitimacy” (Picard 1988, 133).  Pan-Arab ideology and nationalism followed through on this 
particular dynamic in the country of Iraq as conflict with Iran witnessed very few desertions and 
insubordination from the command level to conscripts even as Iraq was divided among sectarian 
and ethnic differences amongst its citizen population (Picard 1988, 133).  Picard claims, in this 
case, the colonial borders in Iraq and Syria had little impact on affecting the success of the 
authoritarianism when faced with an external threat; however such communal strife is present 
during periods of peace in the domestic realm of both countries (Picard 1988, 134). The 
militaries in Egypt and Algeria were less reliant on ideology and focused more on the integrity of 
the state as integral part of the security regimen to prevent the opening of space of an opposition 
to their military dictatorships (Picard 1988, 135). 
 Another form of authoritarianism is sultanistic regimes which is a form of an 
authoritarian regime type outside of characteristics of an authoritarian regime existing in the 
Communist World during the Cold War (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 4-5).  Sultanistic regimes, 
according to Chehabi and Linz (1998) and Goldstone (2011) are characterized by patronage, 
nepotism, cronyism, and corruption (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 5; Goldstone 2011, 1).  Sultanistic 
regimes have many appearances, they can appear as “quasi-military or military forms of 
government, one-party or competitive-party systems or even under the socialist [form]” (Chehabi 
and Linz 1998, 5). In addition, the ruler exercises power without restraint and utilizes the tool of 
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fear and rewards to coopt his followers (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 7).  Bureaucratic institutions are 
consistently subverted to the “arbitrary personal decisions of the ruler” (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 
7).  Friends, family, business associates, and other stakeholders of the regime consistently use 
violence to sustain the regime from collapse or from potential internal threats (Chehabi and Linz 
1998, 7).  Chehabi and Linz claim some authoritarian regimes that fit this ideal type include: 
Trujillo’s Dominican Republic, Duvalier’s rule in Haiti, Batista’s dictatorship in Cuba, the 
Somoza family in Nicaragua, and Phalavi Shah’s reign in Iran (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 8). In 
these regimes, technocrats are brought in to run government agencies and organizations (Chehabi 
and Linz 1998, 11).   Parallel military forces and “mutual espionage: of the security apparatus 
ensure the prevention of coup attempts against the ruler (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 12).   
Sultanistic regimes often lack a clear ideology and utilize a constitution as a smoke 
screen for legitimacy (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 17). Patrimonialism and rent seeking are 
prevalent in sultanistic regimes as the domestic economy is geared towards the extraction of 
resources (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 22). “The constant patrimonial interference in economic life 
leads to distorted market economies that, though embedded in the sphere of capitalism, cannot 
truly be called capitalistic” (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 22).  Chehabi and Linz argue that such 
economies should be called mafia economies (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 23). In this case, 
“Individual entrepreneurs’ opportunities in the market are distorted by the ruler’s intervention in 
economic life: he has the power to deny access, he can allocate public funds for private 
enterprises linked with himself or with his cronies, and he can eliminate from the market 
competitors not ready to abide by his demands” (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 22-23).  Sultanistic 
regimes differs from other authoritarian types such as totalitarianism, according to Chehabi and 
Linz, because the regime lacks a binding ideology that keeps citizens ideologically tied to the 
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regime in power (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 23). Totalitarian rulers such as Castro, Stalin, and 
Hitler, who as rulers believed in their ideological mission, had followers that were ideologically 
inclined to carry out the parameters of the goals set forth by the ruling party’s ideology. In 
addition, totalitarian regimes penetrate society and their countries more thoroughly than 
sultanistic regimes (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 24).  While sultanistic regimes are a sub-type of 
authoritarianism, most authoritarian regimes differ from sultanistic regimes in that they are more 
institutionalized and they contain “social pluralism [which] creates a variety of structures that 
support the regime” (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 25). 
Chahabi and Linz state foreign aid is required by sultanistic regimes in order to satisfy 
stakeholders, essentially coopting them and preventing them from mobilizing an attempted 
overthrow (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 27).  Chehabi and Linz claim sultanistic regimes rely on 
loyal military units or parallel military formations to ensure their hold on power as these units are 
only loyal to the ruler which raises the costs of defection.  Some examples of parallel military 
formations and elites units include:  Nicaragua’s and the Dominican Republic’s National Guards, 
Hatiti’s Garde d’Haiti, and Panamanian Defense Forces under Noriega (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 
32).  According to Chehabi and Linz, regimes can start out authoritarian, however once decisions 
from agencies and government organizations lose influence and decisions are centralized around 
the ruler these regimes become sultanistic (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 34-35).  Iraq’s Baathist 
regime as an example was authoritarian, however by the 1990s many top positions within the 
regime were occupied by members of Saddam Hussein’s own family.  These family members 
were involved in corruption and “a personality cult had developed around Hussein [which] grew 
after his defeat in the Gulf War, and a cult of ancient Babylonia appeared alongside the Baath’s 
Arab nationalism” (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 35).  Chehabi and Linz claim corruption within all 
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sectors of the economy and society leads to an ineffective fighting force as the elites within the 
military take part in corruption.  As a result the military with the exception of elite units or 
parallel military forces are the only forces willing to defend the ruler in a coup attempt or if an 
opposition emerges (Chehabi and Linz 1998, 43-44). 
Goldstone (2011) in addition to Chehabi and Linz (1998) further the conceptualization of 
the authoritarian sub-type of sultanistic regimes. Goldstone highlights how the military in 
sultanistic regimes tends to be divided and pitted against one another such as the Army against 
the Air Force or the Army against the Intelligence branch within the security apparatus in order 
to garner the military and security personnel’s loyalty, which prevents the coalescence of a 
united security apparatus in engaging in a coup attempt (Goldstone 2011, 2).  Authoritarian 
leaders also attempt to keep their populations passive and disconnected by controlling elections, 
political parties, and through the provision of subsidies (Goldstone 2011, 2).  Goldstone states 
sultanistic dictatorships have no ideology and “have no purpose other than maintaining their 
personal authority” (Goldstone 2011, 1).  Goldstone claims they will at times have democratic 
elections, political parties, a national assembly, and/or a constitution to attain some form of 
legitimacy from the masses, but power resides centrally with the leader (Goldstone 2011, 2).  
These dictatorships rely on patronage and as such promote industrialization, commodity exports, 
and other sectors that garner rewards (Goldstone 2011, 2).  At the international level, these 
dictatorships form relationships with other states in order to obtain foreign aid which is then 
funneled back to their patron-client networks ensuring their hold on power and their survival 
(Goldstone 2011, 2).  
Hertog (2011) in contrast to previous research on military dictatorships and sultanistic 
regimes examines monarchal authoritarian regimes of the Gulf.   Monarchal regimes in the 
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Middle East are founded on a ruling family that builds a security network around the regime to 
artificially create a state. As such, monarchies garner legitimacy from continuity of rule and 
represent a symbol of their country’s sovereignty (Lipset 1959, 90). Hertog claims as in other 
forms of authoritarianism that the security services compete for resources from the authoritarian 
leader that is in power and these security organizations rely on the lobbying of stakeholders to 
obtain such rewards (Hertog 2011, 400).  Hertog further states the rivalry among stakeholders 
leads to fragmented command structures leading to parallel security forces (Hertog 2011, 400).  
In the case of Saudi Arabia, the rivalry between King Saud and Crown Prince Faysal led to the 
emergence of a parallel security force called the National Guard within the kingdom (Hertog 
2011, 400). Hertog also claims as in other authoritarian regime types military and security 
positions are often utilized as a form of patronage to reward regime supporters and ensure a loyal 
security force that will be the bulwark against any unrest (Hertog 2011, 401).  
Pilster and Bohmelt (2012) in their examination of authoritarian regimes state various 
authoritarian regime types utilize coup-proofing mechanisms to keep control of their security 
organizations. In China, for example, the utilization of political commissioners down to the 
platoon level with equal rank of the commander ensures loyalty and discipline of the military to 
the ruling party in China (Pilster and Bohmelt 2012, 357). In Niger, President Hamani Diori 
attempted to create a parallel military force which recruited exclusively from Tuaregs that would 
ensure his regime would not be overthrown from a coup emanating within the military (Pilster 
and Bohmelt 2012, 357). Essentially, “coup-proofing divides a country’s military manpower into 
rivaling organizations, inducing an artificial balance between these institutions. This 
‘counterbalancing’ technique not only seeks to create rivalries between existing military units, 
but also establishes paramilitary organizations with command structures outside the regular 
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army” (Pilster and Bohmelt 2012, 357).  Pilster and Bohmelt determine, however, such balancing 
and coup-proofing in the the creation of rival security forces and organizations leads to a less 
capable military force when the need arises for the military to face an external threat (Pilster and 
Bohmelt 2012, 358). According to Pilster and Bohmelt, this stems from poor training and limited 
resources allocated to regular military units and security forces (Pilster and Bohmelt 2012, 358). 
In a different vein of research, Bellin (2004), in contrast to Pilster and Bohmelt (2012), 
examines Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes and the selective incentives of cooptation that 
sustain authoritarianism.  Bellin states patrimonialism disincentivizes reforms as rewards from 
patronage constitutes a financial funnel that would be cut off with institutionalization (Bellin 
2004, 145).  Bellin asserts while weak state capacity exists in sub-Saharan Africa, authoritarian 
regimes of the Middle East have sufficient financial flows to sustain their coercive apparatus and 
for the most part lack any apparent sign of economic collapse (Bellin 2004, 147). Members 
within the regime are able to sustain patronage to their stakeholders and obtain wealth through 
rents.  These rents are obtained from “different endowments [such as] petroleum resources, gas 
resources, geostrategic utility, and control of critical transit facilities” (Bellin 2004, 148).  Saudi 
Arabia for example earns roughly $30 billion a year from its petroleum sector, while Egypt 
garners $2 billion from foreign aid from the United States (Bellin 2004, 148).  “It gives them 
access to substantial discretionary resources so that, even if the country is overall in poor 
economic health, the state is still able to hew to conventional economic wisdom and pay itself 
first, that is, give first priority to paying the military and security forces” (Bellin 2004, 148).  
Bellin claims within authoritarian regimes family members and trusted individuals and groups 
are put into positions of power.  Additionally, ethnic and sectarian identities are utilized as 
heuristics when deciding whom to promote into certain powerful positions within an 
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authoritarian regime (Bellin 2004, 149).  “Political reliability supersedes merit in promotions. In 
Jordan, [for example] Palestinians cannot rise above the rank of lieutenant colonel in combat 
units” (Bellin 2004, 149).  Bellin states coup-proofing practices insulate authoritarian regimes 
from members of outside groups that could threaten the elite stakeholder’s grip on the levers of 
power in an authoritarian regime. 
Further research on authoritarianism examines a division within regime stakeholders 
when the onset of protest occurs. According to Przeworski (1991), authoritarian regimes 
generally hold hardliners and reformers and within the opposition there are generally moderates 
and radicals.  Depending on the middle ground of interests, moderates and reformers can align 
with each other or align with their respective extremist factions.   Additionally, authoritarian 
leaders interested in the survival of their regime create mechanisms of control that reduce the 
potential for the onset of protests or the formation of a strong opposition.  Makara (2013) 
discusses coup-proofing strategies in the creation of loyal security organizations that become 
stakeholders in regime survival. Nassif (2015) displays coup-proofing strategies in the creation 
of loyal security organizations, which are important for regime survival of authoritarian 
governments, as they become stakeholders in the survival of that regime. Waller (2004) claims 
that parallel military structures that exist alongside the Sandinista People’s Army in Nicaragua, 
which were composed of a national police, special forces, and a militia, supplemented the armed 
forces and existed to preserve the regime in power (Waller 2004, 428).  In addition, other 
security structures developed in Nicaragua which modeled its organization off of the East 
German, Stasi or East German Ministry for State Security provided another layer of protection 
for preserving the Sandinista regime that was in power (Waller 2004, 429).   
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Despite existing literature on coup-proofing, security institutions, and parallel security 
structures, the scope of the literature has been limited to examining the existence of parallel 
security organizations and their role within an authoritarian regime. The literature on parallel 
security structures stops short of examining the utility of such institutions.  Limitations to this 
literature provide a window of opportunity to examine the effectiveness of the parallel security 
apparatus and its ability to carry out and sustain tasks that ensure the survival of an authoritarian 
regime.  While the broader literature has been useful in terms of identifying the purpose and the 
types of security institutions that comprise the parallel security structure, it’s still limited with 



















Chapter Three  




The analytical lens that will be utilized to examine the parallel security apparatus and its 
effectiveness is historical institutionalism and to a smaller degree organizational theory. 
Historical institutionalism as a theoretical frame highlights the development of institutions from 
their foundation.  For example, the reason for certain institutional norms or classes present in a 
particular society such as Latin American societies can be attributed to colonial institutions from 
Spanish colonialism.  It’s from this evolution of historical arrangements that certain frameworks 
remain while others change to fit within the contemporary framework (Thelen and Steinmo 
1992, 15).  However, the assumption surrounding institutions is that they tend to remain constant 
or continuous “even while the world changes around them” (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 18).  
According to Thelen and Steinmo (1992), “historical institutionalists tend to see political actors 
not so much as all-knowing, rational maximizers, but more as rule-following satisfiers” (Thelen 
and Steinmo 1992, 8).  In addition, a “historical institutionalist would emphasize how class 
interests are more a function of class position (mediated – reinforced or mitigated – by state and 
social institutions like political parties and union structure) than individual choice” (Thelen and 
Steinmo 1992, 8). Historical institutionalism as a theoretical frame is salient in that one can 
examine political actors as both objects and agents in history (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 10). 
Institutions are salient because they constrain and affect politics and political outcomes (Thelen 
and Steinmo 1992, 13). Although institutions may hold just a conditional effect, in which 
“institutions [may] structure political interactions and in this way affect political outcomes” 
(Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 13). 
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Historical institutionalism is a theoretical frame that highlights the historical nature of 
political developments by emphasizing that events unfold over time and in a given sequence that 
give them significance (Pierson 1998, 29).   The institutionalist aspect of historical 
institutionalism highlights the role of institutions in this process, in which developments of the 
“temporal process are embedded in institutions” (Pierson 1998, 29). Institutional policy changes 
tend to be slow in the temporal process; however sudden changes can occur called “punctuated 
equilibrium” or “critical junctures” that lead to a sudden transformative change within an 
institution (Bulmer 2009, 309).  Historical institutionalism follows path dependence, following 
the trajectory of events that hold impact and influence on institutional change (Bulmer 2009, 
309). “Path dependence is not just expressing the point that history matters; it highlights how 
political processes entail trajectories that are difficult to reverse because they are underpinned by 
mechanisms of positive feedback and increasing returns, as reflected in sunk costs and vested 
interests” (Bulmer 2009, 309-310).  
One of the limitations of historical institutionalism is the problem of predicting events 
along a pattern lines rather than identifying such events before they have occurred (Bulmer 2009, 
309). However there are many salient features as it pertains to the theoretical frame of historical 
institutionalism as the theory examines organizations from their construction, how they are 
maintained over time, and various adaptations they introduce as a result of pressures from both 
within and externally (Sanders 2008, 42; Capoccia 2016, 1096).  
Historical institutionalists claim that ideas are the mobilizing forces for collective action 
leading to institutional changes (Sanders 2008, 42). In this case, “for institutional actors 
themselves, ideas serve as the glue that holds an administration, party, or agency together in its 
tasks, help to garner public support, and provide a standard to evaluate the institution's policy 
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outcomes” (Sanders 2008, 42).   While historical institutionalism as a theoretical frame holds 
limitations from its “empirical description and inductive reasoning,” compared to other theories, 
its longer causal chain in explaining outcomes holds utility for scholars in the field (Sanders 
2008, 43). 
 The theory of historical institutionalism frames its tenets on the interaction of individuals 
within an institutional setting by examining events leading up to critical junctures rather than 
simply extracting snapshots of one event in a particular setting out of a sequence of events 
(Sanders 2008, 40).   Historical institutionalists have long stated the importance of path 
dependence, stating path dependence as a “confluence of events or social pressures” that 
produces a new direction (Sanders 2008, 40).  Historical institutionalism as a theory gained 
traction during the 1970s when political scientists began to question the foundations for how 
human behavior leading to questions of relevance and purpose as it pertained to democratic 
institutions (Sanders 2008, 40-41).  Utilizing path dependence, scholars framed these questions 
around institutions and discovered that “humanly devised constraints shape human interaction” 
(North 1990).   This culminated in the theory of historical institutionalism as we know it today.     
Historical institutionalism also examines individual and collective behavior as it pertains 
to political institutions and formal and informal rules that impact institutions (Boakye and 
Beland 2018, 4). Historical institutionalism views a polity or the ruling portion of an institution 
as “historically constructed” and embedded within an institutional framework that proffers an 
identity (Boakye and Beland 2018, 4). In addition, points of critical juncture can disrupt this 
established status quo leading to a shift in organizational policy (Boakye and Beland 2018, 4).  
Historical institutionalism holds that “institutions are designed to benefit political ‘winners,’ 
creating policy feedback that entrenches certain actors in positions of power – making change 
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difficult” (Cartwright 2018, 383).   Cartwright (2018) claims that positive feedback or steps 
along the trajectory for institutions create potential consequences for different external outcomes 
to the policies espoused by institutions (Cartwright 2018, 384).  Rules, norms, and decisions 
made by institutions either empower political actors or constrain them as well as other categories 
of non-state actors (Cartwright 2018, 385). In addition, “decisions on the design and function of 
institutions can lock-in power asymmetries between political actors, creating circumstances that 
favor some over others. Consequently, these favored political actors will be better able to defend 
institutional arrangements from rivals in the future” (Cartwright 2018, 385).   These positive 
feedbacks that have potential consequences are often referenced in the literature as path 
dependence or the trajectory that leads to institutions to implement various policies from a 
historical base (Cartwright 2018, 385).  
Other dimensions of historical institutionalism include conceptual ideas within a society 
such as culture that become institutionalized within an institution leading to changes within an 
organization (Capoccia 2016, 1097).  Institutions tend to be viewed as stable and it’s from this 
stability that institutions are “attributed to their influence on the resources and incentives of 
actors and to the development of institution-specific assets such as skills, privileges, knowledge 
of procedures, and networks with other actors” (Capoccia 2016, 1098). Historical institutionalists 
argue that institutions are filled with power struggles, leading to contestations of power regarding 
direction and policy outcomes which impact existing institutional arrangements within the 
institutions themselves (Capoccia 2016, 1099).   
Therefore, rather than as equilibria, institutions are best conceived as arenas of conflict, 
as ‘regimes’ in which both ‘rule-makers,’ defined as the actors that set and modify, ‘often 
in conflict and competition,’ the formal rules that constitute an institution, and 
‘ruletakers,’ the actors that are expected to comply with such rules, struggle to adapt the 
institution to their needs and agendas (Capoccia 2016, 1099).  
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Shifts stemming from social movements can lead to changes in institutional arrangements that 
impact the structure of an institution (Capoccia 2016, 1110).  Historical institutionalists also 
highlight the use of agenda-setting, political losers in a previous coalition may utilize agenda 
setting in order to “put reform on the agenda” that would lead to change within the institution 
(Capoccia 2016, 1111).   In addition, losers in an institutional setting attempt to reverse changes 
and outcomes that they do not favor and attempt to reinstitute previous policies that had been in 
place prior (Capoccia 2016, 1116). 
Different approaches to historical institutionalism have attempted to examine where the 
prime movers are within institutions; some scholars attribute agency to high level bureaucrats, 
leaders, and the aristocracy, while other scholars have viewed the bottom such as the populace or 
social movements towards change with regard to the establishment of institutions and changes 
they incur (Sanders 2008, 44). Other scholars claim its neither the top or the bottom but a 
combination of “ideas, interests, and behavior of actors in both state and society” that lead to 
change (Sanders 2008, 44).   In one example, historical institutionalists highlight the creation of 
United States Army, which stemmed from the president, generals, and intellectuals as the prime 
movers to create a professionalized force that could protect the United States both internally and 
externally, as compared to the previous utilization of militia forces to do those same tasks 
(Sanders 2008, 45).   Social mobilization as a result is key and can lead to the expansion or 
retraction of established institutions (Sanders 2008, 50). Social movements may lobby 
representatives in order to expand or retract either utilizing non-partisan or partisan strategies to 
obtain their goals (Sanders 2008, 50). “Once a new policy and its implementing institutions are 
in place, group demands and coalitional dynamics are themselves shaped by the making and 
interpretation of rules by public officials” (Sanders 2008, 50).  
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According to Kickert and Van Der Meer (2011), historical institutionalism possesses five 
different forms of transformative changes with regard to institutions (Kickert and Van Der Meer 
2011, 478).  These include: displacement, layering, drift, conversion, and exhaustion (Kickert 
and Van Der Meer 2011, 478). Displacement, according to Kickert and Van Der Meer, is the 
reactivation of a prior institutional form that had been previously discarded as a result of its 
perceived non-utility by policy-makers within the institution (Kickert and Van Der Meer 2011, 
478).  Layering is the creation of new institutions without removing the old institution, in which 
these institutions either supplement one another or compete against each other (Kickert and Van 
Der Meer 2011, 478; Hanrieder 2014, 327). Drift is essentially the atrophy of an institution as a 
result of lack of maintenance or resources to support an institution (Kickert and Van Der Meer 
2011, 478; Hanrieder 2014, 327). Conversion is the redirection of an institution, where new goals 
are adopted and objectives are set forth (Kickert and Van Der Meer 2011, 478).  Exhaustion is 
the collapse of an institution, the institution eventually breaks down as a result of lack of support 
or individuals to staff it (Kickert and Van Der Meer 2011, 478).  Historical institutionalists can 
identify gradual patterns that do not entirely lead to all out revision of an institution or its 
structure (Hanrieder 2014, 327).   
Historical institutionalism dictates that history matters and that institutions follow a 
historical path as it pertains to changes within those same institutions (Kickert and Van Der Meer 
2011, 476). Changes that occur within institutions are shaped by previous events and events 
taking shape in the contemporary landscape of society and the world (Kickert and Van Der Meer 
2011, 476). “Historical institutionalists analyze temporal processes, sequences of events that led 
to certain important big changes” (Kickert and Van Der Meer 2011, 476).   Historical 
institutionalism cites that path dependency is important because it involves a series of historical 
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events affecting a future sequence of events leading to an outcome (Kickert and Van Der Meer 
2011, 476).   Historical institutionalists claim change does not occur easily within institutions 
and historical traditions tend to have a “conserving influence” on policies and outcomes within 
government structures (Kickert and Van Der Meer 2011, 477).  In addition, institutions tend to 
have a degree of stability so if changes do occur they normally occur incrementally (Kickert and 
Van Der Meer 2011, 477). There are however periods of critical junctures or external shocks that 
lead to immediate changes along the trajectory of an institution (Kickert and Van Der Meer 
2011, 477). These sudden changes can occur from previously uninvolved actors and government 
intervention that leads to change within an institution (Spohr 2016, 259). “Historical 
institutionalism teaches us that changing is difficult, substantial changes hardly ever take place, 
usually only marginal, incremental, slow, small changes around the ‘status quo’” (Kickert and 
Van Der Meer 2011, 478).    
Historical institutionalism is not a theory of politics, “nor a general theory of institutional 
development” (Fioretos 2011, 370); historical institutionalism is a theoretical frame, which aids 
in the understanding of institutions over time.  In this case, the “sequencing of events” and 
timing help to shape the political processes, which occur in institutions (Fioretos 2011, 371). 
Historical institutionalism as a theoretical frame is salient from its observations of evolving 
patterns within institutions in terms of constraints and opportunities shaped by human interaction 
over time (Fioretos 2011, 371).   The temporal dimension of historical institutionalism is key—
events are conditioned by other events over a period of time, which can redefine actor interests 
and actor objectives within an institution (Fioretos 2011, 371).  In this case,  
Historical institutionalism considers attention to temporality crucial for analytical 
reasons, since later events are conditioned by earlier ones (not simply the constellation of 
interests and constraints at the moment), but also in substantive terms because it redefines 
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the disciplinary object from one directed at the study of stationary outcomes to one 
focused on explaining diverse and dynamic processes of institutional development 
(Fioretos 2011, 371).  
Historical institutionalism follows large questions that concern the development and structure of 
institutions with a “temporal scope” (Fioretos 2011, 372).  The structure of preferences is central 
to changes in patterns of institutions.  When confronted with different realties, actors make 
decisions that reform the institutions they belong to in order to confront those new challenges 
(Fioretos 2011, 376).   This is crucial to understanding the key tenet of historical institutionalism 
called path dependence. Path dependence is the prevailing structure maintaining its original form 
during a critical juncture when a more efficient design would be effective as a result of previous 
institutional foundations (Fioretos 2011, 376).   This is not to say that institutions do not evolve 
to meet current challenges or operate solely based upon their existing foundations, it is more or 
less a frame of understanding as to why institutions may operate as they do.  In addition, not all 
institutions can be captured by historical institutionalism as the tracing of historical events may 
not hold explanatory power in understanding an outcome that has occurred in the international 
system.  
 Another theoretical frame that highlights the salience of institutions is organizational 
behavior theory.  Organizational theory views institutions as entities that must evolve in a 
changing environment (Joaquin 2009, 250).  Organizations are social constructions “endowed 
with agency and considerable power” (Meyer and Hollerer 2014, 1223).  They are institutions, 
which enact decisions with specific goals and strategies in mind; however institutions are 
composed of individuals forming practices and pattern structures over time (Meyer and Hollerer 
2014, 1225-1228).  Every organization holds a culture that is “patterned” to the thinking of 
central tasks of that particular organization (Wilson 1989, 91). Culture is often passed on to 
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workers of that organization, although organizational culture is not necessarily static, it does 
change over time (Wilson 1989, 91). In an organizational setting, accomplishing a mission and 
satisfying compliance requirements follow three types of rewards (Wilson 1989, 157).  These 
are: “a sense of duty and purpose, the status that derives from individual recognition and 
personal power, and associational benefits that come from being part of an organization  that is 
highly regard by its members or by society” (Wilson 1989, 157-158).  In organizations such as 
armies, soldiers defend and fight for an organization based upon its structure (Wilson 1989, 17).  
For example, German soldiers in World War II “‘fought for reasons men have always fought: 
because he felt himself a member of a well-integrated, well-led team whose structure, 
administration, and functioning were perceived to be…equitable and just’” (Wilson 1989, 17).   
Coordination within an organization relies on the individuals working in structures; 
“organizations, after all, are composed of individuals who are working interdependently to 
produce some good or service” (Pfeffer 1997, 149).  Organizations recruit individuals who 
possess certain skillsets or attitudes that are conducive to the organization they are joining 
(Pfeffer 1997, 150).  Such recruitment can be based upon a shared identity as well (Pfeffer 1997, 
153). Rewards and incentives in an organizational setting can be administered based upon a 
certain behavior, which can include pay, praise, or a prize of sorts (Pfeffer 1997, 154). In 
addition, “reward practices vary dramatically across organizations and even more dramatically 
across cultures” (Pfeffer 1997, 156).   
Organizational theory often claims policies change gradually over time as a result of 
bureaucratic challenges from within and political actors within such organizations often have 
very little say over the path organizations take as an individual (Williams 1979, 684).  There is 
also the impact of the strategic elite, which can be within the organization itself or outside of it 
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that determines the trajectory of an organization (Williams 1979, 687). Strategic elites attempt to 
minimize the costs of change by creating “alternatives” that are compatible to “existing 
institutional arrangements” (Williams 1979, 687).  As policy areas converge among various 
organizational structures the creation of “layered organizational networks” emerges (Williams 
1979, 687).  However coordination and design is factored towards creating an effective 
organization to carry out its objectives (Williams 1979, 688). Organizational theory as a 
theoretical frame is less defined in the literature of public policy but holds salient features that 
will be useful in assessing the parallel security apparatus, in conjunction with historical 
institutionalism. Theoretical tenets for both theories hold utility in analyzing the parallel security 
apparatus as historical foundations and institutional evolution can be traced over time to examine 
institutional continuity and its impact on polity durability (regime change). 
The theoretical frames of historical institutionalism and organizational theory will assist 
in the uncovering of institutional patterns found within parallel security structures.  These will 
include the missions set forth by regime stakeholders and the institutional framework the parallel 
security apparatus hold in order to safeguard the regime. Where intervening events may occur 
along the pattern line, the historical institutionalist concept of critical junctures will reveal an 
institutional shift in strategy for the security institutions, a modification of tasks of that same 
institution, or the emergence of a new institution to better preserve the regime in power. 
Historical institutionalism will also highlight how parallel security institutions evolve and change 
over time to combat the emergence of internal and external threats to the political regime in 
power.  Organizational theory, alternatively, will focus more on regime stakeholder decisions in 
how changes occur and their effect on the organizational structure of the parallel security 
apparatus being examined.  In addition, organizational theory will help in uncovering 
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institutional loyalty that may include selective incentives as to how and why personnel carry out 
objectives in an unambiguous environment such as regime collapse or popular uprisings. Both 
theories will highlight the utility of parallel security structures in preserving and safeguarding the 
political regime in power. 
Data and Research Design 
In examining the cases of Baathist Iraq, Syria, and Iran, data will come from primary and 
secondary sources for this dissertation.  Scholarly works, such as academic books and peer-
reviewed articles will aid in illuminating concepts and aspects related to parallel security 
organizations. For primary sources, limited past recorded interviews, archival data, and original 
government documents shall provide the basis of analysis for this dissertation.  Some primary 
sources will come from digital archives from the Conflict Records Research Center, Wilson 
Center, Global Terrorism Database, Pro-Government Militias Database, Office of the Historian 
at the State Department, FOIA Archive for the CIA, and aymennjawad.org. I will analyze 
primary Baathist regime documents and transcribed audio recordings from Iraq archived by the 
Conflict Records Research Center and the Wilson Center.  These documents are relevant because 
of the internal communication and policies set forth by various regime stakeholders within Iraq 
that help to broaden the understanding of Iraq’s parallel security structures.  The Global 
Terrorism Database holds recorded terrorist attacks within countries of the international 
community and the groups that carried out those attacks within those countries.  This database 
will help to understand the various trends of conflict or peace occurring within the countries of 
Baathist Iraq, Syria, and Iran and to help assist in determining when periods of high intensity 
conflict occur.  The Pro-Government Militias Database provides sourced information on various 
militias existing throughout the global community.  Data on recruitment practices and periods of 
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operation will be useful in better ascertaining the existence of parallel military forces within the 
countries of Baathist Iraq, Syria, and Iran.  The Office of the Historian and the FOIA archive for 
the CIA provide government reports, observations, and interviews that assist with understanding 
the internal dynamics occurring within each case to better decipher internal threats facing the 
authoritarian regimes of Baathist Iraq, Syria, and Iran at any given time. The last database of 
aymennjawad.org, provides interview data on commanders and militiamen under Syria’s various 
parallel security structures. Other primary data will come from Human Rights Watch reports, 
Congressional Reports, and reports from the U.S. intelligence community.   Human Rights 
Watch reports involve interview data that will be the primary conduit for uncovering events that 
occur within the cases under study in this dissertation.  Congressional Reports and reports from 
the U.S. intelligence community provide interview data, policies, and raw observations which 
help to understand the broader picture of conflict or peace in the spectrum of time for each case 
under study.  
The time horizons for these cases of Baathist Iraq, Syria, and Iran will differ, however 
this dissertation makes observations from 1957 to 2018. Each case, with regard to analysis, will 
examine different conflicts during each case’s time period to determine the effectiveness the 
parallel security organizations have in dealing with either internal unrest or an external threat.  In 
addition parallel security structures will be examined to determine their effect on institutional 
survival and durability of the regime. The unit of analysis for this dissertation is the authoritarian 
regime. The focus of this study is on Baathist Iraq, Syria, and Iran and the role of each state’s 
parallel security structures in promoting stability and institutional survival. The research question 
for this study will ascertain how effective are parallel security structures at ensuring regime 
stability?  And when do parallel security institutions stop performing their duties?  These 
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questions will illuminate the effectiveness of the parallel security apparatus in handling internal 
threats and preserving the regime. The relationship of interest is that of the parallel security 
apparatus and its ability to ensure regime stability, given internal and external threats.   Each case 
will examine the security institutions and their effect on regime durability.   
The Case Studies 
Baathist Iraq, 1968-2003 
 Chapter Four will examine the Baathist Iraq regime during the time period of 1968 to 
2003.  The transition of power of the security apparatus from al-Bakr to Saddam Hussein and the 
expansion of parallel security institutions to include the Popular Army/al-Quds Army, the 
Mukhabarat, Republican Guard, and the Fedayeen.  As an institution, the parallel security 
structures in Iraq preserved the Baathist regime when it sided with Saddam Hussein over al-
Bakr.  These institutions, which expanded under Saddam Hussein, will be assessed both under 
al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein’s tenure to determine their effect in preserving the Baathist regime 
in Iraq.   
Syria, 1976-2018 
 Chapter Five examines Syria with its temporal analysis beginning in 1976 when the 
Republican Guard was created and ending in 2018 with the continuation of the Syrian Civil War.  
In this chapter, Syria will be examined from the successful transition of parallel institutions from 
one leader to the next in preserving authoritarianism.  For Syria, the parallel security apparatus 
has been both helpful and detrimental to the security of the Syrian Baathist regime.  Under Hafez 
al-Assad the parallel security structure of the Defense Committees instigated a coup against 
Hafez al-Assad while the Republican Guard, another parallel security institution, preserved 
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Hafez’s grip on power.  In addition, during the Arab Spring of 2011 the Republican Guard has 
been crucial to preserving the political establishment once protests turned into armed rebellion 
during the period of 2012 to 2013.  
Iran, 1957-2018 
In Chapter Six, the case of Iran will be examined for the years of 1957 to 2018.  For the country 
of Iran, parallel military forces include Iran’s numerous intelligence agencies such as the 
Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as the Basij and Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps.  Iran’s parallel security structure will demonstrate some of the 
failures of the Savak preserving authoritarianism and the success of the parallel security 
apparatus implemented under the Islamic Republic of Iran.  The Savak, which was charged with 
preserving the Shah’s rule, failed to stem popular protests in 1979 that led to the emergence of 
the Islamic Revolution.  Under the Islamic Republic several parallel security structures emerged, 
which include the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Basij, and various intelligence 
organizations.  These entities all ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic as it currently exists.  
While the regular military has been tasked with defending Iran’s borders at home, the parallel 
structures in the Islamic Republic of Iran play both an internal and external role in intervention in 
the wider Middle East.  
Methodology 
The methodology that will be utilized to examine the cases of Baathist Iraq, Syria, and 
Iran will be a qualitative multiple descriptive case-study.  The contextual nature of the case study 
will assist in understanding various concepts that include select in-groups, regime mechanisms of 
control, internal and external pressures both outside and within the state itself. Case studies are 
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useful for uncovering inferences within the data and conditional descriptive inferences that affect 
a particular outcome (Skocpol 1984). While qualitative methods are deterministic from the small 
number of cases examined, the pooling of cases together provides a small iteration that can 
provide some validity to the results (Skocpol 1984; Goertz and Starr 2002).   Problems can occur 
with multiple case comparisons involving both under-specification and selection bias, since case 
studies often times lack precise indicators (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).  However, 
qualitative methods hold strength in explaining outcomes from the context provided in the cases 
under study (Kelle 2006, 309). In addition, processing tracing will be utilized to uncover the 
temporal dimension of the effectiveness of parallel military organizations over time within study.  
Process tracing as a tool focuses on the unfolding of events over time, analyzing and examining 
specific points in time.  Through process tracing new inferences can be uncovered with their 
effect on the outcome holding power in the explanation of a particular event.  Additionally, one 
of the salient and accommodating features of process tracing is its structure for testing one’s 
theoretical frame against historical events (Collier 2011).  Process tracing, according to Van 
Evera (1997), involves the examination of a “chain of events” or decision making procedures 
that unfold into an outcome.  Theory, according to Van Evera, should translate into linked 
patterns in which the theoretical frame utilized should be able to predict events or decisions 
along the pattern line (Van Evera 1997).  Furthermore, document analysis will provide the 
framework for understanding the phenomenon of parallel security structures for this dissertation.  
Document analysis is advantageous from its ease of access when it comes to documents available 
from web archives relegated to the public domain. Furthermore, document analysis as a 
qualitative approach assists in contextualizing data by providing insights into the historical roots 
of various phenomena under study (Bowen 2009, 29-31).    
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While both case studies and process tracing may bring problems of external validity, 
most qualitative approaches that perform small-N studies suffer from this problem of validity; 
qualitative research in general is often regarded as deterministic from the utilization of such 
small sample sizes.  However, the contextual nature of qualitative approaches and methods 
highlights a stronger chain of events emanating from within cases under study, which balance 
out problems of external validity.  As a result, issues of external validity, whether such results 
can be replicated outside of the cases being researched, are often compensated for case 
prioritization of circumventing problems of internal validity through the use of historical tracing 
(Yom 2015, 619).  By historically tracing events within cases, the data uncovered can provide or 
assist in determining a particular outcome.  In this case, “temporal effects become only apparent 
when researchers travel backward in time, and retrace how events play out from initial 
conditions to final outcomes” (Yom 2015, 629). 
To better understand the benefits and utility of process tracing as a methodology, one 
must understand the strengths and weaknesses of process tracing as a methodological approach. 
When using process tracing observed phenomena emerge within data and assume the role of 
inferences (Skocpol 1984).  These inferences can help to better understand the significance of a 
concept on a particular outcome (Skocpol 1984). Necessary conditions can be inferences that 
highlight a particular outcome after multiple iterations, in which case the likely result would 
never occur without the presence of intervening events (Goertz and Starr 2002). Some 
weaknesses of qualitative methods include the weakness of descriptive inferences in terms of a 
lack of a pattern that links causes to an outcome (Shively 2006). Selection bias is also 
problematic in qualitative methods for its potential for a lack of variation in the outcome, which 
can be affected by a contagion effect or similar conditions leading to an expected outcome by the 
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researcher (Achen and Snidal 1989).  As a result the potential for under specification and 
selection bias comes into play when researchers cherry-pick cases leading to issues of external 
validity as replication may be difficult if not impossible when cases are chosen for their expected 
outcomes rather than their unanticipated outcomes (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006).   
Scholars that utilize process tracing examine historical junctures to see if those key 
events lead to a direction of an outcome (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 89). Smaller events may 
lead to a deviation or a continuance down the pattern line and eventually to an outcome (Goertz 
and Mahoney 2012, 89).  As Beach (2016) claims process tracing holds “a close resemblance to 
Historical Institutionalist (HI) theories [with regard to the] importance of temporality, critical 
junctures and path dependency” (Beach 2016, 466).   In process tracing, inferences within cases 
are assessed and linked to predicted and discovered evidence for each part of the mechanism for 
a particular trend (Beach 2016, 468). In addition incorporating multiple cases in an across-case 
comparison increases the internal validity of the descriptive inferences across cases (Beach 2017, 
20). Mahoney (2012) furthers this discussion by explaining process observations, which can 
entail elementary understandings of associations or potential generalizations of results (Mahoney 
2012, 571).  Process tracing utilizes observations to help decipher descriptive inferences within 
cases (Mahoney 2012, 571).  Process tracing helps to uncover a process or specific event that 
took place along the pattern line, to determine if an event took place after the initial event, and to 
see if the initial event caused the second event along the chain of events (Mahoney 2012, 571).  
Process tracing begins with a preexisting generalization and facts (Mahoney 2012, 583). 
Preexisting generalizations are premises that have been deduced from “logical necessity” to form 
a pattern in terms of a perceived outcome (Mahoney 2012, 583).  In this case, “while these 
generalizations always pertain to more than one case, they are not universal laws that apply 
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across all times and places. They are limited—perhaps severely limited—by scope conditions 
that specify the parameters within which they apply” (Mahoney 2012, 585).   Linked inferences 
appear easy to deduce when immediate or proximate events appear frequently across the pattern 
line (Mahoney 2012, 585).   Process tracing involves the inferring of an existence of a process or 
“unobserved event” (Mahoney 2012, 586).   While deducing something involves “descriptive 
inference” it does not highlight the presence of a chain of events (Mahoney 2012, 586).  Only by 
determining descriptive inferences from unobserved data along the pattern line can one reveal 
the presence of a particular outcome (Mahoney 2012, 586).  
In addition to process tracing, this dissertation will utilize a descriptive case-study 
method to examine the phenomenon of parallel security structures in the cases of Baathist Iraq, 
Syria, and Iran.  Descriptive case studies utilize analytical models such as theories as the 
boundaries of the case, framing the direction to better understand less well known concepts 
within literature (Tobin 2010).  Descriptive studies attempt to reveal patterns and connections 
with the framework of theoretical constructs to better understand phenomenon that occur within 
structures of governance (Tobin 2010). Descriptive case studies also allow the researcher to 
utilize a theory-driven lens to better understand robust concepts that may emerge, expand to 
confirm or refute, and further shape one’s understanding of an under-researched phenomenon 
(Tobin 2010).   Studies are considered descriptive when there is no across-case comparison and 
no effort to determine causality (Tobin 2010).  “The findings from descriptive case studies are 
generalizable to theoretical propositions” only (Tobin 2010).   Descriptive studies aid in teasing 
out potential new research by allowing a closer inspection of the data, new directions for studies, 
and conceiving the “once inconceivable” (Tobin 2010).  
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Case study research in general examines one unit to better understand a larger body of 
units, either at a single point in time or over a period of time (Gerring 2004, 342). “As such, case 
studies provide an opportunity for the researcher to gain a deep holistic view of the research 
problem, and may facilitate describing, understanding and explaining a research problem or 
situation” (Baskarada 2014, 1).  While qualitative research may hold its limitations, its use is 
widespread in academia and even utilized by some government entities such as the United States 
Government Accountability Office for research studies to better understand processes and events 
that affect government. The United States Government Accountability Office defines case 
studies as “a method for learning about a complex instance, based on a comprehensive 
understanding of that instance obtained by extensive description and analysis of that instance 
taken as a whole and in its context” (GAO 1990, 15).  Descriptive case studies can illuminate 
some of these more “complex instances” as they attempt to uncover different characteristics of a 
phenomenon in order to better understand the occurrence and provide context (Gerring 2004, 
344).  Descriptive case studies may also be used to compare and identify individual differences 
between cases to create a framework for classification of a particular phenomenon (Gerring 
2004, 344).   Since descriptive case studies attempt to utilize thick description to better 
understand concepts within the academic literature, internal validity, which is utilized to justify 
causal relationships, “only applies to explanatory and not to descriptive” case studies (GAO 
1990).   
While qualitative methods hold some limitations, they also possess tools for better 
understanding phenomena in the academic literature.  In this case, the use of processing tracing 
combined with the descriptive case-study method can trace events while remaining within the 
boundaries of the theoretical constructs utilized within this dissertation to better understand 
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parallel security structures. While process tracing may be able to uncover a multiple intervening 
trends within each case, primary emphasis will be placed on revealing the effectiveness parallel 
security structures have at preserving regimes and stakeholders within those regimes over time.  
It is for this reason both descriptive case studies and process tracing will be useful methods in 
tracing the phenomenon of the parallel security structure and its utility in preserving 













                                                          
2 In this dissertation there is a lack of positivist research which prevents the generalizability of results by deciphering 
if causality is deterministic in the case of qualitative methods or probabilistic in the case of quantitative methods.   
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Chapter Four  
Baathist Transition from Bakr to Hussein 
 
 
 In this chapter, Iraq will be examined from 1968 to 1979 under Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr 
and from 1979 to 2003 under Saddam Hussein to observe the parallel security structures 
employed by both Baathist leaders to determine the institutional effectiveness parallel security 
structures hold with regard to safeguarding the regime and its stakeholders.  The examination of 
events including insurgencies, coup attempts, and foreign conflicts will be reviewed to determine 
how these impact not only the regime but the parallel security structures utilized to counter such 
threats. Each internal and external conflict will be traced along the trajectory of Iraq’s history as 
it pertains to parallel security structures to examine institutional continuity and political 
durability of the regime in power.  Furthermore, the political regime of Baathism in Iraq will 
illuminate stakeholder decisions that lead to the evolution and shift within the parallel security 
apparatus and how those same organizations were able to preserve authoritarianism in Iraq under 
Baathism from regime change prior to 2003. 
Iraq’s Baath Party and Parallel Security Structures from 1968 to the Present 
Iraq for a significant part of its history was ruled by socialist forms of pan-Arab 
nationalism under the Baath Party.  This Baath party assumed temporary control in 1963 but lost 
control due to a lack organization and opposition to other military officers that belonged to other 
forms of socialist nationalist parties such as communists and Nasserites.3  The Baath leadership 
in the country of Iraq was established by Iraqis from Tikrit, most notably Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr 
                                                          
3 Iraq: A country Study, Library of Congress, 1990, p.57. 
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and Saddam Hussein, the two and only Baath Party leaders of Iraq.4  Due to prior coups 
surrounding Iraq from 1958, 1963, and eventually the 1968 coup that brought the Baath Party to 
power, Iraq created an extensive security apparatus to deal with internal threats and dissension.  
Al-Bakr and Hussein differed significantly in their approaches and strategies towards ruling.  For 
one, Al-Bakr was an ideologue of pan-Arab nationalism and a military officer that had extensive 
ties with the military apparatus that brought in significant members to the Baath Party from that 
security organization,5 while Hussein had significant experience in cultivating clandestine 
operations for opposition activity against non-Baathist ruling regimes in Iraq.6  This was further 
reflected amongst the rank and file of both Baathist regimes.  As a former Iraqi General that 
served under both leaders recalled, the unofficial saying under Al-Bakr was “better a good 
soldier than a good Ba’athist,” while under Saddam Hussein it was reversed to “better a good 
Ba’athist than a good soldier.”7 
The security apparatus under Al-Bakr was composed of a militia, the Popular Army, 
established in 1970 to counter local opposition and provide a check on the regular military.8  
Membership was composed of students, civilians, rural villagers, and members of the Baath 
Party.9  Another parallel military force included the Republican Guard, inherited from the prior 
Arif regime (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 124). Other institutions of the security apparatus 
included: al-Jihaz al-Hanin (Baathist Party Security Unit), al-Amn al-’Amm (General Security 
                                                          
4 Iraq: A country Study, Library of Congress, 1990, p.58. 
5 CIA Report: Iraq’s Wartime Government: Power Shifts in the regime, 1986, CIA-RDP88T00096R000200300001-
7, General CIA Records Collection, CIA FOIA Digital Archive, Washington D.C., United States, p.11. 
6 Iraq: A country Study, Library of Congress, 1990, p.58. 
7 Kevin Woods interview with Lieutenant General Ra’ad Hamdani (formerly a corps commander in Saddam 
Hussein’s Republican Guard), p.23, March 2009. 
8 Popular Army/Jerusalem Army (Iraq), Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD) Project. 
9 Popular Army/Jerusalem Army (Iraq), Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD) Project. 
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Service), Mudiriyyat al-Istikhabarat al-‘Askariyya al-‘Amma (The General Military Intelligence 
Directorate), and the al-Mukhabarat (The Iraqi Intelligence Service) (Al-Marashi 2003, 79-84).  
 The Baathist Party Security Unit was the official security organ of the Baath Party 
providing surveillance on members of the Baath Party and then later on the Iraqi population and 
members of the security apparatus when it was made an official state intelligence agency in 1973 
(Al-Marashi 2003, 79). The General Security Service is the oldest Iraqi security agency, which 
dates back to the British Mandate period when it was formally created in 1921 (Al-Marashi 
2003, 83).  The primary mission of the General Security Service was to root out dissention 
amongst the general public, root out potential political opposition, and detect any form of 
economic criminal activity (Al-Marashi 2003, 83).  As a political security and a police force, the 
General Security Service monitored the local populace on a day-to-day basis providing a 
presence even amongst the local population (Al-Marashi 2003, 83).  While the headquarters of 
the General Security Service was located in Baghdad, the capital of Iraq, it coordinated its efforts 
with the local branches in each governate of Iraq for operations involving detection and 
crackdowns on anti-Baathist dissent (Al-Marashi 2003, 83).    
Another security branch within the security apparatus of the Al-Bakr regime was the 
General Military Intelligence Directorate.  The General Military Intelligence Directorate was 
created at the outset of Iraq’s independence in 1932 and performed military intelligence 
gathering activities (Al-Marashi 2003, 84).  These activities included assessing hostile threats 
emanating outside of Iraq, performing foreign surveillance and reconnaissance operations, the 
protection of military infrastructure, and the creation of an informant network within both Iraq 
and abroad to gather intelligence on various threats as well as to determine the loyalty of military 
officers within Iraq’s own military (Al-Marashi 2003, 84).  The military intelligence service also 
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conducted foreign operations involving assassinations of dissidents living abroad opposed to the 
Baathist regime (Al-Marashi 2003, 84).   
The other intelligence organization, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, formed initially under 
Iraq’s monarchy era is famous for its clandestine and subversive operations both domestically 
and abroad (Al-Marashi 2003, 86).  The Iraqi Intelligence Service, better known as Iraq’s secret 
police, can be better understood as a security agency with two departments; one department had 
its role in the domestic realm, conducting operations out of provincial offices, while the other 
department with its focus on foreign external matters conducted operations out of Iraqi 
embassies abroad (Al-Marashi 2003, 86). The domestic mission of the Iraqi Intelligence Service 
included: surveillance of the Baath Party, grassroots movements, workers unions, the 
suppression of opposition groups, monitoring foreigners and foreign embassies, and the creation 
of a network of informants to detect dissent (Al-Marashi 2003, 86).  The Iraqi Intelligence 
Service’s external activities included: aiding opposition groups abroad against enemy states, the 
assassination of opposition elements abroad, conducting subversion and terrorist operations in 
neighboring countries such as Iran and Syria, infiltrating Iraqi opposition groups abroad, and 
gathering intelligence from foreign sources (Al-Marashi 2003, 86).  During the 1970s, foreign 
visitors witnessed firsthand the secret police bothering American businessmen and other foreign 
citizens within Iraq, keeping tabs on their movements within the country.10 
Kurdish Insurgency in the North – 1968 to the 1970s 
 Iraq, one of four countries with a Kurdish minority, has suffered insurrections since its 
inception as a state (Gunter 1992, 7).  Prior pacts obligated the countries of Turkey, Iran, Syria, 
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and Iraq to cooperate on the Kurdish issue (Gunter 1992, 7).  However geopolitical interests and 
the rise of pan-Arab nationalism led to the disregard for the 1937 Saadabad Pact and 1955 
Baghdad Pact, where the countries of Iran, Turkey, and Syria aided Iraqi Kurdish guerillas in 
order to weaken the regime in Baghdad (Gunter 1992, 7). Once Al-Bakr took control of Baghdad 
through a coup, the restive North became an inherited problem from previous Iraqi regimes.  
Attempts to quell the violence led to defections with the Iraqi armed forces of those whom were 
ethnically Kurdish, including two Iraqi Kurdish generals.11  Under Al-Bakr, the Iraqi military 
was deployed to handle the Kurdish insurgency with little to no effect as the Peshmerga (Kurdish 
Guerillas) were able to hold off four-fifths of the Iraq Army during the late 60s and early 70s.12  
During this period of Kurdish insurrection, the intelligence services worked and guided the Iraqi 
army to stamp out Kurdish hideouts and take back control of the North (Rubin 2001, 52). 
Kurdish forces would hide out in caves and occupy high ground, which proved to be an obstacle 
for Iraqi security forces (Lortz 2005, 41). Their guerilla tactics involved “Hiding weapons depots 
in the mountains…using the mountains for supply points, sniper positions, and staging areas” 
(Lortz 2005, 45).  This led the Peshmerga to become an effective guerilla force and ensure a 
stalemate against Iraqi military and security forces.  The Baathist regime under Al-Bakr sued for 
peace after the intelligence services and Iraqi military were unable to quell the Kurdish 
insurgents in 1970.13  Under the agreement the Kurdish guerillas were allowed to retain a 
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“frontier Militia Force” that would safeguard Iraq’s northern border, comprising about 6,000 
former insurgent forces and were garnered limited autonomy.14    
However fearing further insurrection, the Baathist regime under Al-Bakr ordered the Iraqi 
intelligence service to assassinate Mustafa Barzani and his son Idris Barzani to ensure division 
among the Kurds. This was done after Mustafa failed to join the Baath Party and to also prevent 
the resurgence of a potential insurgency. 15 Iraq had suffered during the early to mid-1960s a 
Kurdish insurgency that tied down most of Iraq’s military. About two-thirds of Iraq’s military 
were deployed during this period to quell the insurgency to almost no effect, instead the military 
force became bogged down and struggled to control parts of the Kurdish North.16 Ultimately 
“This contributed to conditions which facilitated a series of successful military coups and 
effectively limited Iraqi capabilities for military adventures abroad against Israel, Jordan, 
Kuwait, and Iran.”17 As a result in September of 1971, the Iraqi Intelligence Service made their 
first attempt to assassinate Mustafa Barzani by planting a bomb in his vehicle, however the 
assassination attempt was unsuccessful.18  In addition, earlier attempts to ambush and assassinate 
Idris Barzani had also failed in 1971.19  Further tension came about when former Kurdish 
insurgents prevented the Baathist regime from conscripting ethnic Kurds into the army and 
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security services through paperwork indicating they were Peshmerga and thus exempting them 
from conscription (Lortz 2005, 48). In addition, Baghdad’s plans to integrate the Peshmerga into 
the army or be brought under the control of the Baath Party was in conflict with plans created by 
Mustafa Barzani and his Kurdistan Democratic Party which wanted to retain control of the 
frontier militia force (Lortz 2005, 48).  
Coup attempts in Central Iraq during the 1970s 
 Despite the establishment of a significant intelligence apparatus designed to detect 
dissent, Iraq’s long history of coup attempts would not be marginalized to the back pages of 
history once the Baath Party assumed power.  In January of1970, a coup emanating from within 
the military orchestrated by Major General Abd al-Ghani al-Rawi, a retired military officer, and 
Colonel Salih Mahdi al-Samarrai led a small contingent of troops from Rashid Camp to the 
Republican Palace (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 118-119). Both coup plotters were unaware 
that their plan had been detected by the intelligence services and their contingent was ambushed 
on the way to the Republican Palace, most likely by the Iraqi Popular Army (Al-Marashi and 
Salama 2008, 119).   Subsequent purges and executions took place after this event to root out 
further dissent within the security services (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 119).  Among the 
purges included Sunni General Mushin al-Janabi and Shia General Muhammed Faraj, both 
accused of belonging to Islamic extremist organizations (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 119).  
High level members of the Baath Party, which included Taha Yasin al-Jazrawi on the 
Revolutionary Command Council and Nadhim Kazzar, the head of the General Security Service, 
led an investigation to root out further dissent within the armed forces and prevent coup attempts 
from further manifesting (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 119).   
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 In 1973, another coup attempt was instigated, this time by Shia General Nadhim Kazzar 
of the General Security Service (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 119). Resentful of Tikriti 
domination of the security services and in government, Kazzar believed eliminating both Bakr 
and Saddam would solidify his control over the military (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 119).  
Soldiers loyal to Kazzar were attacked when the Popular Army attacked Camp Rashid, taking 
control of the camp.20 Kazzar and soldiers loyal to him detained Minister of Defense, General 
Hammad Shibab al-Tikriti and Minister of the Interior, General Saadun Ghaydan (Al-Marashi 
and Salama 2008, 119). The delay in Al-Bakr arriving at the airport in Baghdad from a state visit 
to Poland spooked the coup plotters at Baghdad international airport leaving Kazzar to flee with 
his hostages (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 119).  Al-Bakr upon learning of the coup attempt 
utilized military units and the Popular Army to intercept Kazzar leading to the deaths of General 
Hammad Shibab al-Tikrti and the wounding of General Saadun Ghaydan during a standoff (Al-
Marashi and Salama 2008, 120).  Once apprehended Kazzar and Muhammed Fadhil of the Baath 
Military Bureau were executed for the coup attempt (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 120).   
 The intelligence failures by the General Security Service and the General Military 
Intelligence Directorate led to the creation of additional intelligence organizations by Saddam 
Hussein under the Al-Bakr regime (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 120).  Saddam Hussein further 
strengthened the Iraqi Intelligence Service and created the Directorate of Political Guidance to 
monitor the military and prevent coup attempts (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 120). In addition, 
the Baathist Party Security Unit was made an official state organ and intelligence gathering 
organization to monitor and detect dissent as a result of previous intelligence failures (Al-
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Marashi 2003, 79).  The Baathist Party Security Unit was primarily involved in interrogations 
and arrests.21  This particular intelligence gathering organization also instigated political 
indoctrination of the military, reorganization of the civil service and military, and the recruitment 
of loyal Baathists into top positions within the government and security apparatus.22  In addition, 
there was the creation of the Baathist Intelligence Bureau to which the Baathist Party Security 
Unit had fallen under before its elevation as a state intelligence organization.23  The Baathist 
Intelligence Bureau was primarily concerned with the domestic space that included internal 
security, information gathering, and political subversion in order to detect foreign agents as well 
as dissent within the country.24 
Expansion of Parallel Military Organizations – Republican Guard and Popular Army 
 The Al-Bakr regime had inherited a Republican Guard force that was in use by the prior 
Arif regime and continued to operate as a significant parallel military organization under the 
Baathists (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 124).  The Republican Guard during the late 1960s and 
1970s was heavily drawn from the Sunni population in Iraq providing a layer of sectarian loyalty 
to the heavily dominated Sunni Baathist regime (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 124). The 
Republican Guard which had been utilized before to protect the state’s borders was utilized 
under the Al-Bakr regime to protect the Baath Party and protect the regime in the case of a coup 
attempt emanating from within the military (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 124).  The other 
parallel security organization to be developed under the Al-Bakr regime was the al-Jaysh al-
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Shaabi or the Popular Army (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 125).  The Popular Army differed 
from the Republican Guard as the Republican Guard was more selective and was essentially an 
extension of the military, including more formal initial military training, while the Popular Army 
was a part-time militia encompassing wide sections of the population and further led by senior 
ranking members of the Baath Party (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 125-126).  In addition, the 
Popular Army’s command structure, in the same regard as the Republican Guard, fell under the 
Baath Party as opposed to the Ministry of Defense (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 125). The 
mission of the Popular Army was to protect the Baath Party but also assist with the military and 
police in their own mission of protecting and policing the state.25 In 1975, the Popular Army 
ranged from 30,000 to 100,000 members and was trained by both Iraqi Army Officers and Cuban 
advisors in military tactics and guerilla warfare.26  As the Popular Army was a part-time force, 
training during the year ranged anywhere from two weeks to up to two months (Al-Marashi and 
Salama 2008, 125).  The Popular Army’s main purpose, however, was a check on the regular 
armed forces and could be mobilized quickly to put down a coup attempt originating within the 
military itself (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 125).  The Popular Army was expanded in 1975 to 
further curtail coup attempts and internal unrest in Iraq alongside Iraq’s other parallel security 
structures (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 126).   
Saddam Hussein under the Al-Bakr regime ordered Taha Yasin Ramadan al-Jazrawi, the 
head of the Popular Army, to expand the force even further than its previous expansion in 1975 
and to compel Baath Party members from the ages of 18 to 45 to undergo mandatory military 
training within the paramilitary force (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 126).  By 1978, the Popular 
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Army had increased local formations to include even the remotest villages in Iraq (Al-Marashi 
and Salama 2008, 125).  In addition, training by the Popular Army encompassed mandatory 
weekly drills for up to three hours in combat techniques in addition to other mandatory training 
(Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 126).  Significant portions of the civilian population were 
coopted into the Popular Army raising the numbers of the force by the late 1970s (Al-Marashi 
and Salama 2008, 126).   As part of Al-Bakr’s coup-proofing measures, ammunition and fuel to 
Iraqi military units were restricted in order to prevent their use in a mobilization to march on 
Baghdad (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 120).  The only units that had access to ammunition in 
the capital of Baghdad included the Republican Guard and the Popular Army (Al-Marashi and 
Salama 2008, 120).  Both forces saw rapid expansion during the mid to late 1970s as a result of 
the failed coup attempt of 1973 on Al-Bakr’s Baathist regime. 
Renewed Insurgency in the North 
From the period of the 1970 to 1974, a low level insurgency resumed with Kurdish 
guerillas attacking military and regime installations. On July 3rd 1972, Kurdish guerillas attacked 
an Iraqi security post in Sinjar, northwestern Iraq.27  Iraq’s Military Intelligence subsequently 
ordered reconnaissance flights to locate Barzani’s headquarters in the Haji Umran area which 
followed with military exercises of paratrooper jumps in the Kirkuk and Mosul area of northern 
Iraq.28  From U.S. intelligence reports, there existed among Kurdish guerillas an intent to 
overthrow the Baathist regime with other opposition Iraqi elements as long as they were 
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provided with enough material support from foreign state sponsors.29  In 1974, Kurdish guerillas 
went on the offensive seizing the town of Zukhu and border areas near Turkey (Lortz 2005, 49).  
This start became known as the Second Iraqi-Kurdish War stemming from 1974 to 1975 (Lortz 
2005, 48). Instead of utilizing the Popular Army to fend off Kurdish guerillas, the Iraqi military 
was utilized which led to the recapture of several towns within Iraqi Kurdistan in 1974.30  The 
Iraqi military deployed six regular divisions, two specialized divisions including one in mountain 
warfare, and several independent battalions.31 This was roughly about 80% of Iraq’s military that 
was deployed to the North to attack Kurdish guerillas.32 The Iraqi military relied on air cover and 
artillery to suppress Kurdish positions to maintain their attack.33 The Iraqi military with the help 
of the intelligence apparatus directed its attacks along the Iranian border cutting off supplies after 
attacking from Sulaymaniyah and reaching Qalat Dizah.34 The Iraqi forces attacking northeast of 
Rawanduz were able to defeat Kurdish guerillas by creating fortifications every half mile to 
combat the harsh mountainous terrain that provided an advantage to the defending Kurds.35 
Overall, the Iraqi offensive was a disaster for the Kurds; Kurdish losses were the result by 
Barzani to engage in more conventional tactics as opposed to their traditional guerrilla warfare 
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which led to many losses (Lortz 2005, 49). In addition, previous reconnaissance operations by 
Iraqi military intelligence had mapped out supply points and strategic positions for the Iraqi 
military to obtain and hold that would curtail Kurdish attacks during the Winter of 1974 (Lortz 
2005, 49).  The Al-Bakr regime further weakened the Kurdish guerillas by conceding portions of 
the Shatt al Arab waterway in 1975 to Iran which effectively closed the border and ended Iran’s 
support for the Kurdish guerillas in Iraq (Lortz 2005, 50).  According to a former Iraqi officer 
with knowledge of the Kurdish Insurgency, “We hated the Shah’s government, because the Shah 
interfered with the Kurds and other Iraqi causes internally. He had interests in the Shatt al-Arab 
and the Gulf area. He imposed himself as the police officer of the Arab Gulf. But after 
1975…There weren’t any real problems with Iran, at least until the religious scholars mobilized 
their large and zealous population.”36 Iranian firepower and troops that had been supporting 
Kurdish guerillas in Iraq returned to Iran.37 The Iraqi Army advanced on the remaining Kurdish 
positions, while the Iraqi Air Force bombed hideouts, defeating the Kurdish threat temporarily in 
northern Iraq.38  Many of the Kurdish guerrillas, about 70%, surrendered to the Iraqi Army.39 
The failure of the KDP and the failing health of Mustafa Barzani led to a fracture which 
led to the creation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and its insurgency in Iraq from 
1975 onwards (Lortz 2005, 52).  Further attacks increased after March of 1976, when PUK 
forces carried out wide scale attacks across northern Iraq.40 A weak presence by the Iraqi 
Intelligence Service and General Security Service led to the establishment of PUK bases in 
Qandil, Iraqi Kurdistan, in which to launch attacks on Iraqi security posts in northern Iraq (Lortz 
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2005, 52). In other areas due to the strong presence of the security apparatus, PUK operatives 
had to be more covert in their activities, taking place most notably at night (Lortz 2005, 52).  
Throughout this period, the Baathist militia, the Iraqi Popular Army was never mobilized to deal 
with the Kurdish threat.  Instead various intelligence security organizations, most notably the 
Iraqi Intelligence Service, the General Security Service, and the Iraqi Military Intelligence 
Service were utilized to eliminate and reduce the Kurdish threat in northern Iraq alongside the 
regular armed forces.  However despite attempts to detect and eliminate Kurdish insurgents and 
various acts of terrorism, attacks continued up to the 1980s.  In Baghdad in 1976, a bomb attack 
planted by likely Kurdish guerillas, with the support of Syria, at the airport left 10 dead and 285 
injured.41, 42  In 1976, in Penjwon, KDP Kurdish guerillas kidnapped Polish agricultural experts 
that were assisting the Iraqi government and in 1979 in Mirbusur, KDP Kurdish guerillas in an 
armed attack shot at the Baath Party office in that town.43  Despite these attacks, the Baathist 
security apparatus was very much pervasive in its detection of dissent.  In fact, U.S. intelligence 
assessments determined “despite recent bombing outrages, [the] regime seems to be in [a] 
relatively strong position at home. Police and security agencies pervade all aspects of life in 
Iraq.”44 This continued beyond 1976 as the layers of security and redundant security 
organizations were utilized to stamp out opposition.  
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Shia Unrest – 1970s 
 While Kurdish unrest was a problem in the North, the Shia South had for the most part 
been placated by Baathist integration into government.  Several Baathist leaders were Shiites 
themselves.  The populist economic policies of the Baathist regime during the 1970s even raised 
the socioeconomic status of many Shiites whom had traditionally been marginalized as a result 
of their affiliation to Shia Islam.45  In this case, “Hussein's populist economic policies had a 
favorable impact on them, enabling many to join the ranks of a new Shia middle class.”46  
However in 1977, widespread demonstrations occurred over the closing of the pilgrimage site in 
Karbala over a suspected bomb attack.47  The protests spread from Karbala to other Shia areas in 
the south of Iraq to include Najaf.48  Violent clashes occurred between police and Shia pilgrims, 
in which the army had to be deployed to quell protests in the South.49  Protestors, some armed, 
called for the overthrow of the Baathist regime (Cline 2000). The actions of the protestors 
represented a “significant challenge to the regime” (Cline 2000). However it wasn’t until the 
Islamic Revolution in 1979 that a Shia opposition emerged as a result of inspiration from 
Ayatollah Khomeini.50 In 1979 in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, riots broke out when the 
Baathist regime refused Ayatollah Sadr’s request to lead a procession to Iran to congratulate 
Khomeini on a successful revolution.51 In addition, the Baathist security apparatus uncovered a 
clandestine group with links to Iran and headed by Ayatollah Sadr called the Da’wa party which 
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openly advocated the overthrow of the Baathist regime to create an Islamic Republic similar to 
that of Iran after 1979.52 
Palace Coup 1979 
 Saddam Hussein had operated as Al-Bakr’s deputy since the time of the Baathist coup of 
1968, being placed in high posts within the Iraqi government to include Vice President.53  
However Al-Bakr’s illness led his control on the security services to waver.  According to a high 
level Baathist official, Tariq Aziz, “Saddam Hussein is a patient man. He does not jump, you see. 
He served under the presidency of Al-Bakr very, very faithfully and honestly. But then President 
Al-Bakr, you see, became older and older. He became ill.”54  In July of 1979, Saddam 
summoned the Baath Party leadership and named himself president, wherein he began process of 
purges among those that could not be trusted and were in effect more loyal to Al-Bakr.55 Saddam 
effectively sidelined Al-Bakr, and had him killed a few years later after he had faded from the 
scenes of power (Cougglin 2002, 154).  Saddam Hussein’s purges were so thorough that some 
scholars claim “Given that Saddam’s security forces had already carried out an extensive purge 
of the Baath Party and the military during the early 1970's, it was quite an achievement that he 
was able to find any victims worth purging” (Cougglin 2002, 198). Once in power he promoted 
political leaders into positions of power, loyal Baathists essentially, instead of professional 
soldiers within the security apparatus.56  Furthermore, Saddam, according to a former Republican 
Guard Commander, claimed  
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[Saddam] ordered politicians to serve at the army level and promoted himself to the 
military rank [of marshal]. He also emphasized the principle, a very dangerous saying, 
that as long as one was a Ba’athist he can always be a leader, since the Ba’athist is a truly 
natural leader. Therefore, there was no problem in a Ba’athist switching from being a 
politician to a military leader.57 
Career military officers kept their dissatisfaction of promotions of political Baathists to high 
ranking positions within the security apparatus to themselves, but understood the potential 
negative consequences if war were to break out with regard to military preparedness and 
competence of those same individuals in high government positions.58 
The Parallel Security Apparatus under the Al-Bakr Regime 
 From the lens of historical institutionalism and organizational theory, Iraq’s parallel 
security structures expanded under the Al-Bakr Baathist regime, which included the increase in 
the Republican Guard, which was maintained as a parallel security structure from the previous 
Arif regime, and the creation of the Popular Army during the 1970s.  The regime under Al-Bakr 
also utilized the parallel security structures of the General Security Service, Iraqi Intelligence 
Service, and Baathist Party Security Unit to root out dissent within the local populace, monitor 
foreign individuals within the country, and keep tabs on the military and various opposition 
groups within Iraq.  During the early 1970s when Kurdish guerillas were planning to topple the 
Al-Bakr regime, it was the military not the parallel military organizations of the Popular Army 
and Republican Guard that were deployed to face the Kurdish unrest in the North.  While the 
General Security Service and Iraqi Intelligence Service were utilized in conjunction with the 
military, the Popular Army and Republican Guard were utilized for their institutional purpose of 
safeguarding the regime from potential coup attempts and preventing the emergence of 
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insurrection within their area of operations throughout Iraq.  The coup attempt of 1973 brought 
the expansion of both parallel military organizations after the head of the General Security 
Service, General Nadhim Kazzar, was able to attract a small portion of the military to join his 
coup.  While some coups and unrest were able to manifest, others were detected before they were 
fully implemented such as the 1970 coup by Major General Abd al-Ghani al-Rawi and Colonel 
Salih Mahdi al-Samarrai.  In addition, the expansion of the Popular Army to every village in 
Iraq, the further expansion of the Republican Guard, and the elevation of the Baathist Party 
Security Unit as an official intelligence organization during the 1970s expanded the presence of 
the parallel security structure’s and their ability to detect dissent and unrest within Iraq, limiting 
the success of attacks and coups carried out by insiders and opposition groups.  However despite 
the expansion of Iraq’s parallel security structures under Al-Bakr, the 1979 Palace Coup by 
Saddam Hussein over Al-Bakr’s failing health led the parallel security structures to preserve 
institutional continuity over uncertainty of a weakening leader. This led to the emergence of 
Saddam Hussein at the head of the mantle of continued Baathist rule over Iraq. 
War with Iran and Internal Unrest - 1980 to 1982  
 During the 1980s, prior to the war with Iran, Shia militants with similar ideologies to the 
Islamic revolutionary regime in Iran carried out attacks against the Baathist regime in order to 
overthrow it and install an Islamic regime in Iraq. These militants belonged to a group known as 
the Da’wa party.  They attempted to assassinate in 1980 both the Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, 
and Minister of Culture and Information, Latif Nayyif Jasim.59  The General Security Service 
and Iraqi Intelligence Service as well as other intelligence gathering organizations began a 
process of rounding up Da’wa party members and supporters as well as Shiites of Iranian 
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origin.60  The Shiites from Iran were deported, while the Da’wa party members and supporters 
were executed, along with their leader Ayatollah Sadr.61  Former Republican Guard Commander, 
General Ra’ad Hamdani claims, “the problem was that the Da’wa party adopted the same goal as 
the Iranian revolution and acted as a supporting hand for Iran in Iraq. They had both political as 
well as military members working for their long-term agenda in Iraq, and soon became active 
with the support of Khomeini’s government.”62  Shia officers and soldiers in the military began 
sabotaging aircraft and destroying tanks “acting on behalf of the revolution in Iran.”63   
Throughout January of 1980 to July of 1980, Shia militants as well as militants belonging to the 
Da’wa party carried out attacks and hijackings in Iraq.64  These included a hijacking at Baghdad 
International Airport in January of 1980, a bombing in April of 1980, and an assassination 
attempt on Saddam Hussein’s brother Barzan al-Tikriti.65  In addition, the Iranian leadership had 
been sending messages to the Iraqi military to overthrow the Baath regime (Al-Marashi and 
Salama 2008, 131).  
 In the beginning of September of 1980, border skirmishes were occurring between Iraq 
and Iran, mostly through the use of field artillery.66  Several weeks later, Saddam Hussein ended 
the 1975 treaty with Iran and announced the Shatt al-Arab water waterway would return to 
Iraq.67  In addition, Iraqi troops were ordered to enter Iran on September 23rd, 1980 marking the 
beginning of hostilities of the Iran-Iraq War.68  Figure 4.1 shows Iraq’s staging areas and farthest 
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line of advance in 1980. Throughout the 1980s, the Da’wa party committed insurrections in the 
south of Iraq as well as targeted government buildings and military posts throughout much of the 
South (Dawisha 1999, 557).  
   
Figure 4.1 - The Initial Invasion of Iran, 1980 
 
Source: Satellite image courtesy of National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Available at 
(www.parstimes.com/spaceimages/mideast/); Also used in Kevin Woods, Williamson Murray, and Thomas Holaday 
interview with Lieutenant  General Ra’Ad Hamdani (Formerly a Corps Commander in Saddam Hussein’s 




According to a former Republican Guard Commander, General Ra’ad Hamdani, Iranian 
shelling prior to the war was both to show that the Iranian military had not collapsed and to 
“send a message to the Da’wa party, which was politically active and had carried out a number 
of acts of sabotage and terrorism over the summer of 1980, that there is a strong force that would 
support it.”69  Military preparations for the war with Iran were rushed, and at times operational 
and logistical orders were unclear.70  This was a byproduct of Saddam Hussein’s coup-proofing 
strategy of putting into positions loyal Baathists over that of competent military commanders at 
the Division level and below.71  As Hamdani claims, “the problem was that most of the Division 
commanders at the time were not competent commanders. We [the professional soldiers] looked 
at things differently because [the political generals] came into those commanding positions due 
to their loyalty to the [Ba’ath] party.”72  If battlefield conditions were horrible, reports at the 
command level would change to acceptable by the political generals Saddam promoted.73 
 Further measures were instilled, predominantly on the military to ensure their loyalty, 
which included targhib (enticement) and tarhib (intimidation) (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 
129).   Lavish pay raises and housing facilities were provided to the military; however, 
repression was still the core of ensuring the military’s loyalty (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 
129).  The Iraqi Intelligence Service, General Security Service, Iraqi Military Intelligence, and 
the Baathist Party Security Unit were still very much utilized to detect dissention and subversion 
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within the military’s ranks (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 129). Tactics employed by the 
intelligence apparatus and secret police included a more expansive informant network within the 
military as well as surveillance (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 129). Those detected would be 
arrested and executed for treasonous behavior (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 129).  In addition, 
commanders would be rotated out to prevent the creation of a power base from which a military 
commander might instigate a coup (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 129). In addition, parallel 
military structures were deployed to the fronts of Iran to not only supplement the manpower of 
the Iraqi military deployed but also to keep an eye on the regular military while it was fighting 
Iran (Brill 2016, 37-38).  For regular civilians and members of the Baath Party, the Popular 
Army had less stringent training and could be stationed within Iraq as opposed to the military 
which had been forward deployed to the frontlines (Brill 2016, 38).  Once combat operations 
became more sustained, failures briefed at the top could lead to executions.  From the 
perspective of Saddam Hussein, the lack of success in Iraqi pilots in their bombing missions in 
Iran compared to Iranian fighter jets bombing Baghdad, daily, led to his decision to execute 
several Air Force officers for cowardice and not fulfilling one’s duty.74  According to Saddam,  
those [Iraqi] pilots who refused to fulfill their duty should be executed…So far, we have 
not had one of our (TU) aircraft [Tupolev bombers] downed because the pilots (acting on 
their own) take off and land immediately. Meanwhile the enemy pilots are like rockets 
raiding us with six of their aircraft raiding and only one returning yet they keep raiding 
us.75 
Executions proved to be an incentive to others in the security apparatus to be not only loyal but 
ensure one did what was necessary to not be viewed as a subversive.  The Popular Army to this 
degree operated as both as a check on the military deployed and to detect dissent amongst the 
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populace (Huggins 1994, 31).  While the Popular Army had been sent in mass to the front, there 
were still units of the force residing within Iraq to ensure the security and protection of vital 
government facilities (Baram 1997, 7).  In addition to capturing downed Iranian pilots, the 
Popular Army in Iraq also combated the insurgency by Shia militant groups such as the Badr 
Corps and Da’wa party in southern Iraq (Lewitt 2013, 289).76  The Intelligence services with 
their informant networks within the military targeted predominantly Shia and Kurdish conscripts 
during the Iran-Iraq War to determine their loyalty to the regime (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 
130).  
 During the initial phases of the war, Iraq deployed 200,000 soldiers to the front and about 
100,000 to 130,000 of its Popular Army to the frontlines (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 132).  
Iraqi troops moved into Khuzestan province and captured Khoramshahr in November after heavy 
street fighting (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 132).  The first troops deployed to take 
Khoramshahr were Iraqi special-forces, which incurred high loses to take the city.77 According to 
former Republican Guard Commander General Hamdani, the loss of these special forces were 
significant as the time it took to train a new member was no longer available as there was a 
continuous need for bodies at the front.78 Iraqi troops faced stiff resistance in their advance on 
Abadan from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and believed laying siege to Abadan as 
their only option due to causalities sustained in urban fighting in Koramshahr in 1980 (Al-
Marashi and Salama 2008, 132).  The Iraqi military deployed 70,000 regular army troops and 
20,000 Popular Army for this initial invasion followed up by three additional divisions of 35,000 
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regular army troops and 40,000 Popular Army militia (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 132). 
However tactical advances fell short as decision-making proved slow as strategic decisions not 
only had to be made by political generals, as a coup-proofing measure, but at times by Saddam 
himself (Al-Marashi and Salama 2008, 132).  Initial bombings of Iranian airfields proved 
unsuccessful, during the war, over a lack of intelligence and proper follow up of reconnaissance 
of those strikes.79 As technicians pointed out, reconnaissance equipment acquired from Eastern 
Bloc countries had serious limitations; however political generals in the Baathist regime 
disregarded this information.80  According to a top level Air Force commander briefing Saddam 
Hussein,  
the technicians that we have working in this field do not meet the required level. It has 
been said that it is because the photographic equipment of the eastern [Eastern Bloc] 
aircraft were not efficient and advanced, but housed outdated and non-advanced 
equipment. I don’t believe this is a good reason. Instead the failure is in the people and 
components, and not in the equipment itself.81 
This was demonstrated once again, when military units deployed were provided without 
adequate support equipment such as armored recovery vehicles, which led to the destruction of 
eight tanks in October of 1980 when they become temporarily non-functional.82 These political 
orders “deprived the Army of any momentum, forcing it to sit out a long wasteful interval of 
inactivity, where the troops’ morale deteriorated” (Marashi and Salama 2008, 133). Among other 
decisions made by the political leadership of the Baath Party included an exchange of land 
captured by Iraq for peace with Iran, an offer Tehran rejected leading to a prolonged war 
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(Marashi and Salama 2008, 133).   This was further compounded by executions for failure at the 
front. Commanders, in this case, would often times not provide truthful reports.  “Saddam put 
great pressure on Iraqi commanders on the ground to avoid losses, which led them not to report 
failures. Withholding losses from reports and thus not receiving reinforcements or other support 
left commanders in impossible combat conditions.”83  Executions would begin at the top and 
work their way down to the lower level ranks for failures at the front.84  According to former 
Republican Guard Commander General Hamdani,  
the first one executed was the commander of the 2d Brigade in the Beit Sa’ad region, 
Staff Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Juwad Kadhum, at the beginning of 1981. After 
that, Saddam had a company commander and soldiers of the same brigade executed. In 
1982, the III Corps commander, Major General Salah Al-Qadi, was executed. Then 
Brigadier General Juwad Asaad, the commander of the 3rd Division, followed.85 
Such consequences either led to the falsification of bad reports or no reports being sent up to the 
chain of command, leading Division level commanders as well as the party leadership to believe 
everything on the frontlines was going according to plan. 
During the Iran-Iraq War, the Popular Army proved quite inadequate as a frontline force, 
often times the force would retreat in the face of enemy attacks and suffered serious problems of 
desertions on the frontlines (Brill 2016, 38).  However, their use as a reserve force on the 
frontlines, keeping a check on the army, and providing a local armed force for Baath Party 
branches to combat insurgents and coup plotters proved quite useful (Brill 2016, 74).86  In 
addition, the Popular Army could only be fielded for a matter of two to three months at a time on 
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the frontlines as the force was composed of civilians that were needed for the national 
economy.87 In this case, “because 60 percent of the workforce was unavailable for the normal 
economy. Therefore, Saddam created a system where this Popular Army would fulfill defense 
duties for 2 or 3 months only, and then return to the civilian sector.”88 However despite the 
presence of the Popular Army, the stationing of the Republican Guard in Iraq, and the 
intelligence apparatus with its surveillance operations and informant network, attacks still 
occurred among both Kurdish guerillas and Shia dissident groups inside Iraq.  During the initial 
phase of the war, Iraqi long-range bombers Tu-22 Blinders proved quite useful for striking deep 
in Iran.  Iran utilized Shia militants from the Da’wa party that were Iraqi Air Force technicians to 
sabotage six of the planes so they could not be used for operations in Iran.89   
In May and June of 1981, Kurdish Guerillas belonging to the PUK began targeting 
foreign workers assisting with the Baathist regime by kidnapping them for ransom.90  KDP 
fighters began assisting Iran by fighting Iranian Kurdistan Democratic Party positions (KDPI) 
that had sided with Iraq as well as fighting alongside Iranian troops against Iraqi forces in Iran 
(Lortz 2005,54).  As Iraqi Information Minister, Tariq Aziz, noticed in a meeting with the Armed 
Forces General Command, the recovery of the Brno rifle was indicative of Kurdish guerillas 
fighting alongside Iranian troops against Iraqi troops in the Sarbil-e-Zahab area.91  The PUK 
battling for the most part the intelligence services, pro-government Kurdish National Defense 
Battalions, and the Popular Army in the North received support from both Iran and Syria (Lortz 
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2005, 54; Marashi and Salama 2008, 142). For the most part, the Kurdish threat in the North was 
limited by skirmishes between the KDP and PUK (Marashi and Salama 2008, 142). On the 
frontlines, Iran was chipping away at Iraqi positions and had entered Iraq itself in some locations 
in 1981.92  Iraq’s military was also severely limited in terms of capabilities at this point.  The 
Iraqi military was stretched thin and it could not advance 40 kilometers let alone 800 kilometers 
that were needed to march on Iran’s capital, Tehran.93 This left Iraq at a great disadvantage with 
significant parallel security structures and the intelligence apparatus stuck along the front lines to 
counter the external threat, while pushing the military into a more defensive position.94  
Furthermore, Iraq’s parallel security structures still in Iraq such as the Popular Army, Iraqi 
Intelligence Service, General Security Service, and Baathist Party Security Unit still had to 
contend with threats in the North such as Kurdish guerillas or threats in the South that included 
the Badr Corps or Da’wa party that were being supported by Iran.  
In 1982, Saddam Hussein suffered an assassination attempt by Shia militants and as a 
result of the Iraqi Intelligence Service and General Security Service’s failure to detect the threat, 
Saddam created a new security organization called Al-Amn al-Khas (Special Security) to provide 
bodyguards to ensure his personal protection (Al-Marashi 2003, 80).  Operatives would be 
recruited out of both the General Security Service and Iraqi Intelligence Service and they would 
not only ensure Saddam’s personal protection but also surveil the Military Intelligence 
Directorate to ensure that specific organization was fulfilling its duties of intelligence gathering 
operations (Al-Marashi 2003, 80). Other duties of the organization included internal suppression 
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of Shia and Kurdish opposition, surveillance of government ministries, surveillance of the 
military, purchasing arms and technology, and securing critical infrastructure along with its 
duties of protecting Saddam Hussein (Al-Marashi 2003, 81-82). “According to Iraqi defectors 
and exiles, this agency more than any other instills a sense of fear in all layers of Iraqi society” 
(Al-Marashi 2003, 82). Under Saddam Hussein, most conversations or knowledge of the regime 
was considered a state secret with the divulging of such knowledge could potentially be punished 
by death (Cougglin 2002, 198).   With the vast number of employees and informants the chance 
of getting caught by surveillance or an informer was quite high (Cougglin 2002, 198).  During 
the 1980s alone, the Iraqi intelligence service had over 200,000 employees with likely double if 
not triple informants not on payroll.95 While the coercive apparatus of the Iraqi intelligence 
apparatus and secret police had a vast array of surveillance throughout both Baathist regimes, 
under Saddam the intelligence services while conducting surveillance had surveillance placed 
upon them.  A special directorate called Directorate 19 within the Iraqi Intelligence Service was 
utilized to weed out dissent within the Iraqi Mukhabarat (intelligence) services.96 In addition, “as 
a rule, each agency [had] an inner security unit that monitors any dissent in that agency. The 
head of this unit [reported] directly to the agency chief who [then] reports directly to the 
president or the Office of the Presidential Palace.”97 Operatives and agents could be purged or 
assassinated if their loyalty was put into question, and each intelligence organization was utilized 
to counter another to ensure their loyalty (Al-Marashi 2002).  
Iranian offensives in 1982 focused primarily in the south of Iraq for two reasons.  First, 
the majority of the population in Iraq’s South was Shia and Islamic Regime in Iran was led by 
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Twelver Shia Islamic clerics.98 In addition, the two Shia militant groups operating in the South 
could aid Iran in capturing territory or sabotaging Iraqi supply lines if Iran were able to advance 
significantly into Iraq.99 Attempting to advance into the central part of Iraq would not only 
witness the resistance of local Sunni Popular Army forces but also that of Iraq’s elite Republican 
Guard.100  In the summer of 1982, Iraq began to retreat its forces from inside Iran and establish a 
defensive line from its pre-war positions in Iraq (Marashi and Salama 2008, 140). Khoramshahr, 
a city that took Iraq months to liberate had been taken by Iranian forces in May of 1982 (Huggins 
1994, 31).  The defenders of the city were the Iraqi Popular Army in which seven brigades were 
decimated and three surrendered in masse to Iranian forces in the defense of the city (Huggins 
1994, 31). After the loss of Khoramshahr in May of 1982, Iraq attempted to negotiate peace with 
Iran, however Iran was embolden by its successes in the conflict and hoped to overthrow the 
Baathist regime through its offensives in the South (Marashi and Salama 2008, 140). Iran aimed 
to capture Basra, a Shia city in southern Iraq which at the time was defended by the Iraqi Army 
III Corps, consisting of seven divisions with a total of 70,000 troops (Marashi and Salama 2008, 
141).   As the war began to turn, Saddam decided to employ his parallel security structure of the 
Republican Guard to be reorganized and expanded to be used against the Iranian military, which 
for the most of the war up until 1982 had been stationed within Iraq to protect regime 
stakeholders.101 Prior to 1982, the Republican Guard had been too small to be thrown into the 
war with Iran and protect regime stakeholders at the same time as its size was one brigade of 
troops (Huggins 1994, 31). The Republican Guard as it began to expand selected competent and 
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war-tested officers to be placed into the Republican Guard, which in effect gutted the regular 
military of its capable and proficient officer corps.102 Prior to this expansion, the Republican 
Guard was led by Saddam’s relatives and family members that ensured the Baathist regime’s 
survival in the event of a coup.103   
The Republican Guard, while a parallel security structure under Saddam Hussein, also 
held elite status as they underwent numerous training and were afforded the best equipment in 
contrast to the regular military.104  As former Republican Commander General Hamdani claims 
“Throughout the war and afterward, most Iraqi officers started to realize that they did not want to 
become members of the Republican Guard, because of the great responsibility demanded of 
them. There were approximately 365 days’ worth of training, with high-level missions, and high 
levels of expectations and sacrifices from the Republican Guard.”105  When Republican Guard 
formations accomplished their objectives they would return to Iraq to reequip and rearm, while 
conventional units would fill in the gaps left behind by the Republican Guard.106 The Republican 
Guard during 1982 was expanded from one brigade to three brigades (Huggins 1994, 32).  These 
Republican Guard Brigades were drawn from loyal members of the military as well as from 
Iraq’s Sunni tribes as displayed in Table 4.1.  Before recruits were accepted into the Republican 
Guard they underwent a thorough background investigation (Hashim 2003, 24).  After, the new 
recruits underwent an intensive two months of military-style training that not only included 
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military based instruction but also ideological instruction that garnered their loyalty to the 
Baathist regime (Hashim 2003, 24).  
 
Table 4.1 - Republican Guard Tribal Recruitment 1982 – 1983 




Provided Tribal Members that contributed to 
the 10,000 or more Sunni tribesman recruited 





Provided Tribal Members that contributed to 
the 10,000 or more Sunni tribesman recruited 





Provided Tribal Members that contributed to 
the 10,000 or more Sunni tribesman recruited 
into the Republican Guard 
 
 
Source: Ahmed Hashin, 2003, “Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and 
Power.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 57, p.32.; International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance, 
Iraq, 1992-1993 – To determine the size of a brigade (5000 Soldiers).  
 
In June and December of 1982, Shia militant groups involving the Badr Corps and Da’wa 
party bombed the Ministry of Planning in Baghdad and a state-run news agency.107  While the 
intelligence services uncovered several planned attacks, not all were able to be detected.  In the 
North, Kurdish guerilla attacks from the PUK and KDP focused around Sulaymaniya in August 
of 1982, capturing spoils from defeated Iraqi troops and pro-government Kurdish National 
Defense Battalions (Lortz 2005, 55; Marashi and Salama 2008, 142).While Iraq was able to hold 
off attacks in 1982 from Iran, Iranian offensives continued especially around the southeastern 
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Iraqi city of al-Amara after the failed Basra offensive (Marashi and Salama 2008, 141).  Iraq’s 
IV Army Corps and Popular Army formations held off the Iranian advance and even 
counterattacked scoring prisoners and captured tanks (Marashi and Salama 2008, 141). The 
Iranian strategy then shifted, utilizing Iraq’s existing insurgency, which for most of the war had 
been combated by Iraq’s parallel security structures.  As former Republican Guard Commander 
General Hamdani lays out,  
when the Iranians realized they were unable to achieve success in the areas of Iraqi 
superiority in armored and air force units, particularly in the south, they altered their 
strategy from one of seeking deep penetrations to one of mounting operations in areas of 
complex terrain, where the use of armored and air force units was difficult. So they 
started to work in the mountain and marsh areas to achieve a greater degree of success.108 
The other issue is that mountainous areas require a large number of troops, and therefore 
would consume a major part of Iraq’s reserves. This would hurt the effectiveness of the 
remainder of the force down south.109 
This was a significant strategy as Iraq’s military had been bogged down fighting Kurdish 
guerillas in the decades prior.  As the military was defending the borders of Iraq from Iranian 
military offensives, any new influx of support could greatly impact parallel military units and 
local pro-government forces used in fighting in the North.   
War with Iran continues 1983 to 1986 – Kurdish and Iranian offensives and al-Faw 
Campaign 
 Joint Iranian and Kurdish attacks led to the capture of significant parts of northeastern 
Iraq on June 23rd 1983, to the point where Iranian troops were overlooking urban centers such as 
Qalat Diza and Kirkuk (Marashi and Salama 2008, 142). Several days later the Iraqi government 
called upon Kurds born between the years of 1963 to 1964 to report for military service (Marashi 
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and Salama 2008, 142).  The combined Kurdish and Iranian offensives led to more areas being 
captured in the North, including the military base of Hajj Umran in 1983 (Marashi and Salama 
2008, 142).  Iraq’s First Army Corps as well as troops originally stationed in the South for 
defense were brought to the North to assist the parallel security structures such as the Popular 
Army and Intelligence Services as well as Kurdish pro-government militias to fend off attacks by 
Iran (Marashi and Salama 2008, 142).110  By 1984, Iran was on the offensive again in the South, 
the Da’wa party bombed a government office in March of 1984 and the KDP kidnapped foreign 
workers helping the Iraqi government in June of 1984.111112 There was a short lived agreement 
between Iraq and the PUK where the PUK was able to maintain a force of 40,000 as long as they 
did not attack Iraqi security positions, however the PUK once again during that same year 
engaged in hostilities with Baghdad (Gunter 1992, 14). One of the reasons behind this collapse 
with the agreement between the PUK and the Baathist regime in Baghdad was Iraq needed 
bodies for its military and security apparatus and removed much of the exemptions garnered to 
Kurds during the 1970s from conscription (Gunter 1992, 14). As the war in Iraq looked towards 
Iranian victory and Iraq’s defeat, a group of Iraqi military officers planned a coup to overthrow 
Saddam and his Baathist regime (Al-Marashi 2002).  However, Saddam’s personal protection 
under the office of Special Security, along with other intelligence organizations discovered the 
plot and apprehended the military officers involved (Al-Marashi 2002). From 1982 to 1985, the 
frontlines in Iraq were pretty static with the Republican Guard acting as the regime’s fire brigade 
when breaches occurred along the lines of contact (Huggins 1994, 32). Figure 4.2 shows various 
                                                          
110 Kevin Woods interview with Lieutenant General Ra’ad Hamdani (formerly a corps commander in Saddam 
Hussein’s Republican Guard), p.62, March 2009. 
111 Global Terrorism Database, Iraq, 1984. 
112 Kevin Woods interview with Lieutenant General Ra’ad Hamdani (formerly a corps commander in Saddam 
Hussein’s Republican Guard), p.66, March 2009. 
98 
 
Iranian offensives from 1983 to 1986, known as the Fajr or Dawn offensives in southern and 
central Iraq. 
 
Figure 4.2 – Iran’s Fajr Offensives 1983 to 1986 
 
Source: Satellite image courtesy of National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Available at 
(www.parstimes.com/spaceimages/mideast/); Also used in Kevin Woods, Williamson Murray, and Thomas Holaday 
interview with Lieutenant  General Ra’Ad Hamdani (Formerly a Corps Commander in Saddam Hussein’s 




 In 1986, Iran attacked and captured the al-Faw peninsula (Huggins 1994, 32). Due to 
Saddam Hussein’s coup-proofing strategy, the information gathered by the intelligence section in 
Baghdad superseded intelligence gathered in the field.113 As a result preventative measures to 
prevent not only the decimation of the VII Corps of the Iraqi Army but also units of the 
Republican Guard deployed in the South were disregarded because the Iraqi military intelligence 
section in Baghdad believed Iran would attack the III Corps in Central Iraq as they did in 1983, 
1984, and 1985.114 As a result, Republican Guard Units and the VII Corps sustained numerous 
casualties and Popular Army units defending al-Faw had fled in the face of Iranian onslaught 
(Huggins 1994, 32). Iran captured the port of al-Faw and was threatening Basra and Um Qasr in 
the South (Huggins 1994, 32).  The Baathist regime dispatched from Baghdad its three brigades 
of the Republican Guard to halt the offensive on al-Faw (Huggins 1994, 32).  Losses were 
significant; the Republican Guard lost 30% of its force in countering Iran in the al-Faw campaign 
to prevent Iran from entering further into Iraq (Huggins 1994, 32).  As a result Saddam Hussein 
decided to expand the Republican Guard even further after the loss of the al-Faw peninsula in 
1986 (Huggins 1994, 32). The Republican Guard was to be expanded to 10 divisions of troops.115 
The process for recruitment had been changed from a selective process of handpicking soldiers 
from the military or from Sunni areas in Iraq to opening up the Republican Guard to anyone that 
wanted to join it (Huggins 1994, 32).116 According to former Republican Guard Commander 
General Hamdani, “we recruited at universities for students who possessed a decent level of 
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education and also involved tribal leaders to recruit from the tribes.”117  Hamdani describes the 
standing up of additional Republican Guard units, 
for approximately 6 to 8 months, the system worked and was able to form several [new] 
armor and infantry formations at the base. These were the 7th Republican Guard brigade, 
the 8th Republican Guard armored infantry brigade, the 9th Republican Guard armored 
brigade, and the 12th Commando brigade…There were also the 21st Maghaweer brigade, 
the 26th Special Forces brigade, the 16th Special Forces brigade, and the 26th Naval 
Special Forces brigade, the sea mission brigade, the frogmen. This group trained at Al-
Habbaniyah Lake on diving and attacking [from an amphibious environment]. They 
brought in experts, who I think were Egyptians, to train [our soldiers] in these operations, 
as well as some of the senior officers who worked for the navy’s special forces and 
understood the underwater technologies. 
There was an extensive training curriculum, day and night, and we reached a limited level 
of preparation. Saddam Hussein continuously followed up with us to see how our training 
was coming, and the readiness of our forces. Hussein Kamel was the Republican Guard’s 
supervisor and was in charge of reviewing any requests we submitted. Anything that we 
asked for, he provided. He was also the main point of contact between Saddam and us.118 
Despite the objections of Iraq’s field commanders, Saddam Hussein ordered the military and 
Republican Guard to attack and seize Mehran in Iran in 1986, which ultimately led to another 
Iraqi defeat since field commanders did not have a direct line for air support (Huggins 1994, 32). 
Messages had to be sent to Baghdad, first, to obtain support whether that be air support for 
campaigns or more troops for the defense of one’s sector on the battlefield (Huggins 1994, 32). 
“Saddam Hussein refused to allow his generals to coordinate directly with the air force” 
(Huggins 1994, 32).  For coup-proofing measures, elite formations were limited in the military 
and Saddam worried about generals gaining too much power where they could instigate a coup 
(Huggins 1994, 32).  However expanding the Republican Guard rectified this issue as the 
Republican Guard fell under the security apparatus in Baghdad directly under Saddam rather 
than the Ministry of Defense (Huggins 1994, 32). One of the issues of expansion with regard to 
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the Republican Guard had been that Iraq was close to full mobilization with every male between 
the ages of 18 to 40 had been already called up for military service (Huggins 1994, 32).  The 
Baathist regime decided in 1986 to fix this shortfall by lifting the exemptions for those in 
university to be recruited into the Republican Guard as well as calling up males that were either 
the ages of 17 or 41 (Huggins 1994, 32).  The Popular Army also began summer training 
practices with students at universities and since many males figured they were going to be called 
up anyways, they decided to join the Republican Guard rather be drafted into the regular army 
(Huggins 1994, 32).  
War with Iran 1987- 1988 
 In 1987, the revitalized and expanded Republican Guard was deployed along with the III 
Corps and VII Corps to southern Iraq to defend Basra from Iranian incursions (Huggins 1994, 
33).119  The Republican Guard fell under the Ministry of Defense when engaged in offensive 
operations with the regular army but fell under the State Special Security Apparatus in Baghdad 
when not in an offensive capacity during the war (Huggins 1994, 33). “In other words, the 
[Republican Guard] structure allowed them to function on an operational level with the army and 
on a political plane for Saddam Hussein” (Huggins 1994, 33). The success in defending Basra 
led Saddam to expand the Republican Guard even further in 1987 from sixteen operational 
brigades to twenty-five brigades (Huggins 1994, 33). At one point in 1987, the Republican 
Guard had more mechanized brigades than the regular army (Huggins 1994, 33). The Republican 
Guard during the 1987 campaign were ordered to not only defend Basra but push Iran out of Iraq 
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in the South.120  In the North, the Kurdish guerillas of the PUK and KDP continued their 
campaign against Iraqi forces, capturing the town of Sulaymaniya in April of 1987, attacking 
Mosul in September of 1987 and Baji, Iraq in October of 1987 (Lortz 2005, 56).121 In 1988 with 
the expanded role of the Republican Guard, Iraq was able to recapture the al-Faw peninsula.122 
Part of the success was also attributed to Iraqi special forces, 16th and 3rd brigade which 
conducted an air assault to capture portions of al-Faw peninsula123  The success of the offensive 
allowed the III Corps of the Iraqi Army to push through Iran’s second line of defenses to 
advance towards Ahvaz in Iran.124 By July, Iraqi offensives were pushing further into Iran in the 
South as Iran was suffering from dwindling supplies.125 Beginning in April of 1988, Iraq began 
garnering several victories against Iran (Hashim 2003, 29).  By July 1988, Iranian forces began 
fleeing from the battlefields in the South (Hashim 2003, 29).  Despite controlling areas within 
Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran decided to accept UN Resolution 598 for an unconditional ceasefire with 
Iraq in August of 1988, ending the war.126 After the Iranian ceasefire, Iraqi troops were 
redeployed to the North to fight the Kurdish insurgency.127  Without their Iranian backers, 
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resistance by Kurdish guerillas lasted until September of 1988, before Iraq brought Kurdish areas 
back under its control.128 
The Parallel Security Structures during the 1980s 
 During the war with Iran and in line with the theoretical frames of historical 
institutionalism and organizational theory, the parallel security structures were utilized for 
defense of the Baathist regime and its corresponding institutions.  While the necessity for 
manpower saw their use against Iran, the parallel military organizations of the Popular Army and 
Republican Guard predominantly resided in Iraq to engage in opposition groups in the South and 
North and to prevent the success of coup attempts.  In the South the Popular Army battled the 
Da’wa party and Badr Corps.  In the North, the Popular Army was utilized to fend of Kurdish 
guerilla attacks by the KDP and PUK.  However, despite fulfilling its primary mission of internal 
defense, the Popular Army was also utilized as a check on the military on the frontlines to 
prevent desertions and to prevent the regular army from marching back to Baghdad to overthrow 
the Baathist regime.  The Republican Guard for the initial phase of the war was only utilized for 
internal defense and was positioned in Baghdad to safeguard the regime and its stakeholders.  
From there the Republican Guard expanded three times; the first occurred in 1982, the next came 
in 1986, and the last came in 1987.  The Republican Guard expanded from one brigade in 1982 
to twenty-five brigades by 1987.  This expansion was two-fold, it would provide an elite force to 
assist in the capture of difficult strategic points against Iran and it would also ensure that if the 
Iraqi army ever did mount a large military coup at the front, the Republican Guard could act as a 
significant counter-coup force.  Since the Republican Guard did not hold permanent positions on 
the frontlines and were stationed in their permanent bases in Iraq once military objectives were 
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completed, any threat that would form either by the military or by opposition groups could be 
dealt with quickly while safeguarding regime stakeholders in Baghdad.  
Iraq’s parallel security structures also included Iraq’s numerous intelligence 
organizations; these included the Iraqi Intelligence Service, General Security Service, and the 
Baathist Party Security Unit.  These organizations detected various coups and planned attacks by 
opposition groups during the 1980s. However, some planned attacks by coup plotters and 
opposition groups unfolded without detection.  These include the 1980 assassination attempt 
against Information Minister, Tariq Aziz, and Minister of Culture and Information, Latif Nayyif 
Jasim, and the 1982 assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein. The fact the General Security 
Service and Iraqi Intelligence Service did not detect either event led to the creation of the office 
of Special Security.  The new intelligence gathering organization not only protected Saddam 
Hussein but even managed to uncover a plot in 1984 when the military planned to overthrow the 
Baathist leader over failures at the front and the perceived mishandling of the war.   Iraq’s 
intelligence organizations during the 1980s expanded in terms of capabilities as a result of the 
war and issues of internal insurrection.  Iraq’s parallel intelligence organizations began by 
increasing their informant networks and the number of personnel employed.  It was from this 
expansion that these organizations were able to root out sabotage and dissension within the ranks 
of the military and other security structures that had plagued the security apparatus before the 
war and during the early phases of the war. Due to the potential issue of coups and dissention 
emerging within Iraq’s parallel intelligence organizations, each intelligence agency had an 
internal security unit dedicated to surveilling their own organizations and reporting back to the 
office of the president on operatives and agency employees whose loyalty was in question.  In 
addition, each intelligence organization would spy on each other not only to root out potential 
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coups but to garner favor with regime stakeholders when coup plots were uncovered.  Iraq’s 
parallel security structures during the 1980s not only protected the regime against internal 
insurrection but also aided in its secondary mission of preventing the external threat of Iran from 
overthrowing the Baathist regime by force.  Institutional evolution also occurred with the 
expansion of capabilities across Iraq’s parallel security apparatus to confront not only internal 
threats but also external ones. As a result regime durability was maintained which allowed for 
the institutional continuity of Iraq’s parallel security structures. 
Resistance in the North and the Invasion of Kuwait 
 While Kurdish forces lost control of the North once again, they reorganized into an 
insurgency to combat the Baathist regime (Lortz 2005, 57).  The Kurdish guerrillas in 1989 
organized into strike teams of no more than 60 fighters armed with assault rifles, rocket 
propelled grenades, and mortars (Lortz 2005, 58). In April of 1989, KDP Kurdish guerillas 
successfully attack an Iraqi convoy.129 Kurdish attacks on Baathist regime positions continued up 
until August of 1990 (Lortz 2005, 58).  Despite continuous Kurdish attacks in the North, Saddam 
Hussein developed plans to invade Kuwait in August of 1990.130  He believed the disagreements 
with Kuwait over land disputes and war debts were a conspiracy against his regime (Woods 
2008, 78).131  Iraq with its parallel security structures had the 4th largest army in the world in the 
summer of 1989 and a battle tested force from the Iran-Iraq War (Woods 2008, 85). During that 
same summer, Iraq resumed combined arms training that had largely been put on hold as a result 
of conflict with Iran (Woods 2008, 85). However internal plots were ever present.  Several 
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officers planned a coup against the Baathist regime, but were detected by Iraq’s intelligence 
organizations that resulted in expulsions from the military and executions (Hashim 2003, 20). In 
January of 1990, Iraq’s intelligence apparatus most notably Special Security uncovered an 
assassination plot by the Jubur tribe (Al-Marashi 2002).  Jubburi Army officers planned to 
assassinate Saddam Hussein during a military parade; the plot was uncovered two days prior to 
the parade that resulted in the executions of a number of Jabburis and members of the Ubaydis 
tribe as well as the further dismissal of hundreds of more from the military as a precaution 
(Baram 1997, 5). In retaliation, Jubburi Air Force pilots bombed the presidential palace in 1991 
(Baram 1997, 5).  The original reason for this particular Sunni’s tribe dissatisfaction with the 
Baathist regime was tribal land expropriation ordered by Saddam affecting both the Jubur tribe 
and Ubaydi tribe (Baram 1997, 5-6). 
 In preparation for the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq’s Military Intelligence Directorate in July 
of 1990 laid out vital targets that included command and control centers and the Kuwaiti order of 
battle.132  The Republican Guard Hammurabi Division deployed to the south of Iraq in 
preparation for the invasion of Kuwait.133 The Republican Guard which expanded significantly 
during the Iran-Iraq War were believed to be Iraq’s best security units and would lead to a quick 
victory over Kuwait.134 Out of the 12 Republican Guard Divisions the Baathist regime possessed, 
half of them participated in the invasion of Kuwait with three spearheading the assault (Woods 
1994, 33).  The regular military acted as a reserve force following the advancing Republican 
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Guard divisions.135  The 16th and 3rd Republican Guard Special Forces brigades were air dropped 
in or infiltrated through Iraq’s border to secure vital points that would allow for the easy capture 
of objectives near the border eventually leading to Kuwait’s capital, Kuwait City.136 Learning 
from the lessons of the Iran-Iraq War, Infantry brigades were attached to armored forces to clear 
security checkpoints and artillery would follow behind to fire illumination shells to speed up the 
advance of the attacking forces.137 As former Republican Guard Commander General Hamdani 
recalls, “Speed would prevent the Kuwaiti 6th Mechanized Brigade (defending forward of the 
Mutla Pass) from withdrawing into it. Speed would also prevent the Kuwaiti 35th Brigade from 
reaching and blocking the pass from its base 40km to the South.”138  The Iraqi Navy was also 
crucial with regard to speed.  Iraq’s Navy would assist the Republican Guard by securing 
Kuwaiti ports and ships and linking up with the advancing Republican Guard units to further 
their advance on Kuwaiti targets.139  The Iraqi Navy with its missile boats and the 440th Naval 
Infantry would utilize an amphibious attack to seize the Kuwaiti Naval installation 50 miles from 
the capital and assist with the Republican Guard in furthering their advance on the capital.140  
After capturing the Naval Base, the Republican Guard forces began to storm it not knowing the 
installation had been captured. In this case,  
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there was firing and loudspeaker sounds demanding that we lay down our weapons and 
surrender. Some of our fighters, who earlier were dispatched to reconnoiter the [area 
around the base], were able to make out the red triangle insignia identifying those fighters 
as members of the Republican Guard. We then raised the Iraqi flag to assure them we 
were like them.141 
 
Figure 4.3 - Republican Guard Invasion of Kuwait 
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency; Kevin Woods, Iraqi Perspectives Project Phase II Um Al-Ma’arik (The Mother 
of All Battles): Operational and Strategic Insights from an Iraqi Perspective, 2008. 
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Iraq’s Navy also captured Kuwait’s Faylakah Island with little to no resistance.142 In addition, 
despite a few sorties flown by the Kuwaiti Air Force, the Iraqi Air Force managed to ground 
Kuwait’s Air Force from carrying out further strikes on the advancing Republican Guard.143 
 During the invasion, Iraqi Republican Guard units faced little resistance from Kuwaiti 
defenders. Figure 4.3 displays the Iraqi ground invasion of Kuwait. Kuwait’s military doctrine 
was based upon its air power where its armored forces were to hold off an invading force for 
about 48 hours before Kuwait’s Air Force and allied Air Forces in the region could be utilized to 
repel an invading enemy.144  When Kuwait’s 6th mechanized brigade encountered the 
Hammurabi Division of the Republican Guard they retreated after a few losses.145 Similar to 
Kuwait’s 6th mechanized brigade, once Kuwait’s 35th Armored Brigade came under attack by 
Iraq’s Republican Guard they abandoned their tanks after only a few losses to their forces.146  
Once the Republican Guard had taken the capital they deployed tanks at key intersections and 
began arresting government officials and security personnel.147 Iraq’s Republican Guard Medina 
Division secured coastal areas and the southern areas of Kuwait with little to no resistance.148  
The Medina Division encountered remnants of Kuwait’s 35th Armored Brigade and defeating 
them in the desert in the southwest of the country.149  By 3rd of August 1990, Iraq’s Republican 
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Guard Divisions had secured Kuwait and sustained less than 100 causalities each and relatively 
few equipment losses (Woods 2008, 123).  
Iraqi Occupation of Kuwait 
 After Iraq’s occupation, a sizable Kuwaiti opposition emerged with hit and run tactics 
similar to those employed by Kurdish guerillas in the North.150  The Iraqi Republican Guard 
consolidated its gains in August by creating defensive positions throughout the country and 
conducting missions on behalf of Iraq’s intelligence services to stem the tide of Kuwaiti 
resistance (Woods 2008, 135).  Soon units of Iraq’s regular military and Popular Army arrived to 
augment the Republican Guard and assist in cracking down on Kuwait’s internal resistance, the 
latter force being cast by some Iraqi military commanders as undisciplined and as part of the 
problem in combating the Kuwaiti resistance (Woods 2008, 135). Most Iraqi Popular Army units 
deployed to Kuwait were sent without uniforms, which led to Saddam Hussein and his inner 
circle to chastise Baathist officials for allowing this force to be deployed without uniforms in a 
designated combat zone.151  Further issues with the Popular Army were noted in a military 
intelligence report, “many among our troops left their weapons and went for a walk in a 
disorganized way which caused some of them to be murdered.”152  Another problem was the 
deployment of Iraqi security forces in Kuwait.  Blind spots or minimal forces in certain areas led 
to the Kuwaiti resistance to target small concentrated areas with Iraqi soldiers where backup was 
                                                          
150 Correspondence among military intelligence directorates on security conditions in Kuwait, various dates between 
26 August and 25 October 1990, IISP-2003-00036124, Harmony Document Folder, Harmony Documents Database 
Archive, Alexandria, VA, United States. 
151 Saddam discussing post-invasion Arab policy with high-ranking officials, early August 1990, ISGQ-2003-
M0006909, Harmony Document Folder, Conflict Records Research Center Archive, Washington, D.C., United 
States. 
152 Memorandum from General Military Intelligence Directorate (Southern  Zone Intelligence Branch) to the 
Secretary, Presidents Office, 1990, ISGP-2003-00029600, Harmony Document Folder, Conflict Records Research 
Center Archive, Washington, D.C., United States. 
111 
 
too far to intervene and assist the Iraqi elements under attack.153 After about eight weeks, the 
internal security situation stabilized in Kuwait (Woods 2008, 138). “Iraqi forces were still 
manning checkpoints, conducting security patrols and executing large-scale sweeps, but the level 
of public violence had generally subsided” (Woods 2008, 138).  In November of 1990, Iraqi 
Special Forces and Popular Army units under the Khadima Forces Command were performing 
sweeping operations to detain any suspicious persons or discover any banned weapons.154 
However due to the depopulation of larges areas in Kuwait, many areas were ghost towns, 
simplifying the security situation within the country for not only the intelligence services but also 
for the army and parallel security structures deployed in Kuwait (Woods 2008, 138).  
Defense of Kuwait and Iraq 
 The Baathist regime plan for defending Iraq’s 19th province was the dispersion of forces 
which included parallel military structures such as General Security Service, Iraqi Intelligence 
Service, and Popular Army units.155  Baathist leaders decided to prioritize on air defense and 
have military supplies available in the event of a campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraq.156 Other 
air defense measures included communication via liaisons rather than communication equipment 
due to concern that enemy forces could intercept such communications with advanced signals 
intelligence.157  In addition, Baghdad recalled the Republican Guard from Kuwait and deployed 
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them along the border of Iraq.158  In anticipation of an invasion in Iraq and Kuwait, Regime 
officials expanded the Republican Guard by four divisions to include the al-Nida, al-Quds, al-
Abed, and al-Mustafa Divisions.159  The Republican Guard handed control of its last sector in 
Kuwait to the Iraqi regular army on 7 September 1990.160  After about a month and half of an 
aerial campaign by the U.S. led coalition, coalition ground troops began advancing into Kuwait 
on 21 February 1991 (Woods 2008, 280).  Despite Iraq’s III Corps of the regular army in 
Kuwait, putting up stiff resistance to coalition attacks, the air power and coalition’s ability to 
outmaneuver Iraqi forces on the ground proved too difficult for the Baathist regime.161 Iraq’s III 
Corps was deployed in the South, but Iraq also had five more Corps deployed in Kuwait.  These 
included IV Corps, VI Corps, VII Corps, the I Corps, which was deployed in western Kuwait, 
and II Corps, which was deployed in Kuwait City (Woods 2008, 300,308).  On February 25th, 
1991, under the cover of darkness Iraq’s 5th Division with Iraq’s 22nd Brigade of the 8th 
Division, and Iraq’s 7th Division with Iraq’s 8th Brigade of the 3rd Armored Division, all part of 
the III Corps, attacked coalition positions at dawn in a pincer attack.162  The attack led to 
significant losses on both sides but eventually, the III Corps was repulsed.163  The remnants164 of 
the III Corps fell back to Kuwait City that same day.   
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Further on the 25th of February 1991, Iraq’s Ministry of Defense approved an order to 
withdraw Iraqi forces from Kuwait after severe coalition attacks not only from the air but also on 
the ground.165  From February 25th to February 26th, Iraqi command troops, Intelligence services 
personnel, the Popular Army, Iraqi Naval Forces and Iraq’s III Corps withdrew back into Iraq.166  
From February 26th to February 27th, Iraq’s IV, II, VI, and VII Corps withdrew from Kuwait, 
returning to Iraq.167 A senior Iraqi commander commented on the withdrawal, “Frankly, we had 
not planned for retreat, we had not given it a thought, therefore the majority of sectors were 
surprised to hear of the orders of withdrawal… Some of the commanders lost control of their 
units during the process of withdrawal…this was caused by the large numbers of retreating 
sectors [simultaneously] piling onto the roads.”168  The withdrawal process and defensive “reset” 
was further complicated by the parallel, but distinct chain of commands, between the regular 
army and Republican Guard (Woods 2008, 315). In which case, “a senior Army officer 
complained that he and his staff never received information on the Republican Guard disposition 
around al-Basra as the Army made its way North out of Kuwait” (Woods 2008, 315).  On 26th 
February of 1991, U.S. forces in Iraq encountered the elite Republican Guard Tawakalna 
Division.169  This would become known in history as the Battle of 73 Eastings (Woods 2008, 
317). Despite the small size of the U.S. force facing this Republican Guard Division, the battle 
would favor the coalition leading to the complete destruction of the Iraqi Republican Guard force 
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they faced.170 Despite coalition advances underway in Iraq, the coalition led by the United States 
decided on a ceasefire on 28th of February 1991 with Iraq, ending hostilities after Iraq withdrew 
from Kuwait (Woods 2008, 326-327). After Baghdad accepted the ceasefire, Saddam ordered the 
military back to their pre-war locations.171  As soon as this order was made, reports of uprisings 
had begun in the South and North.172  Even with Baghdad’s acceptance of a ceasefire, a cessation 
of hostilities did not immediately take effect.  West of Basra, the Republican Guard’s 17th 
Brigade of the Hammurabi Division came under aerial attack from the United States as well as 
ground forces from the U.S. 24th Infantry Division.173  Despite this engagement, an emergency 
order was issued as a result of a Shia uprising in the South and the need for the Republican 
Guard to put it down.174  Desertions had already begun in the regular military units, making their 
usefulness in putting down a popular uprising in the North and South impossible (Huggins 1994, 
33).  
1991 Uprising in the North and South 
Prior to the uprising, Iraq’s General Military Intelligence Directorate received 
intelligence on insurgent groups called the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution and the Iraq 
Islamic Liberation Army that were planning a revolt in southern Iraq.175 This information began 
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coming in around December 31st, 1990.176 From this information, Iraq’s Military Intelligence 
was able to identify recruitment centers opened in Dezful and al-Ahwaz in southwestern Iran for 
future attacks against the Baathist regime.177 Iraq’s intelligence services continued monitoring 
these groups and Iranian military movements along the border until coalition air attacks began 
and these initiatives were repurposed for the ongoing war effort.178 Retreating Iraqi forces back 
into Iraq began deserting and joining insurgents as soon as they entered back into the country. 
Unrest in the Shia South first began on the 2nd of March 1991 in Basra (Cline 2000). Retreating 
soldiers and deserters joined the ranks of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution and the 
Islamic Liberation Army rather quickly, which swelled as residents in the South began to join 
these opposition groups as well (Cline 2000). Shia opposition groups were able to recruit around 
125,000 fighters from army deserters and local residents (Cline 2000). By March 5th of that same 
year, over twelve towns were in the hands of Shia insurgents (Cline 2000).  On 7 March, Saddam 
Hussein named his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, as the new interior minister to crush the 
uprisings.179  Fearful of the rebellion reaching Baghdad, the Republican Guard established 
checkpoints at approaches to the capital.180  Republican Guard units were sent to both the North 
and South to quell the uprisings (Cline 2000).  Shia insurgents were quite brutal in their tactics, 
often capturing and murdering Baathist officials and their families in areas they seized (Cline 
2000). However the regime’s response was just as brutal when dealing with the Shia insurgents 
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and their supporters. The utilization of the Republican Guard as well as operatives from the 
office of Special Security were instrumental in eliminating the Shia rebellion in the South (Al-
Marashi 2002). By the 28th of March, the rebellion in the South had been crushed by the 
Republican Guard and all the towns seized by insurgents had been recaptured (Cline 2000). By 
30 March, the Baathist regime began sending more Republican Guard units up North to assist 
with the dilemma of Kurdish guerillas (Cline 2000). The first elements of the Kurdish National 
Defense Battalions defected to the Kurdish guerillas of the KDP and PUK in early March of 
1991 (Lortz 2005, 59).   Soon Baathist control over the Kurdish towns of Raniya, Chawar Qurna, 
Koi-Sanjaq, Sulaymaniya, Halabja, Arbat, Arbil, Duhuk, Zahku, and Kirkuk fell to Kurdish 
guerillas as military desertions expanded (Lortz 2005, 59). By March 14th, 1991, Kurdish 
guerillas had taken control of 75% of Iraqi Kurdistan (Lortz 2005, 59). After the deployment of 
the Republican Guard in the North and their advances on captured towns, Kurdish guerillas 
retreated to the mountains, allowing the regime to recapture most of Iraqi Kurdistan (Lortz 2005, 
60).  
Iraq’s Parallel Security Structures – From the Invasion of Kuwait to the 1991 Revolts 
From the lens of historical institutionalism and organizational theory, Iraq’s parallel 
security structures followed their institutional framework and mission of internal defense. The 
parallel security apparatus, in this case, were crucial to uncovering coup attempts during the late 
1980s and early 1990s, one of which involved an assassination attempt against Saddam Hussein 
during a planned military parade. Iraq’s Republican Guard proved effective in its invasion of 
Kuwait and combating the opposition during the occupation period as well as defending Iraq 
from the coalition.  The Popular Army, on the other hand, had mixed results. The force proved to 
be combat ineffective during the initial part of the occupation period from a lack of discipline.  
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However the forced proved somewhat combat effective as opposition activity was curtailed after 
about 8 weeks of occupation as a result of raids and security patrols by the Iraqi military, Popular 
Army, Republican Guard, and Iraq’s intelligence organizations.  During the uprisings in the 
North and South, the Popular Army completely collapsed as well as the regular army.  It was the 
Republican Guard and Iraq’s intelligence organizations, most notably the office of Special 
Security, which brought Iraq’s South and North back under the control of Baathist rule. 
Iraq from 1992 to 1998 
After the Gulf War and the 1991 uprisings, the military was downsized as thousands of 
officers and enlisted were retired or “pensioned off” (Hashim 2003, 20). In light of the uprisings 
in the North and South and as a result of coup attempts by the Republican Guard in the early 
1990s, Saddam Hussein created a new intelligence organization called Military Security in 1992 
(Al-Marashi 2002). This organization of Military Security’s primary mission was to detect 
dissent within the military, but it also monitored other areas of the security apparatus as well (Al-
Marashi 2002).  As in other intelligence gathering organizations in Iraq, Military Security had 
informants and agents within the military and also possessed its own military brigade for internal 
security (Al-Marashi 2002).  In 1992, a coup attempt was instigated by two brigades of the 
Republican Guard involving 135 officers (Cougglin 2002, 81; Hashim 2003, 24-25).  However, 
Iraq’s Intelligence Service uncovered the plot and mass executions were carried out to purge the 
parallel security structure from ever carrying out another planned attack on the Baathist regime 
(Cougglin 2002, 81). In another coup attempt two weeks after the 1992 coup attempts by the 
Republican Guard, a prominent Shia General Abdul Wahid Shanan Rabt was executed along 
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with 30 more officers for his coup attempt against the Baathist regime.181 In 1993, yet another 
coup attempt was made by a member of the Jubur tribe; Colonel Sabri Mahmud al-Jiburi, an 
armor officer in the Iraqi military, attempted a coup against the Baathist regime but was detected 
before the coup could take off (Hashim 2003, 28). In yet another coup attempt, a Dulaymi officer 
in the Air Force attempted to oust various stakeholders of the Baathist regime, however his plot 
was detected by one of Iraq’s intelligence services (Hashim 2003, 32).  His body was left outside 
the city of Ramadi, home to the Dulaymi tribe (Hashim 2003, 32). This led to a tribal revolt by 
the Al-Bu Nimer, a sub-tribe of the Dulaym tribal confederation (Baram 1997, 6).  Thousands of 
soldiers from the Republican Guard defected and attempted to attack Abu Ghraib prison to 
release their fellow tribesmen incarcerated there.182 The unrest lasted for three weeks before it 
was put down by Iraq’s parallel security structures (Baram 1997, 6).  By 1996, the Baathist 
regime had problems not only with Shia militants, Kurdish guerillas, but also now from three 
Sunni tribes of the Ubayd, Jubur, and Dulaym (Baram 1997, 6).  
In light of all these coup attempts, even among the Republican Guard itself, the Baathist 
regime under Saddam Hussein created the Fedayeen Saddam in 1994183 and Special Republican 
Guard in 1995 where soldiers were handpicked and recruited out of loyal Sunnis (Al-Marashi 
2002).  In addition this Special Republican Guard’s strength numbered at around 26,000 troops 
or four brigades; the new force was deployed in and around Baghdad (Boyne 1997; Al-Marashi 
2002).   The soldiers were primarily recruited from perceived loyal areas of Iraq which included 
Tikrit, al-Sharqat, Baiji, and other small towns south and west of Mosul and north and west of 
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Baghdad and particularly from Saddam’s tribe of the Al Bu Nasir (Boyne 1997; Hashim 2003, 
25). The Special Republican Guard were deployed at government palaces, escorted Saddam on 
his travels, and acted as an emergency response force in case of coup attempts (Boyne 1997). 
The need for the Fedayeen Saddam arose out of the failure of the Popular Army and other Baath 
Party organs to put down the revolts of 1991 in the North and South (Woods et al 2006a, 52).  In 
addition, the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard were unable to act with “sufficient speed” to 
tackle the revolts in the North and South (Woods et al 2006a, 52).  Furthermore, the increase in 
coup attempts and tribal animosities led to the creation of the Fedayeen Saddam even further 
(Woods et al 2006a, 52). The Fedayeen Saddam very much acted in the same manner as the 
Iraq’s Baath Party militia, their role was confined to defending various areas within Iraq from 
insurgent attacks, infiltrations from Iran, and surveillance of the local populace as well as the 
military.184  Some of the Fedayeen’s operations included “‘Extermination operations’ against 
saboteurs in Al-Muthana, an operation to ‘ambush and arrest’ car thieves in Al-Anbar,” and “The 
monitoring of Shi’ite civilians at the holy places of Karbala” (Woods et al 2006a, 53).185  The 
Fedayeen Saddam primarily focused on small arms unit training, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (Woods et al 2006a, 53).  Some of these operations also included capturing 
military deserters throughout Iraq.186 In 1994, the Fedayeen Saddam not only recruited loyal 
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Iraqis but also foreign Sunnis to join their ranks (Woods et al 2006a, 54).187 While the Special 
Republican Guard was a relatively selective parallel security structure, with respect to who they 
recruited, this did not prevent potential coups from occurring.  In 1996 a coup attempt by 
members of the Republican Guard Forces Command along with soldiers of the Special 
Republican Guard was foiled by the Iraqi Intelligence Service before the coup could move 
forward, resulting in the execution of those members that were part of the coup (Hashim 2003, 
25).  
After 1992, the Iraqi intelligence apparatus as well as parallel security structures not only 
had to contend with internal unrest but infiltration attempts and attacks by Iranian sponsored Shia 
militant groups and the Peshmerga up North.188  By the early 1990s, the Badr Corps had an 
extensive network within Iraq and was supported by Iran’s Qods Force of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard.189 The Badr Corps had its headquarters in Karmanshah in Iran and 
established recruitment centers all throughout the south of Iraq.190 On the southern axis, the Badr 
Corps had approximately 60,000 to 70,000 militants and along the central axis they had around 
90,000 militants with around 40,000 inside Iran itself at any given time.191 The Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps established training camps along Iraq’s border to train Shia militant 
groups to attack targets inside Iraq and provided financial assistance of up to 20 million dollars 
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per year to fund such operations.192 While the Badr Corps had rivalries within its own 
organization, they still created problems for Iraq’s Baathist regime.193 Another group called the 
Tharallah group in Iraq attacked regime positions in the South.194 The group had a presence in 
Basra and Nasiriya and would punish locals who would interfere in their group’s affairs.195 Other 
Shia insurgent groups supported by Iran included the movement of Hezballah, 15 Sha’aban, and 
the Sayid al-Shuhada’ Movement.196 
 Iraq’s intelligence organizations also monitored significantly Iraq’s army and Republican 
Guard.  Officers in both organizations had to contend with the Special Security Office, the Iraqi 
Intelligence Service, the General Military Intelligence Directorate, and various security service 
offices observing the actions of both organizations (Woods et al 2006b, 21).  In addition coup-
proofing procedures were implemented to prevent insurrection.  Any time the Republican Guard, 
for example, wanted to move a brigade size unit they had to get permission from their Corps 
Command, which was then submitted up to staff command for approval (Woods et al 2006b, 21).  
For the Republican Guard, spies and informants were everywhere and often times due to the 
atmosphere of mistrust or potential for compromise, new spies were sent to spy on the spies 
already planted within the military and Republican Guard units (Woods et al 2006b, 22).   Any 
time a meeting was held, Corps Commanders would have to purposely find ways to invite spies 
that they were not supposed to know were spies into all meetings held by the Republican Guard 
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and military, otherwise they might suffer the consequences of suspicion from Baghdad (Woods 
et al 2006b, 22). According to one Republican Guard Commander, 
‘all phones in the Republican Guard office were monitored and all meetings were 
recorded. High-ranking officers were subjected to constant technical monitoring and 
surveillance in and out of their homes. The Republican Guard Security Office monitored 
all aspects of senior Republican Guard officers' lives, including their financial affairs and 
diet. Republican Guard Security Office personnel even questioned the guards at senior 
officers' houses to see what they could learn about the officers' lifestyles. The Special 
Security Office knew how many times I went to the bathroom. Republican Guard 
commanders were not trusted to conduct any movement or even so much as start a tank 
without permission. Requesting retirement was impossible because the regime would 
assume one opposed them politically, and one would be arrested and jailed’ (Woods et al 
2006b, 23). 
The constant need for surveillance was indicated by the practices of the security services.  As can 
be seen in Figure 4.4, many of Iraq’s parallel security structures fed into the president’s office as 












Figure 4.4 – Iraqi Intelligence Apparatus by Late 90s 
 
Source: Adapted from Anjali Bhattacharjee Iraqi Security Apparatus chart from the James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies. Adapted from: Ibrahim Al-Marashi, “Iraq’s Security and Intel Network”, MERIA, Sept. 
2002; Compiled by the author. 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard were no longer positioned 
along the borders of Iraq and were instead positioned at checkpoints at crossroads within Iraq 
124 
 
and were in settled areas to monitor communications and respond to infiltration attempts.197  
Iraq’s Popular Army and other paramilitary formations would counter opposition infiltrations 
from Iran by covertly following such groups and eliminating them after reaching their targeted 
destination.198 According to former Corps Commander of the Republican Guard, these 
infiltrators from Iran would enter “the cities to incite the people against Saddam’s regime. This 
was the change in Iranian strategy; they wanted to instigate the cities against the Iraqi regime.”199 
In other instances, the Republican Guard and the Iraqi military raided locations or ambushed 
Iranian infiltrators near the border or in Iran itself.200  These infiltration points can be seen by 
Figure 4.5 which shows both Iranian infiltration points as well as Iraqi checkpoints.  Iraqi 
intelligence services would monitor the border, monitoring Iranian combatants bringing in 
weapons to Iraqi Shia militants that belonged to either the Badr Corps or Da’wa party.201  Then 
based off of this information, according to former Republican Guard Commander General 
Hamdani, they would set up ambushes with a small force.202  Sometimes these raids led to the 
establishment of tapping into the insurgents and Iranian communications network to determine 
when meetings would occur in Iraqi cities.203  Once meetings occurred or strikes or revolts 
manifested, it was the job of the Baath Party Militia and/or Fedayeen Saddam to intervene.204 
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According to Hamdani “if control were lost, the reserve force (Baath Party Militia, Quds Army, 
or Fedayeen)205 would block the city and then storm it. Pretty much all the major cities or the 
villages along the border had this system. It aimed at avoiding any kind of revolt within the 
cities.”206   
From 1995 to 1997, the Kurdish threat was minimal in the North as two rival factions of 
Kurdish guerrillas engaged in their own version of a civil war.   The PUK received assistance 
from Syria and Iran, while the KDP received support from the Baathist regime (Lortz 2005, 63).  
In August 1996, the KDP Peshmerga and 30,000 Iraqi troops captured Erbil from 3,000 PUK 
defenders (Lortz 2005, 63-64).  The PUK lost significant ground in northern Iraq until Iranian 
aid began flowing in (Lortz 2005, 64). However by early 1997, the KDP was once again at odds 
with the Baathist regime (Lortz 2005, 65).  From July 1997 to December of 1997, Iraq’s 
Intelligence Service placed various organizations under surveillance and had others penetrated 
by agents and informants.207  These included the Hezbollah party, Badr Corps, Da’wa party, al-
Thawrah, Al-Wahabiyyah Movement, Supreme Council, Kurdistan Democratic Party, Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan, and Islamic Ideology Organization.208  Locations of meetings or warehouses 
that were raided belonging to these groups often times uncovered weapons and plots for attacks 
against regime and its stakeholders.209  In addition, Kurdish Fedayeen units with the 
Nebuchadnezzar Division of the Republican Guard conducted operations within Iraqi Kurdistan 
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beyond the reach of the Baathist regime and provided area defense in villages and cities in the 
North.210   
 
Figure 4.5 – Map of Northeastern Iraqi with Iranian Infiltration Attempts. 
 
Source: “U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Iraq, DI Cartography Center/MPG 802950A1 (C00519), 1-03. Red = 
Iranian infiltration movements. Blue = Iraqi defensive positions and movements. Green (in Iran) = theoretical Iraqi 
positions for potential mission and choke points.”211 
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Iraq from 1999-2003 
In 1999, more officers implicated in a plot to overthrow the Baathist regime were 
detected by Iraq’s Military Security and executed (Hashim 2003, 20).  These included prominent 
generals such as, Major General Ghadban 'Abed al-Ghriri and General Kamel Sachet, a member 
of the al-Janabbi tribe from central Iraq (Hashim 2003, 20). Throughout the late 1990s and early 
2000s, Iraqi opposition groups would infiltrate the border and attack various government 
buildings and checkpoints throughout Iraq.  In November of 1999, around 10 reported attacks 
and infiltration attempts were recorded by Iraq’s intelligence services, and by Iraq’s III Corps 
and IV Corps commands.212  On 13 November 1999, the III Corps of the Iraqi Army reported 
infiltration attempts by Iranian agents to facilitate attacks on state security and party 
headquarters.213 This information was forward to the General Military Intelligence Directorate to 
coordinate operations to apprehend the infiltrators.214 On 26th November 1999, Iraq’s IV Corps 
of the Iraqi Army detected with the assistance of Southern Zone Command and General Military 
Intelligence Directorate that Iraqi Shia militants were in the Al-Sardahiyyah area of Iraq.215  The 
IV Corps of the Iraq Army utilized intelligence officers under its command to conduct 
surveillance while coordinating with the III Corps of the Iraqi Army in the southern zone of 
operations.216  The IV Corps of the Iraqi Army also coordinated its efforts with Iraq’s various 
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intelligence services as well as the Baath Party headquarters in the Al-Aziz area.217  An ambush 
was subsequently established by both the III Corps and IV Corps of the Iraqi Army which 
included about 15 soldiers and two officers to establish an ambush to intercept the militants.218  
On 20th November 1999, The General Military Intelligence Directorate and Iraq’s IV Corps of 
the Iraqi Army discovered a surveillance plot of Iraqi troop movements near Al-Fadli village.219 
The militants made their way back to Iran.220  The III Corps of the Iraqi Army received advanced 
warning from the General Military Intelligence Directorate that a unit of Iran’s Special Forces 
Division would accompany infiltrators with light to medium weapons and mortars to attack 
various posts in the southern command zone.221 On 25th November 1999, Iraq’s Baathist militia 
was utilized to intercept cargo in Diyala province carrying Iranian Shahin surface to air missiles 
as well as explosives to be utilized by insurgents in southern Iraq.222  This was done in 
coordination with an armed element of the General Security Service and with operatives of Iraq’s 
Intelligence Service.223  On 26th November 1999, the III Corps of the Iraqi Army was utilized as 
a response force in the wake of an attack on a police station in the South.224 The 2nd Brigade of 
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the III Corps apprehended 4 Iranian soldiers in camouflage uniforms and two Shia militants.225 
An hour later,  
At 1100 hrs, (4) Land Cruiser vehicles and (4) motorbikes were observed with about (30) 
Iranian soldiers. (5) Soldiers who speak Arabic advanced and the rest deployed in the 
area, they requested us to release the (4) soldiers who were arrested earlier, and they 
threatened to attack our troops if we refused. We released the soldiers...226 
The General Security Service on 27th November 1999 detected Shia militant activities in the 
village of Al-Amarah where they committed “crimes against the people of the village.”227  The 
General Military Intelligence Directorate on 28th November 1999 received information that an 
attack would occur on Basra’s Baath Party Headquarter, which led to increased surveillance and 
security within the city.228  Further in 1999, there were disturbances by Shia unrest in the holy 
cities of Najaf and Karbala.229  The Babil and Najaf based Fedayeen Saddam were deployed 
alongside Baath Party militia and the Republican Guard to subdue the unrest.230  The Fedayeen 
Saddam for the most part acted as riot control and deployed snipers on the roofs.231 
 From 2000 to 2001, Iraq’s parallel security structures with the intelligence services began 
operations to root out dissidents and insurgents throughout Iraq.  On 22 January 2000, the 
General Security Service with the assistance of the Baath Party militia established checkpoints in 
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Karbala and Najaf and conducted house searches in order to root out any supporters of the 
militant factions in the South.232 The Iraqi intelligence service received information on 13 May 
2000 that the Badr Corps was planning to utilize suicide bombers in Anbar province to attack 
regime posts.233 The information likely allowed Iraq’s security forces to foil the plot.  Four days 
later, Iraq’s intelligence service received information that an Iranian infiltration attempt was to 
be made.234  According to the report, two Iranian operatives dressed in Iraqi military uniforms 
with the ranks of a staff colonel and staff lieutenant colonel would arrive in Baghdad to commit 
acts of sabotage and that their vehicle would have Iraqi government plates and be carrying 
guided missiles to commit such acts of sabotage.235  In May of 2001, Iraq’s intelligence service 
uncovered a plot by the KDP to bomb the cities of Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Al-Mawsil.236  This led 
to increased security as well as the deployment of parallel security structures to prevent the 
success of KDP guerillas from bombing their targets.  Further intelligence reports by Iraq’s 
intelligence service also indicated in May of 2001, Iran’s attempts to recruit Iraqi officers within 
the intelligence services in order to better facilitate their proxy’s attacks inside Iraq.237   
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Around 2001, Iraq’s Baath Party militia was reorganized under an expansion called the 
Quds Army (Woods et al 2006b, 14). Their role as a parallel security structure was to surveil 
roads and villages, prevent infiltration attempts by insurgents, and protect vital government posts 
and buildings.238 Based upon intelligence reports, Iraq’s Quds army, a Baath Party militia, was 
deployed in Karbala to intercept Badr Corps attacks in the South.239 The Karbala branch of the 
Quds Army was ordered to “conduct patrols and monitor the area near camps, and intensify the 
guard duty and patrols in order to prevent those agents from achieving their intentions.”240  The 
major problem with the Quds force was that most arms provided to the Baath Party militias came 
from the army, and as a result, the military had less weapons and ammunition.241 In the same 
strand as the Popular Army and the Baath Party militia after it, the Quds Army was led by high- 
ranking Baathists rather than military professionals to ensure the force’s loyalty.242 Both the 
Fedayeen Saddam and Quds Army as organizations not only drained resources from the military 
in the form of armaments, but also made recruitment into the military more difficult (Woods et al 
2006b, 14).  Potential conscripts joined these parallel security organizations as part-time soldiers 
and at varying times full-time enforcers of the Baath Party rather than full-time conscripts in the 
military (Woods et al 2006b, 14). Quality of life was generally significantly better in both 
organizations rather than being a lower enlisted in the military. 
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 In 2001, the General Security Service ordered the Fedayeen Saddam in central Iraq to 
surveil and attack a Sunni insurgent group called the AI-Wahabiyyah Movement, the Iraqi 
Communist Party, and the Islamic Movement of Al-Sulaymaniyyah.243  In 2002, the General 
Military Intelligence Directorate received multiple reports of Badr Corps and other Shia group 
attacks across the south of Iraq to include in Basra and infiltration attempt near the Majnun and 
Al-Huizah marsh.244  Iraq’s Military Intelligence directed the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard 
to establish ambush points and increase border security and surveillance to combat infiltration 
attempts and intercept attacks by the Badr Corps and other Shia militant groups.245 Further 
attacks occurred in December of 2002, this time in central Iraq.246 One attack occurred in Al-
Majar district, near Umm Al-Aranib village against a government bus.247  Another attack 
occurred near Al-Qurnah and Al-Chibaiysh and a police patrol near these areas came into contact 
with Shia militants that resulted in the death of the Police Lieutenant, Bashir Qazim Al-Maliki.248  
In addition ambushes were set by the 14th Infantry Division of the Iraqi army in Abu-Khassaf 
area and Al-Majari area to eliminate Shia militant groups operating in the area.249  Furthermore, 
in December of 2002, embedded operatives of Iraq’s Intelligence Service in the Badr Corps 
uncovered plans to attack Republican Guard troops in the Al-Sawadah area as well as 
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government buildings to take control of Wasit province.250  To better tackle infiltration attempts 
and attacks in the South, the Quds Army began field-training exercises to practice ambushes and 
attacks to best combat insurgent threats within the country.251  
 
Table 4.2 – Number of Recorded Terrorist Attacks against the Baathist Regime from 1992 
to 2002 
Year of Attacks Number of Recorded Attacks Carried 
Out that Year 
1992 14 











Source: Global Terrorism Database, Iraq, 1992 to 2002. Data compiled by author. 
 
Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the military and the Baathist regime’s parallel 
security structure focused on the infiltration attempts from Iran, opposition groups in the north, 
south, and central Iraq, and coup attempts by the military and Republican Guard.  As Table 4.2 
demonstrates, which only shows successful terrorist attacks, there were several other detected 
coups and planned terrorist attacks that were not carried out as a result of Iraq’s parallel security 
structures.  While this table is limited to only successful terrorist attacks, there were other forms 
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of political violence carried out during this period of time from 1992 to 2002 which included 
armed assaults by opposition groups and local insurrections that unfolded, threatening the 
Baathist regime. 
The Coalition Invasion of Iraq - 2003 
 By 2003, after more than a decade of sanctions and two external wars, Iraq’s military was 
unprepared for a conventional conflict.  When the coalition did invade Iraq in March of 2003, the 
military collapsed (Woods et al 2006a, 125-126).  Even Iraq’s parallel security structures such as 
the Republican Guard began to face significant desertions (Woods et al 2006a, 126). The parallel 
military organization of the Quds Army not only faced issues of desertions, but many members 
would not report for duty during the invasion by the coalition (Woods et al 2006, 50).  The 
Fedayeen Saddam were the only force that essentially put up stiff resistance against the coalition 
long after the Republican Guard had quit the field (Woods et al 2006a, 55). By 6 April of 2003, 
most Division and Corps level headquarters had been destroyed (Woods et al 2006a, 148).  
Command and control had effectively been neutralized as Saddam began in April moving units 
of the military and the parallel security structures for the defense of Baghdad that no longer 
existed, either because of losses or mass desertions (Woods et al 2006a, 149).  “There were 
reports of significant Fedayeen Saddam and Ba’athist militia desertions in Nasiriyah, Najaf, and 
other southern Iraqi cities. By March 31st, desertions among Ba’athist and Al Quds militiamen, 
for example, had reduced the total number of defenders in the Central Euphrates region” 
(Hosmer 2007, 103).  Once defeat became inevitable, significant portions of the military, 
Republican Guard, Quds Army, Fedayeen Saddam, and Intelligence services simply “faded 
away” (Hosmer 2007, 103). When Iraq’s forces in the North were ordered on April 2nd to move 
towards Baghdad for its final defense of Baghdad, commanders were told they would be joined 
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by 4,000 Republican Guard soldiers; the reality was that only about 1,000 Republican Guard 
soldiers actually heeded the call as most had deserted by this point (Hosmer 2007, 109). By April 
5th, 2003, most of Baghdad’s defenders that were mustered in the capital had begun deserting 
themselves (Hosmer 2007, 109). “Soon after American forces fought their way into the Baghdad 
International Airport, the men began to desert” (Hosmer 2007, 109). By April 7th as U.S. forces 
moved further into Baghdad, Special Republican Guard units and Republican Guard units that 
had been ordered to protect the palace complex in Baghdad had deserted themselves putting up 
no resistance what so ever (Hosmer 2007, 112). According to Harith Ahmed Uraibi, a Baath 
Party militiaman and archivist at the palace complex whom had come into contact with 
Saddam’s convoy in Baghdad after he deserted his post (Hosmer 2007, 112). “Saddam shouted at 
him: ‘What’s going on at the palaces?’ Uraibi said: ‘Mr. President, everything is finished, (He 
didn’t say anything. His convoy just took off across the bridge, away from the palaces and all the 
tanks)’” (Hosmer 2007, 112). In about a month coalition forces made it to Baghdad and the 
Baathist regime essentially ceased to exist (Homer 2007, 112).  
Conclusion: The Effectiveness of Iraq’s Parallel Security Structures from 1992 to 2003 
 In line with historical institutionalism and organizational theory, Iraq’s parallel security 
structures were effective at not only preserving the regime from internal threats but were able to 
suppress revolts quickly and limit the movement of opposition groups in Iraq.  Despite some 
failures during the 1991 uprising with regard to the military and Republican Guard, which led to 
the creation of the organization of Military Security in 1992 and the Fedayeen Saddam in 1994, 
Iraq’s parallel intelligence organizations such as the office of Special Security, Iraq’s 
Intelligence Service, General Security Service, Military Security, Baathist Party Security Unit, 
and Internal Security units within each intelligence organization were all instrumental in 
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detecting dissent and coups within the security apparatus.  The Republican Guard, on the other 
hand, Iraq’s most elite parallel security structure, suffered from issues of planned coups against 
the Baathist regime as a result of tribal affinities.  It was from this weariness and problems within 
the Republican Guard that the Baathist regime decided to create a coup-free organization called 
the Special Republican Guard in 1995. However that myth was quashed in 1996 when soldiers 
from both the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard instigated a coup against the 
Baathist regime.  However despite issues of coups and local insurrections, Iraq’s parallel security 
structures which also include the parallel military organizations such as the Quds Army, 
Fedayeen Saddam, Republican Guard, and Special Republican Guard, were able to confront and 
disrupt infiltration attempts from Iran, raid and ambush opposition groups, and preserve regime 
institutions and stakeholders. These institutions stayed true to their institutional arrangements, 
evolving and changing only to meet organizational needs set forth by Baathist stakeholders.  
The downside to these parallel security structures was they drained resources from the 
regular armed forces that were necessary to combat external threats.  When the coalition decided 
to invade in 2003, the military put up little resistance before disintegrating from the oncoming 
advance of coalition forces.  In addition the resources provided to the parallel security structures 
did very little as many parallel security structures put up little resistance with the exception of a 
few Republican Guard units and the Fedayeen. The Fedayeen by far was the only force to put up 
stiff resistance, but its organization also suffered from desertions especially in the South.  Overall 
institutional continuity was not preserved when regime durability was put into question by 
overwhelming force from the coalition.  While the parallel security structures had been 
successful in preserving the regime from internal plots and opposition groups, they were 
woefully unprepared for an external threat whose capabilities far exceeded the conventional 
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power of its own military and parallel security structures.  While Iraq’s parallel security 
structures had been involved in previous external conflicts such as war with Iran during the 
1980s and war with Kuwait during the early 1990s, their capabilities and mission were geared 
towards internal defense as set by their institutional framework as parallel security structures.  
While Iraq’s parallel security apparatus could preserve the regime from internal threats, their 
success in defending the country’s borders alongside the military was contingent upon equal 
military parity.  In addition, parallel security structures that had undergone more military training 
were more effective in symmetrical conflicts, while all the parallel security structures were 
























Chapter Five  
Baathism and the Assad Dynasty 
 
 The case of Syria is examined from 1976 to 2018, where the parallel security structures 
utilized by Hafez al-Assad and later under Bashar al-Assad are observed.  Insurgencies, 
assassinations, and internal conflict will be traced to determine the effectiveness parallel security 
structures have on preserving the Syrian Baathist regime.  The durability of Syria’s parallel 
security structures will also be crucial to understanding regime preservation as well as 
institutional continuity in the face of emerging threats and combating existing ones.  The 
political regime under both Hafez al-Assad and later Bashar al-Assad extends further the 
conceptualization of parallel security structures and their use in preserving authoritarianism. By 
tracing the use and impact parallel security structures have on safeguarding and preserving the 
Syrian Baathist regime, one will be able to link the pervasiveness of the parallel security 
apparatus to the durability of regime survival of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.  
Syria’s Parallel Security Structures 
Syria like Iraq has endured coups since its inception as a state.  Around 15 coups took 
place between Syrian statehood in 1949 and Baathist consolidation in 1970 (Quinlivan 1999, 
134).  In 1963, Baathists with other groups of socialists such as the Nasserites and independent 
officers staged a successful coup (Nassif 2014, 168).  During that same year, Baathists instigated 
a coup to oust anyone that was not a member of the Baath Party in the ruling government (Nassif 
2014, 168).  In 1966, another coup occurred between internal Baathist factions (Nassif 2014, 
168).  One led by Generals Salah Jedid and Hafez al-Assad and another faction led by Generals 
Amin al-Hafez and Muhammad Umran (Nassif 2014, 168).  Hafez al-Assad’s faction proved to 
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be the stronger group within the ruling Baathist regime, and successfully ousted from power 
Generals Amin al-Hafez and Muhammad Umran (Nassif 2014, 168). In 1970, Hafez al-Assad 
ousted his former partner within his faction, General Salah Jedid, leading to his consolidation of 
control over the Baath Party and rule over the country (Nassif 2014, 168). Hafez al-Assad and 
his son, Bashar al-Assad, are the only two Baathist leaders whom have been able to navigate 
insurrection and coup attempts within Syria.  Internal control has mostly preserved the Baathist 
regime in Syria and its various regime stakeholders through the utilization of parallel security 
structures.   
 Since 1970 Syria has possessed four pervasive intelligence organizations and one bureau 
that in theory oversees all four of these intelligence gathering organizations (Syria’s Intelligence 
Services 2000).252  Each of the intelligence organizations operates not only in secrecy but 
without coordination, surveilling each other as well as other security organizations within the 
regime and the local populace (Syria’s Intelligence Services 2000).  Each organization possesses 
an extensive informant network that is known only to each individual organization from which 
that informant operates (Syria’s Intelligence Services 2000). In addition, different section leaders 
or commanders of different divisions within these intelligence organizations report directly to 
Assad himself rather than to their agency’s nominal head (“Syria’s Intelligence Services” 2000).  
These intelligence organizations include the Idarat al-Amn al-Siyasi (The Political Security 
Directorate), Idarat al-Amn al-'Amm (General Security Directorate), Shu'bat al-Mukhabarat al-
'Askariyya (Military Intelligence), Idarat al-Mukhabarat al-Jawiyya (Air Force Intelligence), 
and the National Security Bureau of the Arab Socialist Baath Party (Syria’s Intelligence Services 
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2000).253  All of Syria’s intelligence gathering organizations have their own facilities which 
include interrogation cells and detention centers ensuring the detection of dissent and coup 
attempts within the populace and security apparatus.254  
The parallel intelligence gathering organizations of the General Security Directorate, 
Syria’s Military Intelligence, the Air Force Intelligence, and the Political Security Directorate all 
perform similar functions of internal surveillance on the populace. The General Security 
Directorate is the main intelligence body in Syria with three branches (Syria’s Intelligence 
Services 2000).  Branch 251 of the General Security Directorate concerns itself with surveilling 
the local population, the Baath Party, and civilian bureaucracy to detect dissent amongst the 
population (Rathmell 1996; Syria’s Intelligence Services 2000).255  The other two branches 
under the General Security Directorate focus on external threats emanating outside of Syria and 
Palestinian groups within Lebanon and Syria (Syria’s Intelligence Services 2000).  In addition, 
the police and border guards fall under the General Security Directorate (Rathmell 1996). Syria’s 
Military intelligence also provides surveillance of the population but more or less surveils the 
military and gathers intelligence on threats abroad that are of concern to Syria’s military 
leadership (Rathmell 1996; Syria’s Intelligence Services 2000). The armed force of Syria’s 
Military Intelligence is the military police, which falls under their direct control when combating 
internal threats (Rathmell 1996). Despite its name, the Air Force Intelligence is not an 
organization that provides intelligence on enemy military assets (Syria’s Intelligence Services 
2000).  The Air Force Intelligence essentially operates much in the same regard as the General 
Security Directorate by providing a check on the Baath Party and surveilling the local population 
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for potential dissent (Syria’s Intelligence Services 2000).  In addition, the Air Force Intelligence 
also surveils the military for potential coup attempts and to check the loyalty of personnel within 
the military (Syria’s Intelligence Services 2000).  The Air Force Intelligence also operates both 
internationally and domestically, often times tackling Islamist opposition when it emerges within 
the country (Syria’s Intelligence Services 2000).The Political Security Directorate also parallels 
that of the General Security Directorate as it pertains to duties of surveillance. One of the roles 
the Political Security Directorate holds is detecting dissent within the population and the 
emergence of organized political activity that run counter to the regime’s interests (Rathhmell 
1996; Syria’s Intelligence Services 2000).256  Syria’s intelligence organizations constitute 
parallel security structures because they parallel the internal police by enforcing regime control 
and cracking down on dissent.   
Another parallel security structure is the National Security Bureau. The National Security 
Bureau operates to the same extent as Syria’s other parallel intelligence organizations by 
surveilling the local population, the military, and also the Baath Party to detect dissent or the 
questionable loyalty of those within the regime.257  While its core duty is to provide 
recommendations to the president of Syria and coordinate operations amongst Syria’s 
intelligence agencies, the National Security Bureau operates on its own due to the high degree of 
autonomy afforded to Syria’s other intelligence organizations by the Syrian Baathist regime.258  
The pervasiveness of the secret police and informant networks within the country are so 
extensive that some estimates hold that each intelligence service has one agent per 257 citizens, 
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further enabling the regime to detect dissent and provide internal control over the population 
(Moharram 2006, 31).  
Since Hafez al-Assad’s regime, and later under Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the Baathist 
regime in Syria has created a bulwark of parallel military organizations that have prevented the 
overthrow of both Baathist governments.  These parallel security structures include: Presidential 
Security, Saraya as Sira (Struggle Companies), Saraya ad Difa (Defense Companies), the 
Republican Guard, Special Forces, Baath Party Militia or Popular Army, and the Third Armored 
Division (Rathmell 1996; Syria’s Praetorian Guards 2000).259, 260  Presidential Security is a 
special bodyguard force that provides protection to the president, similar to the United States 
Secret Service and travels wherever the president goes.261  While technically its role and mission 
does not fall directly under the umbrella as a parallel security structure, presidential security 
provides another enforcement arm that parallels the internal police forces and in times of war or 
a coup attempt would thus become militarized. The Struggle Companies are a parallel military 
force that was commanded by Hafez al-Assad’s cousin, General Adnan al-Assad.262  The force is 
roughly around 5,000 soldiers and its primary responsibility is to create a security cordon around 
the greater Damascus area, the capital of Syria.263 Many within the Struggle Companies were 
recruited from Hafez al-Assad’s own tribe, the Kalbiyya tribe (Dam 2013, 115).  
Another parallel military force is the Defense Companies, which was commanded by 
Hafez al-Assad’s brother, General Rifaat al-Assad.264  The Defense Companies protected crucial 
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government institutions and military installations within Damascus.265  The Defense companies 
recruited almost exclusively Alawites and often received the newest military equipment. They 
served to provide a check on the regular military to prevent any coup attempts (Dam 2013, 
115).266  The Defense Companies number anywhere from 12,000 to 25,000 troops (Batatu 1981, 
331).  
The Republican Guard, yet another Syrian parallel military organization, was originally 
the Presidential Guard and later expanded and became an elite countercoup force in Syria.267  
The Republican Guard is commanded by General Adnan Makhluf, an Alawite and brother to 
Hafez al-Assad’s wife.268 The Republican Guard consists of around 10,000 soldiers and is 
comprised of an armored division, a mechanized brigade, and an artillery regiment based in and 
around Damascus.269  It is the only force that is allowed to deploy within the city center of 
Damascus and has the responsibility of protecting not only the Presidential Palace but also Malki 
district, home to many Syrian regime stakeholders.270 Another parallel security structure that 
protects the Syrian Baathist regime is the Special Forces. The force first emerged in the 1970s 
and has around 10,000 to 15,000 soldiers under its ranks (Rathmell 1996; Syria’s Praetorian 
Guards 2000).   The Special Force’s headquarters are in Al-Qutayfah, which is 25 miles 
northeast of Damascus271 and it is led by General Ali Haydar, an Alawite.272 The force is often 
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stationed in sensitive locations within Syria to curb unrest (Syria’s Praetorian Guards 2000). 
Most soldiers in the Special Forces belong to the Alawite sect within Syria, which garners their 
loyalty to an Alawite dominated Baathist regime.273  
Other parallel military formations that protect the Syrian Baathist regime include the 3rd 
Armored Division and the Baath Party Militia.  The 3rd Armored Division is led by Hafez al-
Assad’s cousin, General Shafiq Fayyad (Syria’s Praetorian Guards 2000).  The 3rd Armored 
Division is comprised of about 15,000 soldiers.274  The last parallel military organization is the 
Baath Party Militia and holds an estimated strength of 100,000.275  The Baath Party Militia is 
supposed to aid other security agencies during periods of unrest and for the most part is a paper 
or part-time force.276  The Baath Party Militia has been led by Major General Ibrahim al-Ali and 
has no familial relationship to either Hafez al-Assad or Bashar al-Assad.277  As a coup-proofing 
measure, most officers within the regular military were Alawite under the Hafez al-Assad 
Baathist regime (Batatu 1981, 332).  These include General Yunis, 9th Armored Division 
Commander and Tawfiq al-Jahani, 1st Armored Division Commander of the regular Army 
(Batatu 1981, 332).  Due to the fact that Hafez al-Assad’s tribe only constituted one-fifth of the 
Alawites in Syria during the 1970s, he was forced to branch out to other Alawites and at times 
Sunnis (Batatu 1981, 332). 
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Syria from 1976 to 1989 
 Prior to 1976, internal insurrection was mostly dealt with by the military and the Baath 
Party Militia within Syria (Galvani 1974, pp. 8-9).  The majority of the military at the time 
reflected the population of Syria which was majority Sunni and minority Alawite, along with 
some other minority communities which included Christians, Druze, and Ismailis. The majority 
of Syrian conscripts at the time were predominantly Sunni, whereas a majority of the high 
ranking officer corps and members of the intelligence apparatus were Alawites. 278, 279 From 1976 
to 1978, assassination attempts of regime stakeholders by Sunni opposition groups occurred 
throughout Syria.280 Further Sunni discontent in 1978 led to the emergence of two Islamic 
fundamentalist groups in Syria (Huckabey and Stout 2010, 343). These groups called the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Fighting Vanguard attacked various regime posts and institutions 
throughout Syria, with the security situation dramatically deteriorating by 1982 (Huckabey and 
Stout 2010, 343).  These Sunni fundamentalist groups carried out a series of successful attacks 
targeting prominent Alawites tied to the regime.281 In 1979 alone, the Muslim Brotherhood 
carried out 15 recorded attacks across Syria from Latakia to Aleppo.282 One Muslim Brotherhood 
attack was on the Syrian Artillery School in 1979 and it left 80 Syrian soldiers dead (Huckabey 
and Stout 2010, 343).  In another attack in 1979, one Alawite and one Christian officer cadet 
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were assassinated in Aleppo.283 In Aleppo, the Muslim Brotherhood gained traction from 
economic marginalization from Damascus of the Sunni merchant class (Pierret and Selvik 2009, 
600).  In September of 1979, in Aleppo and Homs province, anti-regime Shia militants attacked 
military posts in Syria to destabilize the Baathist regime in Damascus.284 From March 9 to March 
10 of 1980, the towns of Jisr al-Shughur and Ma’arra in the province of Idlib protested Baathist 
control over the country.285  In Ma’arra, local security forces open fired on the demonstrators 
killing 30 of them.286  In Jisr al-Shughur, the protestors were more forceful, in which they burned 
down the local Baath Party headquarters, raided local armories, and stormed police stations in 
the town after the police were unable to quell the violence.287  The parallel military organization 
of the Special Forces based out in Aleppo were brought in to bring Jisr al-Shughur back under 
Baathist control.288  The Special Forces destroyed about twenty homes and fifty stores in Jisr al-
Shughur and killed 200 inhabitants of the town, including those detained.289  
In April of 1980, police and other security forces were needed to restore order to the city 
of Deir ez Zor in eastern Syria after the local Baath Party headquarters was set ablaze.290  From 
April of 1980 to February of 1981, unrest in the city of Aleppo in northwestern Syria was a daily 
occurrence.291  Protests and attacks on police patrols and Baathist institutions in Aleppo occurred 
frequently, despite the deployment of both Special Forces and Defense Companies in the city.292  
Once the local security forces lost control of Aleppo, the Special Forces, Defense Companies, 
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and the 3rd Armored Division, 30,000 troops in all, sealed off the city before assaulting it.293 On 
April 1st of 1980, the Special Forces entered Aleppo first followed by the 3rd Armored Division 
five days later.294  General Fayadh who was leading the assault utilized the parallel military 
organizations to do house to house searches, detaining hundreds of people within Aleppo 
suspected of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood.295  After retaking Aleppo, the parallel security 
structures faced attacks on their patrols from late April 1980 to February 1981.296 The security 
forces responded by detaining males over the age of 15 at random and proceeded to execute them 
for attacks that took place against their foot patrols.297 Roughly 2,000 of the inhabitants were 
killed from late April 1980 to February of 1981 while 8,000 inhabitants of Aleppo were arrested 
for suspected links to the Muslim Brotherhood.298 
On June 26th 1980, outside the presidential palace in Damascus, members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Hafez al-Assad by tossing live grenades into the courtyard 
where he was standing, waiting for his entourage.299 Presidential security jumped on top of the 
grenades saving Hafez al-Assad’s life.300  The following day, Rifaat al-Assad with his Defense 
Companies traveled to Tadmur prison in Homs province, where they executed between 500 and 
800 Muslim Brotherhood prisoners.301  The Muslim Brotherhood tactic of massive recruitment 
allowed Syria’s Political Security Directorate, Air Force Intelligence, and General Security 
Directorate to infiltrate the group (Huckabey and Stout 2010, 344). In July of 1980, intelligence 
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forces hunted down a Muslim Brotherhood cell near the village of Sarmada.302 A skirmish took 
place in the town which resulted in the deaths of several Muslim Brotherhood members; the 
security forces tied to the intelligence services subsequently rounded up 200 villagers and 
executed a quarter of them over suspected links to the Muslim Brotherhood.303 From August to 
November of 1980, the Muslim Brotherhood stepped up their attacks involving assassinations 
and bombings of Alawite officials in Damascus.  There was a car bomb outside the Councils of 
Ministers, a car bomb outside the Air Force Intelligence Headquarters that killed 70 people, and 
a Muslim Brotherhood car bomb in Azbakia, which left 200 dead.304 The Syrian Baathist regime 
responded with sweeps, mass arrests, executions, and extra security posted at government 
buildings.305  This evoked a response from the Baath Party that led to the expansion of the Baath 
Party Militias to fight the increasing insurgency in northwest Syria (Corbin 2013, 165). 
In 1981, a group of disaffected Syrian officers aligned themselves with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and attempted to overthrow the Baathist regime in Syria (Huckabey and Stout 2010, 
344). However Syria’s intelligence services discovered the plot before it could be put into action 
(Huckabey and Stout 2010, 344).  Further in 1981, assassinations were so pervasive by the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Fighting Vanguard that over 300 officials and soldiers connected to 
the Syrian Baathist regime were killed by both groups.306 During this period, the Special Forces 
was heavily utilized to counter Muslim Brotherhood insurrection throughout Syria along with 
Syria’s intelligence services (Rathmell 1996).  
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While Syria’s Baathist regime and parallel security structures were heavily dominated by 
Alawites, the need for inclusiveness found support not only among Syria’s other minorities but 
also the rural disenfranchised Sunni population.307  Several Baath Party and regime stakeholders 
were Sunnis, including Army Chief of Staff General Shihabi, Vice President Khaddam, and 
Minister of Defense General Talas.308  Many lower class and middle class Sunnis greatly 
benefited under the Baath Party and supported the al-Assad Baathist regime in Syria.309  In 1981, 
Alawite dominated Defense Companies began rounding up suspected Muslim Brotherhood 
members in Hama, including card holding Baath Party members, and summarily executed them 
(Dam 2013, 112).  This led to a dispute between the Hama Baath Party Branch and the 
Damascus Baath Party Branch over the execution of Baath Party members by the regime’s 
parallel military organization of the Defense Companies (Dam 2013, 112). From 1980 to 1982, 
there were 69 confirmed terrorist attacks by the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria targeting regime 
posts and institutions, predominantly in Aleppo and Hama province.310  During that same period 
of time there were four confirmed terrorist attacks against Syrian Baathist institutions by the 
Fighting Vanguard in the provinces of Aleppo and Hama.311  While fighting in 1981 in the Hama 
province, government troops came across a cell of Omar Jawwad-Sunni Salafists against the 
Baathist regime (Corbin 2013, 166).  The Baathist regime deployed 12,000 regular troops to 
fight the Sunni insurgents that lasted for weeks, leading to defections of Sunnis among Syria’s 
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regular military units of the 47th Tank Brigade and 21st Mechanized Brigade based in Hama 
province (Corbin 2013, 166).  It took the military an additional two weeks, with the help of the 
intelligence services to hunt down the remnants of the cell after they dispersed (Corbin 2013, 
166).   
In 1982, after the Muslim Brotherhood took over the city of Hama, Syria’s parallel 
security structures stormed the town leading to the deaths of up to 40,000 people within the city 
(Huckabey and Stout 2010, 344). Syria’s Defense Companies were deployed to quell the unrest 
in the city.312 Other parallel security structures involved in storming Hama included the 3rd 
Armored Division, Special Forces, and Baath Party Militia (Dam 2013, 112).  Regular military 
units included the 47th Tank Brigade and 21st Mechanized Brigade, followed by units of the 
Military Intelligence (Dam 2013, 112). The total force was roughly 25,000 soldiers with the 
majority comprised of parallel military organizations to retake Hama (Dam 2013, 112).  Initially, 
conventional military units were dispatched to put down the uprising in Hama, however since a 
majority of these units were made up of Sunnis, the rank and file chose not to crack down on 
their fellow Sunni countrymen.313 As a result, Syria was forced to deploy its parallel security 
structures to put down the revolt.314 It took a month for Syria’s parallel security structures to put 
down the unrest in Hama in 1982 (Dam 2013, 111). In the ensuing battle, the Muslim 
Brotherhood overran police stations and military armories as well as executed 70 Baath Party 
officials within the city (Dam 2013, 113). The Muslim Brotherhood also laid siege to the 
Governor’s residence as well as other areas occupied by Party officials and high-ranking Army 
and security officers within the city until Syria’s parallel security structures put down the unrest 
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(Dam 2013, 113). Prior to the assault of the city, local conscripts from Hama in the 47th Tank 
Brigade and 21st Mechanized Brigade were removed due to their questionable loyalty in the 
eventual assault on the city (Dam 2013, 113). During the month long battle in Hama, several 
Baath Party members were once again killed by the security forces in retaking the city of Hama 
at the frustration of the local Baath Party branch in Hama (Dam 2013, 114).  
After 1982, the Muslim Brotherhood joined with other Syrian opposition groups to form 
the National Alliance for Liberation of Syria.315  The Muslim Brotherhood also found safe haven 
in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in which the Iraqi Baathist regime, at odds with Syria, allowed 
infiltration attempts through Iraq’s western border into Syria.316  The Muslim Brotherhood in 
1983 carried out a wave of assassinations that included the assassination of a Syrian Colonel in 
Aleppo in July of 1983.317 Syrian security forces responded with raids across Syria on suspected 
Muslim Brotherhood hideouts.318 In addition, Syria’s intelligence services infiltrated the Fighting 
Vanguard, crippling that organization as an effective fighting force as its leader and several key 
members were arrested by Syria’s security services (Huckabey and Stout 2010, 344). The 
Baathist regime in 1984 offered amnesty to members of the Fighting Vanguard to limit the 
group’s movements and place closer surveillance on members of the group.319 The Baath Party 
Militia was also increased to fight the Muslim Brotherhood, and the military increased its 
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numbers from 160,000 in 1973 to 400,000 troops by 1983 to help with the insurgency in 
northwest Syria (Corbin 2013, 183). The increase in the military and weapons acquired were 
entirely dependent upon revenue from Syria’s oil exports (Corbin 2013, 186).  Less revenue from 
oil exports meant fewer weapons and less sophisticated weapons that could be obtained from the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as well as other countries (Corban 2013, 186).  
In 1984, a crisis emerged within the Syrian Baathist regime. When Hafez al-Assad 
became ill in 1984, his brother Rifaat al-Assad with his Defense Companies marched on the 
capital of Damascus.320 Rifaat deployed tanks to cut off approaches to Damascus and deployed 
SA-8 surface to air missiles to a hill overlooking Damascus.321 Fearful the government might be 
toppled, the Baathist regime’s other parallel military organizations including the 3rd Armored 
Division, commanded by General Shafiq Fayyad; the Republican Guard, commanded by General 
Adnan Makhluf; and the Special Forces, commanded by General Ali Haydar mobilized within 
Damascus to prevent a potential overthrow of the Hafez al-Assad regime.322 Prior to the coup 
attempt, Rifaat attempted to elicit support from the regular military and populace to succeed as 
heir to the Baathist regime in Syria.323 Several reports indicated that there was indeed support for 
Rifaat if Hafez were to die in office.324  However, many animosities existed towards Rifaat from 
fellow Alawites and Baathist regime stakeholders.325 In one incident, Minister of Defense 
General Talas attempted to deploy Rifaat’s Defense Companies to the frontlines during the Arab-
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Israeli War of 1973.326 Rifaat refused the orders of the Minister of Defense and one of his 
subordinates killed one of Tala’s officers in the ensuing argument.327 Part of the reason for a 
desire to deploy Rifaat’s Defense Companies was the simple fact that the parallel security 
structure of the Defense Companies was the best-equipped security unit in Syria, with the most 
modern weapons and armament.328 They had the most modern T-72 tanks and modern surface to 
air missile batteries as well as other weapons at their disposal that could have helped with the 
war against Israel.329  
The initial coup attempt in 1984 by Rifaat al-Assad was more than a typical attempt at 
regime change.  The initial deployment of the Defense Companies by Rifaat al-Assad to block 
entrances to Damascus was in retaliation to the Military Intelligence’s decision to transfer out 
loyal Division Commanders, senior ranking officers, and mid-level ranking officers to other 
military units.330 The Military Intelligence sensing the growing power of Rifaat attempted to 
weaken his base of power by removing some of his loyal commanders in the Defense 
Companies.331 However, Rifaat attempted to overturn those orders, which ultimately failed.332  
Syria’s Military Intelligence in response to Rifaat’s attempt to countermand the orders threatened 
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to arrest any officer resisting or impeding the transfer orders.333 Rifaat in turn threatened 
airstrikes against any security official or military commander that opposed his decision to keep 
his loyal officers under his ranks.334 From March to May of 1984, a standoff ensued in the capital 
between the Defense Companies and parallel security structures loyal to Hafez al-Assad.335 The 
Republican Guard at the time of this crisis had about 1,000 soldiers.336 After the crisis, the 
Republican Guard was greatly expanded to around 10,000 soldiers to balance against future coup 
attempts.337 In May of 1984, Hafez al-Assad asked various Alawite tribal leaders to withdraw 
their support from his brother, Rifaat.338 This led to massive defections from the Defense 
Companies, wherein 
the Syrian dictator then drove unescorted to Rifaat's heavily-guarded residence and 
confronted him in the presence of their mother. ‘You want to overthrow the regime?’ 
Assad asked. ‘Here I am. I am the regime.’ After a lengthy argument, Rifaat became very 
emotional and backed down in return for a promise that his position and interests would 
be respected (Dossier: Rifaat Assad 2000).339 
After the crisis, the Defense Companies were stripped of their duties of protecting Damascus and 
the duties carried out by the Defense Companies were transferred to the Air Force Intelligence 
and the Republican Guard.340  Rifaat was sent into exile, while his Defense Companies were 
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disbanded.341  Many soldiers were dispersed to other military units or the growing Republican 
Guard, while others were rolled up into a new parallel security structure called the 569th 
Armored Division, which would later be reorganized into the 4th Armored Division of around 
15,000 to 20,000 soldiers (Syria's Praetorian Guards 2000).342  Table 5.1 displays the strength of 
each parallel military organization by 1987. 
 
Table 5.1 – Personnel Strength of Syrian Parallel Military Organizations (1987) 
Unit Personnel Strength (Approximate) 
Republican Guard 10,000 
Special Forces 15,000 
569th Armored Division 15,000 
3rd Armored Division 15,000 
Struggle Companies 5,000 
Baath Party Militia (Popular Army) 10,000-100,000 (Estimate) 
Presidential Security Unknown (50-100) 
Source: CIA Report: Syria's Elite Military Units, 1987; UK Border Agency, Report: The Syrian Arab Republic, 6 
February 2009. 
 
While the Baathist regime strengthened its base after the crisis, further unrest continued. 
The Sunni opposition, while weakened, continued its anti-regime activities up to 1986. In 1985, 
the Muslim Brotherhood dispersed pamphlets in Hama, Hims, Aleppo, and Damascus 
encouraging the overthrow of the Syrian Baathist regime.343  From early to mid-1986, a wave of 
bombings occurred throughout Syria.344  The bombings primarily targeted government 
institutions and were tied to the Sunni fundamentalist group of the Muslim Brotherhood (Emadi 
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2011, 68).345  The Baathist regime was able to apprehend five of the suspected participants in the 
bombings, labeling them as Iraqi agents, before executing them for the deaths of 144 people that 
died in the wave of attacks in 1986 (Emadi 2011, 68). Towards the latter part of the 1980s, the 
Syrian security apparatus became dependent upon Soviet rents and Gulf rents as a frontline state 
against Israel to fund its burgeoning security apparatus in tackling the Sunni opposition within 
the country (Corbin 2013, 273).  A decline in oil revenue and economic waning in the Syrian 
economy led to less sophisticated arms acquisitions for Syria after 1985 (Corbin 2013, 275-276).  
However, after 1987, the security situation dramatically improved with most Sunni opposition 
activity curtailed by Syria’s parallel security apparatus. 
The Parallel Security Apparatus and Internal Insurrection under Hafez al-Assad 
 In line with historical institutionalism and organizational theory, Syria’s parallel security 
structures were crucial to preserving Baathist control over the country.  During the 1980s, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and other Syrian opposition groups took over the city of Aleppo and rural 
areas of northwestern Syria.  Syria’s parallel military organizations of the Special Forces, the 3rd 
Armored Division, and the Defense Companies were deployed to confront these opposition 
groups. In the city of Aleppo, the Defense Companies, Special Forces, and 3rd Armored Division 
stormed the city to restore Baathist control over the provincial capital of Aleppo.  In parts of the 
Idlib countryside, Syria’s Special Forces were utilized to combat the Sunni fundamentalist 
groups such as the Fighting Vanguard and Muslim Brotherhood due to defections amongst the 
regular military.  Further during the 1980s, the Baath Party Militia was expanded to impede the 
movement of Syrian opposition groups and end the insurgency in northwestern Syria. The lack 
of reliability with regard to the police and regular military led the Baathist regime to utilize the 
                                                          
345 Global Terrorism Database, Syria, 1986. 
157 
 
Baath Party Militia to combat Sunni fundamentalists in northwestern Syria. In 1982, in Hama, 
Syria’s parallel military forces were once again utilized due to the lack of resolve by Syria’s 
conventional military units which were predominantly Sunni and unwilling to fight a Sunni 
dominated opposition force.  As a result, Syria’s parallel military forces of the Baath Party 
Militia, 3rd Armored Division, Special Forces, and Defense Companies were utilized to bring the 
provincial capital of Hama back under regime control.   
The intelligence services, including the General Security Directorate, Military 
Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, and the Political Security Directorate were crucial to 
dismantling both the Fighting Vanguard and the Muslim Brotherhood during the 1980s.  The 
intelligence services infiltrated both organizations of the Fighting Vanguard and Muslim 
Brotherhood, arresting key leaders of the opposition which reduced the capabilities of both 
fundamentalist groups. In 1984, the intelligence services, specifically Military Intelligence, 
attempted to diminish the power base of Rifaat al-Assad, which led to a coup attempt.  The 
Republican Guard, the Special Forces, the 3rd Armored Division, and the Struggle Companies 
faced off with the Defense Companies for months in the capital, Damascus. The coup attempt 
ended with disbanding the Defense Companies and exiling Rifaat al-Assad, with his primary 
mission taken up by the Air Force Intelligence and the Republican Guard. Furthermore, the 
Republican Guard was expanded from 1,000 soldiers to almost 10,000 soldiers to prevent 
another coup occurrence again in which a parallel security structure could threaten the regime.  
Syria’s parallel security structures during the 1970s and 1980s fulfilled their institutional purpose 
of safeguarding the regime.  The only exception was Rifaat al-Assad’s Defense Companies 
which were more loyal to Rifaat than the stakeholders within the Syrian Baathist regime.  
However, the coup attempt was largely unsuccessful due to Hafez al-Assad’s other parallel 
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security structures, which were positioned in and near Damascus to protect not only Hafez al-
Assad but regime stakeholders as well. Syria’s parallel security structures ensured the 
preservation of the Syrian Baathist regime and the institutional continuity of those forces 
allowing for the political durability of the Hafez al-Assad regime in Syria to endure.  
Occupation of Lebanon and External Conflict with the Israeli invasion – 1976 to 1982 
 During the beginning stages of the Lebanese Civil War, Syria’s military and security 
structures intervened to preserve the status quo by initially bolstering the Christian led 
government.346 Part of the Syrian intervention into Lebanon was the inability of Syria’s proxy 
the Palestinian Liberation Army to bring security throughout Lebanon.347  By June of 1976, Syria 
deployed 30,000 soldiers to Lebanon, mostly from the regular military to ensure Syria’s interests 
were met in the neighboring country.348  Despite initially supporting the Christian government in 
Syria in 1976, divisions amongst the Maronite Christians led Syria to create a patchwork alliance 
of Maronites, Druze, Shiites, and Sunnis to support their interests within Lebanon during the 
civil war period.349  Initially, during Lebanon’s state collapse, Syria sent in units of the 
Palestinian Liberation Army to shore up support for the Maronite led government.350  However 
by June of 1976, those Palestinian forces were either decimated or defected to rival Palestinian 
factions working with Lebanese opposition groups to end the Maronite led confessional 
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system.351 The Syrian military after this disaster reorganized the Palestinian Liberation Army in 
Syria and created two brigades with a total of 3,000 soldiers and deployed them to Lebanon 
during the late 1970s.352  Another Palestinian force based in Lebanon called the Saiqa, which had 
3,000 soldiers under arms, was created by the Syrian Baath Party in 1968 and received its orders 
from the Baath Party in Damascus, serving Syria’s interests during the civil war period as 
well.353  Attached to this Palestinian force is Syria’s parallel security structure of the Special 
Forces which advised and assisted on missions in Lebanon.354  Another Syrian parallel military 
organization that was sent to Lebanon to preserve the collapsing Lebanese government was the 
Defense Companies.355  The Defense Companies were deployed and fought in the Lebanese 
Civil War from June 1976 to October 1976 before returning to Syria.356 In addition, elements of 
the Air Force Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and the General Security Directorate were sent 
to Lebanon to preserve the Maronite government and cultivate relationships with Lebanon’s 
various warring factions as the government began to disintegrate (Moharram 2006, 22). 
 In 1982, Israel began preparations for an invasion of Lebanon that would entail conflict 
with Syrian forces deployed there.  The reason for the invasion was the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization’s dominance in the south of Lebanon outside of the control of Syrian proxies in 
Lebanon.357  Syria was neither capable nor willing to bring the Palestinian factions in the south 
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of Lebanon under control and prevent attacks on Israel’s northern border communities.358  Israel 
viewed a continued Syrian presence in Lebanon as a threat and had war aims if not to completely 
remove Syrian forces from Lebanon to at least drive them back from Shuf and southern Bekaa 
Valley, so Syrian forces could no longer offer sanctuary to the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization from which they could attack Israeli northern border communities.359 Israel prior to 
the invasion had stipulated that Syrian forces were not to advance south of Sidon or Buhayrat al-
Qir’awn or deploy surface to air missiles or artillery units that could shell Israel.360  However, 
after Israel shot down two Syrian helicopters near Zahlan, Lebanon in 1981, Syria deployed its 
SA-6 surface to air missile batteries in Bekaa Valley to protect its forces there from potential 
Israeli air raids.361   
Due to coup-proofing measures, the Syrians were uncoordinated in their defense in 
Lebanon once Israel finally invaded.362  Israel was able to carry out strikes against Syrian 
command and control centers, surface to air missile batteries, and troop reinforcements.363  The 
destruction of these Syrian assets allowed Israel to push back but not expel Syrian forces from 
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Lebanon.364  Syria’s regime stakeholders believed the Syrian military performed well, including 
its parallel security structures of the Special Forces which were deployed in Bhamdun and 
Tripoli (Syria’s Praetorian Guards 2000).365  The fault they found in their failure to repel the 
Israeli invasion was the failure of Syrian air defense forces and its Air Force to properly counter 
Israeli warplanes over the skies of Lebanon.366 Following the 1982 invasion by Israel, several 
brigades of the 3rd Armored Division were stationed in Lebanon until 1985 to ensure Syria’s 
interests there and serve as a counter to Israel’s deployment to the south of Lebanon.367  This was 
witness during a period when Iran’s Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its proxy Hezbollah 
went against Syria’s interests in the mid to late 1980s.  After the kidnapping of an American 
journalist by Hezbollah in 1987, Syria deployed 7,500 troops in southern Beirut to disarm 
Hezbollah (Corbin 2013, 288).  Prior to the deployment of Syrian troops, Iran warned Syria any 
interference could lead to the nullification of the Syrian-Iran alliance (Corbin 2013, 288). 
Fighting left 23 dead and Syria restricted arms flows from Iran to Iranian Revolutionary Guard 
bases in Bekaa Valley (Corbin 2013, 288).  “Assad demonstrated to the groups that he was 
pulling the strings of support and sanctuary, and that he offered power projection to Tehran and 
not vice versa” (Corbin 2013, 288).    
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Syria’s Parallel Security Structures in Lebanon 
 Syria’s parallel security structures were deployed to Lebanon to ensure the interests of 
the Syrian Baathist regime and were later utilized to defend Syrian interests in Lebanon from an 
Israeli invasion.  During the initial stages of Lebanon’s Civil War, Syria’s intelligence 
organizations cultivated a patchwork of relationships among Lebanon’s various warring factions 
and religious groups to promote Syria’s interests.  This was followed by the short deployment of 
the Defense Companies to fight Lebanese opposition factions. However, in October of 1976, 
they were subsequently redeployed back to Damascus for their institutional purpose of fulfilling 
their primary mission of safeguarding the Syrian Baathist regime.   Units of Syria’s Special 
Forces were also deployed to shore up support for the Lebanese Maronite government and were 
deployed to strategic locations of Lebanon to counter the threat of Lebanese opposition militias.  
When Israel invaded in 1982, they were utilized as an elite force to counter that invasion.  Due to 
losses and inability to push back Israeli forces, the Special Forces were supplemented by the 
deployment of the 3rd Armored division up to 1985, in case Israel decided to move further into 
Lebanon.   
The deployment of Syria’s parallel military organizations to Lebanon were not only to 
ensure Syria’s interests within the country, but to provide a reliable and elite force capable of 
countering external state-actors such as Israel and countering various Lebanese militias opposed 
to Baathist interference within the country.  However, in line with historical institutionalism and 
organizational theory, large deployments of Syria’s parallel security structures were never 
deployed to Lebanon as that would detract from their primary mission of preserving Baathist 
governance in Syria.  As a result, Syria’s parallel security structures were only deployed for short 
periods of time such as in the case of the Defense Companies or in small formations such as 
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Syria’s intelligence organizations, the 3rd Armored Division, and the Special Forces, while the 
bulk of those same forces resided in Syria to preserve regime stakeholders and Baathist control 
over Syria. 
Syria and Stability - 1990 to 2000 
The fall of the Soviet Union during the early 1990s, meant an end to Soviet aid and 
bartering agreements, which were prevalent during the 1980s, and were needed to procure new 
weapons and sustain Syria’s security forces (Corbin 2013, 276).  The new Russian authorities in 
Moscow demanded cash for arms and were unwilling to accept bartering agreements of the past 
to acquire those weapons to sustain Syria’s security (Corbin 2013, 276). The exogenous shock 
from the collapse of the Soviet Union and a weak Syrian economy plagued the Baathist regime 
as arms shipments could no longer be made on credit and Syria’s military deployment in 
Lebanon became an “expensive trap” (Corbin 2013, 296).  In addition, rents by the Gulf 
countries for Syria as a frontline state also began to dwindle by the early 1990s (Corbin 2013, 
308).  “Arms deliveries from 1991-1994 were a mere $400 million, a fifth of those from 1987-
1990. Deliveries declined even more from 1995-2000 to barely $75 million” (Corbin 2013, 310). 
Hafez al-Assad during the 1990s Gulf War with Iraq, hoped to gain not only the lifting of 
sanctions by the United States placed on Syria for its support of Hezbollah and Iran during the 
1980s but also garner investment from the United States to replace rents and aid the Soviet 
Union provided to Syria during the Cold War (Emadi 2011, 68-69). Syria, in this case, provided 
both tanks and troops for the liberation of Kuwait when it joined the U.S. led coalition in the 




 The death of Republican Guard Major Basil al-Assad, first son and heir apparent to Hafez 
al-Assad in 1994, led to Bashar al-Assad’s return to Syria in order to prep his role to take over 
the leadership of the Baathist regime.368  Bashar al-Assad underwent military training and 
became an officer within the Republican Guard gaining the rank of Staff Colonel by 1999 and 
General by 2000 (Hemmer 2003, 222; Corbin 2013, 304).  Hafez sought to prevent Rifaat from 
assuming power after his death.  In doing so Hafez al-Assad removed Rifaat as Vice President of 
Syria in 1999 and charged him with corruption (Moharram 2006, 68).  Rifaat attempted to once 
again overthrow the Baathist regime by gathering former loyalists from his disbanded Defense 
Companies, allies within the security apparatus, and the purchase of mercenaries from abroad 
(Moharram 2006, 69). In Latakia province, Hafez al-Assad’s Air Force Intelligence and General 
Security Directorate as well as local security forces attacked Rifaat’s men, quashing any traction 
of rebellion from moving forward (Moharram 2006, 69). 
 By the end of the 1990s, Syria was unable to procure various weapons or maintain its 
security apparatus as a result of dwindling oil exports and large public deficits from a weak 
economy (Corbin 2013, 300). Its parallel military organizations, which were extensive in the 
1980s were reduced to three active parallel military organizations, which included the 4th 
Armored Division, Special Forces, and the Republican Guard.  The Baath Party Militia at this 
period of time was no longer an active force.  It was predominantly a paper force that could in 
theory be called upon in the event of unrest.  The regular army on the other hand was around 
215,000 soldiers by 1998,369 a significant drop from its peak during the 1980s when it was 
around 400,000 soldiers in the Syrian Army.  In line with historical institutionalism and 
organizational theory, stability was maintained throughout the 1990s with the diminishing of 
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various Syrian opposition groups by the late 1980s.  While a coup attempt was made by Rifaat 
al-Assad over succession, the Air Force Intelligence and General Security Directorate along with 
Syria’s other security forces were utilized to eliminate the threat of regime change and stamp out 
opposition to succession from Hafez al-Assad to Bashar al-Assad.  Table 5.2 shows the parallel 
military organizations and their strength towards the end of the 1990s. 
 
Table 5.2 – Personnel Strength of Syrian Parallel Military Organizations (1998) 
Unit Personnel Strength (Approximate) 
Republican Guard 15,000 
Special Forces 15,000 
4th Armored Division 15,000 
Baath Party Militia (Popular Army) 10,000-100,000 (Estimate) 
Presidential Security  Unknown (50-100) 
Source: Human Rights Watch Report: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in 
Syria, December 2011 (To determine the size of a Division); International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military 
Balance, 1998/99 (London: IISS, 1998); “Middle East and North Africa,” The Military Balance, 1998; UK Border 
Agency, Report: The Syrian Arab Republic, 6 February 2009. 
 
Bashar al-Assad - 2000 to 2010 
 The death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000, led to a debate among Syria’s regime stakeholders 
to decide if they would support Bashar al-Assad (Stacher 2011, 205). In June of 2000, it was 
decided amongst the regime stakeholders they would support Bashar al-Assad’s leadership and 
control over Syria (Stacher 2011, 205).  The Syrian Parliament and Baath Party Congress named 
Bashar al-Assad as President of Syria and Party Secretary General in June of that same year 
(Stacher 2011, 205). “The party and army elite closed ranks to prevent a power struggle [and] 
ratified the process Hafez had begun, but [had] not completed” (Stacher 2011, 206). Internal 
debates did take place amongst the regime elites, but in order to prevent a series of successions 
that could create instability and power struggles, and since most regime elites were over 70 years 
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of age, they decided to put their support behind Bashar al-Assad (Stacher 2011, 201-211). While 
Bashar al-Assad’s ascendance to leader of Syria seamed flawless, Bashar al-Assad still had to 
contend with old guard Alawites despite the loyalty of the security services and parallel security 
structures (Emadi 2011, 69-70; Corbin 2013, 307).  As a result, Bashar al-Assad didn’t gain full 
consolidation until 2005 when remaining old guard Alawites and younger generations of the 
security services fell in line (Corbin 2013, 307).  At the time of Bashar al-Assad succession to 
president, 90 percent of the heads of the military and security services were Alawite (Hemmer 
2003, 229).  Even Sunni leaders within the security services were often paired with an Alawite 
deputy as a coup-proofing measure so that whole units would not defect to any opposition that 
might emerge (Hemmer 2003, 229).   
Bashar al-Assad consolidated his power by retiring or purging the old guard that did not 
fit with his reformist vision of Syria (Hemmer 2003, 229).  Bashar al-Assad forcefully retired 
Army Chief of Staff General Ali Aslan in 2002 and replaced him with his deputy, Maj. Gen. 
Hassan Turkmani, an ethnic Syrian Turkmen (Gambill 2002). “[General Ali] Aslan was not only 
considered to be powerful member of the late Hafez Assad's inner circle, but he was also 
regarded by outside observers as having significantly improved Syrian military readiness while 
operating under severe financial constraints” (Gambill 2002). Mustafa Talas, the Defense 
Minister, was also forced out from his position in 2002 in a transitioning of the old guard 
(Gambill 2002).  Other senior Hafez al-Assad old guard forced out during the early 2000s 
included: the head of the Military Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Hassan Khalil, the head of the Air 
Force Intelligence, Gen. Ibrahim Hueiji was forcibly retired from his post, the head of the 
General Security Directorate, Maj. Gen. Ali Houri whom was a member of the Ismaili sect, and 
the “Interior Minister Muhammad Harba was replaced by [Gen Ali] Hammoud” (Gambill 2000). 
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Protests over a weak economy and a demand for reforms led to a crackdown and arrests 
of many Syrians in Damascus in 2001 (Corbin 2013, 312-313). However, Bashar al-Assad’s 
reforms during the 2000s to the banking sector and other parts of the economy also assuaged 
some of the discontent within the country including members of the Baath Party (Corbin 2013, 
315).  The Baath Party in 2005 announced that Syria had transitioned to a social market economy 
and laws were changed to allow investment that led to economic growth all the way up to 2010 
(Corbin 2013, 316).  The difficulty with enacting reforms to change the Syrian economy was the 
issue of widespread corruption among the Baathist regime’s various stakeholders (Corbin 2013, 
316).  This included Defense Minister Talas and Vice President Khaddam’s family, both of 
whom amassed massive wealth from their food processing facilities and monopoly in the 
telecommunications sector under Hafez al-Assad (Corbin 2013, 316).  These regime officials and 
other stakeholders were against reforms enacted by Bashar al-Assad since reforms would impact 
wealth they accrued from illicit business dealings under the cover of socialist equality.  
Other reforms carried out by Bashar al-Assad to lessen tensions within the country 
included the de-militarization of the school curriculum, the creation of private universities, 
relaxing state restrictions on media, releasing political prisoners, and the closing down of the 
notorious Tadmur prison (Emadi 2011, 70).  Bashar al-Assad pardoned many Muslim 
Brotherhood members within Syria’s prisons during his first few years in office, however 
membership in the Muslim Brotherhood was still outlawed by the regime (Landis and Pace 2006, 
51). Despite reform efforts by Bashar al-Assad and his Baathist regime, civil society still 
remained non-existent in Syria as a result of Syria’s pervasive security services controlling the 
emergence of dissent from organizations outside of the state; in this case, only state sponsored 
organizations were allowed to operate within the country (Landis and Pace 2006, 49).  While 
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opposition parties existed in the 2000s under Bashar al-Assad, legal and illegal, they remained 
fragmented and divided as a result of Syria’s intelligence services (Landis and Pace 2006, 50).   
Syria’s intelligence services, essentially, infiltrated both underground illegal opposition parties 
and the legal opposition parties in parliament with the intention of fermenting discord amongst 
those groups so that those same groups could not create a united front against the Baathist regime 
(Landis and Pace 2006, 50).  
 The parallel security structures utilized by Bashar al-Assad’s father in 1999 were still in 
place when Bashar al-Assad took office in 2000 (Nassif 2015a, 269).  The 4th Armored Division 
which was mostly Alawite and was commanded by Bashar’s brother, Maher al-Assad (Nassif 
2015a, 269). Important posts in the military were for the most part sectarian and ethnically 
stacked in favor of Alawites under Bashar al-Assad.   The Alawites for the Baathist regime act as 
stakeholders, protecting it from ideals and threats emanating from outside the regime’s core 
which include threats stemming from Sunni fundamentalists groups (Nassif 2015b, 628).   To 
demonstrate the importance of certain posts within the military, officers of all backgrounds 
within the Syrian military prefer posts in the intelligence services for the rewards they receive.370   
As one officer claimed of positions within the intelligence services “with the kind of salary 
officers make in the military, they can spend ten years of their lives saving money and still not be 
able to buy a car. The same is true about apartments. So the privileges bestowed upon the 
mukhabarat officers in terms of cars and housing are very important. To be able to get married, 
and settle down, you need to own an apartment and a car.”371 Officers in the elite parallel 
security structures of the Baathist Regime also receive free cars and housing, such as those in the 
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4th Armored Division, Special Forces, and Republican Guard units (Nassif 2015b, 633).  
Military officers posted in supply and procurement positions also prosper from various forms of 
corruption; since their duties require the procurement of food, arms, and other provisions, they 
can orchestrate inflated deals with suppliers in order to obtain kickbacks.372  
Many of the non-privileged positions in the military are provided to Sunnis in desolate 
and remote desert bases as a coup-proofing measure; in addition, promotion beyond the rank of 
colonel, where privileged positions within the military lay in terms of amassing wealth are 
skewed in favor of the Alawite minority (Khaddour 2016).373374  Syrian officers often complain 
about their old and malfunctioning equipment of Mig-21 and Mig-23 jets, and T-55 and T-62 
tanks as a result of limited weapons acquisitions during periods of decreased weapons 
procurements from 1990s to 2010.375376  When defense procurements do occur they often go to 
one of Syria’s parallel military organizations such as the Republican Guard or 4th Armored 
Division (Nassif 2015b, 638).  In one case, Air Defense Officers in Syria’s regular military asked 
to procure the latest portable surface to air missile in 2004.377 When the Syria made the purchase 
in 2006, the weapons were given to Republican Guard units over that of Syria’s Air Defense 
units which had originally made the request.378  
Due to Syria’s weak economy during the 1990s and 2000s, regular military units often 
received outdated equipment handed down from one of Syria’s elite parallel security structures, 
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377 Hicham Bou Nassif interview with Major Iyad Jabra (Air Defense Officer), 7 May 2014. 
378 Hicham Bou Nassif interview with Major Iyad Jabra (Air Defense Officer), 7 May 2014. 
170 
 
rather than new procurements.379  Officers within these same regular military units, especially 
Sunni officers, suspected the Baathist regime was attempting to keep regular military units weak 
by equipping them with outdated equipment in order to prevent potential coup attempts, so the 
Alawite dominated parallel military units could defeat them if any coup attempt came to 
fruition.380381  Soldiers and officers within the regular military are under constant surveillance by 
the intelligence services.  If a Sunni soldier entered a Mosque on leave, he would likely be 
picked up by one of Syria’s intelligence services and questioned to see if he harbored any 
fundamentalist views opposed to the Baathist regime.382 
Aside from protests in 2001, protests also occurred in 2004; this time in northeastern 
Syria (Gambill 2004). Unrest at a soccer stadium in Qamishli between ethnic Arabs and ethnic 
Kurds led to an overreaction by the local security forces that killed several Kurdish soccer fans 
(Gambill 2004).  This led to a widespread Kurdish uprising that spread from Qamishli to Hasaka 
and Amuda (Gambill 2004). From there it spread to Kurdish areas of Aleppo, Afrin province in 
northwest Syria, and Ayn al-Arab in the North of the country (Gambill 2004). Protestors burned 
government offices and local Baath Party Branches and even tried to break out inmates from 
regional prisons (Gambill 2004). The Baathist regime sent in the regular military and police to 
quell the unrest leading to 40 deaths, 400 injuries, and more than 2,000 arrests (Gambill 2004).  
“Calm was restored only after tanks were sent into all major Kurdish towns” (Gambill 2004). 
Syria’s intelligence services arrested more than 2,000 ethnic Kurds in order to determine and 
dismantle organized Kurdish opposition as a result of the uprising (Gambill 2004).  
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In 2005 and 2006, political activists attempting to extract more reform based concessions 
from the Syrian Baathist regime found themselves being locked up by Syria’s security 
services.383  Those caught speaking out against the Baathist regime were subsequently picked up 
and interrogated by the intelligence services, a throwback from the days of Hafez al-Assad 
(Landis and Pace 2006, 60). In 2005, the Syrian military along with its parallel security 
structures withdrew from Lebanon after 30 years of occupation over international pressure and 
Lebanese protests to a continued Syrian presence in the country, especially after Former 
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri was assassinated by supposed Syrian agents (Landis 
and Pace 2006, 46).  Clashes between security forces took place in Syria near the border with 
Iraq in 2005 (Landis and Pace 2006, 51). While no attempt was made by these groups to 
overthrow the Baathist regime, their presence in gaining adherents in following a Sunni 
fundamentalist form of Islam was problematic and had the potential for the emergence of future 
conflict between the regime and its followers (Landis and Pace 2006, 51). As a result, Syria’s 
intelligence services infiltrated these groups to diminish their utility in the potential their aims 
were geared toward regime change.384 Despite continued reform measures and economic growth, 
the country’s population continued to grow exponentially to the point where rising 
unemployment and foreign debt became an issue for the Baathist regime (Hemmer 2003, 226; 
Emadi 2011, 71). Syria’s institutions, with their overlapping mandates and competition with one 
another, were unable to absorb the growing population into the workforce in the country 
(Hemmer 2003, 209). Furthermore, the real power for change and reforms did not lie with these 
institutions but instead with the president over that of the parliament, the Baath Party, the 
security institutions, and even the position of prime minister (Hemmer 2003, 209).  
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Table 5.3 – Personnel Strength of Syrian Parallel Military Organizations (2010) 
Unit Personnel Strength (Approximate) 
Republican Guard 15,000 
Special Forces 15,000 
4th Armored Division 15,000 
Baath Party Militia (Popular Army) 100,000  
Presidential Security  Unknown (50-100) 
Source: Human Rights Watch Report: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in 
Syria, December 2011 (To determine the size of a Division); “Middle East and North Africa,” The Military Balance, 
2010; UK Border Agency, Report: The Syrian Arab Republic, 6 February 2009. 
 
Syria’s Parallel Security Structures prior to the Civil War 
 The emergence of protests and political activists in the early 2000s were suppressed 
predominantly by Syria’s regular security forces and parallel security structures of the 
intelligence services.  Protests over reforms, ethnic conflict, and political activism were actively 
suppressed or covertly infiltrated by the intelligence services to prevent the emergence of a 
united opposition.  Along the border of Iraq in 2005 the presence of Sunni fundamentalist groups 
led to Syria’s intelligence services to embed agents and informants within the group in order to 
determine their aims and potentially dismantle those organizations if they ever posed a threat to 
the Syrian Baathist regime.  While Bashar al-Assad inherited a smaller military and even smaller 
parallel security structure with the death of Hafez al-Assad, their use as a countercoup force and 
preserving the Baathist regime was maintained throughout the 2000s.  Table 5.3 shows Syria’s 
parallel military organizations at the disposal of Bashar al-Assad prior to unrest in 2011. As a 
result, Syria’s parallel security structures from 2000 to 2010 fulfilled their mission in preserving 





2011 Protests and Uprising 
 The lack of an economy that could absorb an exponentially growing Syrian population, 
the slow movement of even further needed reforms, and the general disdain for what some 
Syrians saw as Alawite dominance led to a series of protests throughout the country in 2011.  In 
this case, widespread protests within the country spread because of the previous mentioned 
reasons and more.   
Syrians [became] disenchanted with the liberalized autocracy and fed up with having the 
Alawite barons and with the Assad family at the helm of the country’s politics for 
decades. The rising cost of living, growing unemployment, rampant bureaucratic 
corruption, and abuse of power by the ruling Alawites generated greater public dismay as 
the government failed to carry out the needed reforms it had promised. Confessional 
differences (Sunnis versus the Alawites), ethnic differences (Arabs versus the Kurds and 
others), and marginalization of non-Alawites continues to plague the regime. The Sunnis 
aspire to restore their community’s past hegemonic position, and radical political Islam 
views Alawites as apostates and resents the secular policies of the Baath Party. In 
general, Syrians want increased opportunities for grassroots participation in politics and 
an end to Assad’s dynastic rule (Emadi 2011, 73). 
 
The Baathist regime watchful of what was transpiring in the Arab world decided to form 
a special committee to determine the best way to deal with protests if they occurred in Syria 
(Heydemann 2013, 62).  Bashar al-Assad determined from the report that the failure of Tunisia 
and Egypt to preserve their regimes in 2011 was the failure to “crush the protests instantly” 
(Heydemann 2013, 62).  When protests finally did take place in Deraa, in southern Syria on 18 
March 2011, the regime utilized force against the protestors to end the protests there 
(Heydemann 2013, 62).   The General Security Directorate and Political Security Directorate 
made arbitrary arrests and tortured suspected protestors in Deraa.385 The Syrian Baathist regime 
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attempted to offer further reforms combined with force to end the protests.386  However the 
protests spread throughout Syria, including the capital of Damascus, and the northern city of 
Aleppo.387  The Syrian Regime began to deploy military units to quell the protests in 2011 to 
2012.388   
The Jaysh al Shaabi or the Popular Army that was significant during times of Hafez al-
Assad in manning checkpoints and helping the regime battle the Muslim Brotherhood during the 
late 70s and early 80s was unable to muster the same large size force as it had done under Hafez 
al-Assad (Pro-Government Paramilitary Force 2013). The Popular Army at the outset of protests 
was only able to obtain recruits from “army families, Baathist true believers, intelligence-backed 
goon squads, religious minority communities, certain Sunni Arab tribes, and other local interests 
that either depended on the Assad regime or feared a takeover by the Sunni Arab–dominated 
rebellion” (Lund 2015). In addition to the Popular Army, the regime also utilized, quasi-criminal 
offshoot, called the Shabiha, due not only to their loyalty to the regime but also because of their 
composition of being predominantly Alawite.389  Both forces fell under the banner known as the 
Lijan al-Sha’bia (Popular Committees), however the opposition and regime soldiers alike 
commonly referred to them as Shabiha, despite the overwhelming composition of pro-
government loyalists within the force and the organization being largely cross-sectarian (Pro-
Government Paramilitary Force 2013; Lund 2014). The Popular Committees or the Shabiha 
often fell under the direct control of the parallel intelligence services in conducting attacks on 
protestors, becoming another armed force of the Political Security Directorate, General Security 
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Directorate, and Air Force Intelligence (Pro-Government Paramilitary Force 2013). During this 
period, the intelligence services made arbitrary arrests, conducted executions, and aided the 
military in attempting to put down protests.390  During the protests, soldiers in the military began 
to desert from their units over orders to shoot at the protestors in various locations of Syria.391392  
As protests spread to the Damascus, Deir al-Zor, Idlib, Hama, Homs, Latakia, and Tartous 
governates of Syria, the Baathist regime began to mobilize its military and intelligence forces to 
stamp out the protests.393  The regular military deployed the 3rd, 5th, 9th, 11th, 15th, and 18th 
Divisions, while the Baathist regime deployed the 4th Armored Division, Republican Guard and 
Special Forces of the parallel military forces to suppress protests across Syria.394 
 Soldiers in Deir ez Zor and other provinces of Syria recalled what happened when the 
protests began in Deraa. “Protests in Deraa [province] started on March 18. The very next day 
they confiscated our cell phones and barred us from watching anything but Syrian state TV and 
the pro-government Dunya TV. On the news, they started telling us about terrorists.”395  
Conscript soldiers from other parts of Syria provide a similar story.396 Even among the parallel 
military structures, soldiers in the Special Forces were briefed about how the protestors were 
being manipulated by terrorists or were terrorists themselves.397398  Soldiers in the 105th Brigade 
of the Republican Guard were ordered to suppress protestors and shoot if the protestors didn’t 
                                                          
390 U.N. Document A/HRC/21/50, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian 
Arab Republic, August 15, 2012. 
391 UK Border Agency, Report: The Syrian Arab Republic, 3 October 2012. 
392 Human Rights Watch Report: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in Syria, 
p.15, December 2011. 
393 Human Rights Watch Report: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in Syria, pp. 
17-18, December 2011. 
394 Human Rights Watch Report: Individual and Command Responsibility for Crimes against Humanity in Syria, 
pp.18-19, December 2011. 
395 Human Rights Watch interview with Imad (Conscript in the Military Police), 5 November 2011. 
396 Human Rights Watch interview with Wassim (Conscript in the Syrian Army), 27 October 2011. 
397 Human Rights Watch interview with Salim (Officer in the Special Forces), 30 October 2011. 
398 Human Rights Watch interview with Mu`awiya (A soldier in the Special Forces), 15 June 2011. 
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disperse.399400 Agents and soldiers in the Air Force Intelligence were ordered to suppress 
protestors by any means necessary.401402 According to another conscript,  
When the events started in Deraa [province], the officers took all our TVs, radios, and 
phones. The only news we got was through internal radio, and it was all about hooligans, 
foreign elements, etc. Most of us believed it, and we were scared; even the movement of 
birds and butterflies would set off shooting.403 
Once the soldiers saw firsthand in both the regular military and parallel security structures that 
the protests were not terrorists or manipulations of nefarious groups, defections began to 
occur.404 Especially when they knew friends and family were participating in these same anti-
regime protests.405  Defections further occurred as a result of friendly fire incidents between 
regular army soldiers, and soldiers and agents of the intelligence services cracking down on 
protests.406 In Deraa province and other provinces throughout Syria there were so many detainees 
that many soccer stadiums were converted into detention centers and guarded by agents of the 
intelligence services and soldiers in the Special Forces.407  According to one Special Forces 
soldier based at a checkpoint in Damascus, agents of the Military Intelligence and the General 
Security Directorate ordered detained protestors to be beaten before transported to interrogation 
and detention facilities.408   
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Agents and soldiers of the intelligence directorates, as well as parallel military 
organizations were ordered to provide a watchful eye on conscript soldiers during the 
suppression of protests in 2011.409  Those that chose not to shoot protestors or failed to follow 
orders were executed primarily by agents of the intelligence services.410 According to one former 
Syrian Army soldier, “a couple of soldiers dropped their guns, refusing to shoot. Suddenly, 
agents from Air Force Intelligence opened fire on those who dropped their weapons, killing at 
least three soldiers from Brigade 52. I don’t know their names. When I saw that, I took my gun, 
ran away, and started shooting at the security agents.”411  Republican Guard soldiers were posted 
as snipers as well to shoot any soldiers that chose not to shoot at protestors.412   
In August of 2011, there were 2500 detainees in Tadmur prison, the prison since being 
closed by Bashar al-Assad was reconfigured as a military prison but because of the amount of 
arrests taken place during the protests in 2011, many of the newly incarcerated were political 
prisoners that had participated in the protests.413 According to a prison guard at Tadmur prison, 
“We didn’t care whether they were from Assad’s 4th Division or a regular division. We tortured 
them to show them that nobody is above the law and so that they would learn their lesson.”414 
Soldiers that displayed anti-regime attitudes or chose not to suppress were also detained by the 
intelligence services, not necessarily executed on the spot.415 Soldiers that survived detention 
claimed they saw the dead piled up and a pile of blood soaked uniforms, including insignia from 
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the parallel security structure of the 4th Armored Division.416 Those that survived detention were 
either sent back to units or sent to regime prisons across Syria.417  Those detained even included 
soldiers from the Republican Guard as well.418  As a result of massive desertions from the 
regular military, the Republican Guard was broken up and attached to regular military units to 
prevent further defections (Waters 2018a, iii).    
By the end of 2011 around 3,000 protestors had been killed by various organizations of 
the security apparatus including the Political Security Directorate and General Security 
Directorate.419  The Shabiha was not only utilized to suppress protestors but was actively 
involved in the killing of soldiers and policemen that refused to crackdown on the protests.420 
The need for such a force in the suppression of the protests can be largely assumed as a result of 
the defections from the security apparatus and size of the uprising sweeping across all of Syria.  
By May 2012, it was estimated that 10,000 Syrian protestors had been killed by the Baathist 
regime.421  In Houla, a village in Homs Province, security forces executed 108 people.422  In the 
village of Qubair, in Hama Province, Syrian troops killed 78 people.423 The provinces most 
affected by government violence include the provinces of Idlib, Homs, Deir ez Zor, and Deraa, 
although other areas of the country were affected as well.424 Residential areas were targeted by 
the regime and its parallel security structures under the false pretense that they were terrorist 
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strongholds.425 As the protests became more violent with the crackdowns instigated by the 
Baathist regime, the evolution of protests to an armed uprising occurred.  As a result, the creation 
of the Free Syrian Army by the opposition was initially instituted to protect protestors, but 
eventually culminated into a force to end Baathist rule in Syria.426  
The Free Syrian Army (FSA) grew to be the largest rebel formation with 50,000 fighters 
under its banner in 2011 and 2012 (Hove and Mutanda 2014, 560).  However the loyalty and 
cohesion of the FSA under one banner was put into question when smaller but more aggressive 
Salafist rebel movements began taking ground or caused significant regime casualties which led 
to the defection of purported secular rebel fighters to those Islamist organizations.  Some notable 
Salafist organizations that became predominant in Syria were Jabhat al-Nusra, the Syrian 
Liberation Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and Jaysh al-Islam, and the Islamic Front (Spyer 2013, 13; 
Hove and Mutanda 2014, 560).  The predominance and success of Islamic rebel groups is partly 
attributed to the leadership of these groups in which a significant portion of their leaders had 
been in regime prisons before the “revolution” (Hove and Mutanda 2014, 561).  The Baathist 
Regime towards the beginning of armed revolt released Salafist radicals from its prisons in order 
to discredit the armed revolution as an attempt dissuade outside state-actors from supporting the 
Syrian opposition (Hove and Mutanda 2014, 561).  However such actions were only partly 
successful as these Salafist organizations began pulling fighters away from the Free Syrian Army 
to their more aggressive and Islamic fighting formations which limited the amount of supplies 
outside state actors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Qatar were willing to supply to the Syrian 
opposition (Hove and Mutanda 2014, 563).  Although, these Islamic rebel movements proved to 
be far more effective at fighting than the FSA, which created further casualties for the Syrian 
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Army and the capture of more territory held by that force. The rebels and opposition in Syria 
whether labeled as Salafist or the Free Syrian Army remain divided and non-cohesive as a 
unified fighting force.  It’s reported that there were 1200 different rebel groups in Syria with 
their own objectives and interests in 2012 (Spyer 2012, 47; Spyer 2013, 12).  This growing Sunni 
led opposition, made minorities of other Islamic sects or those that were Christian feel the 
emerging Sunni Islamic radicalism of the opposition left no room for them in their future version 
of Syria.  According to one Alawite, “in my neighborhood, just about everyone is either in the 
Army or the National Defense Forces. I don’t like Bashar al-Assad, in fact, I hate him. He is the 
one who put the Alawites into this situation. But If I was kidnapped by the Free Syrian Army, 
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Figure 5.1 – Syria’s Elite Parallel Military Organizations in 2011 by Brigade  
 
Source: From Joseph Holliday, The Syrian Army: Doctrinal Order of Battle, The Institute for the Study of War, 
February 2013; Made by the author. 
 
As military units mobilized to quell the protests and the eventual evolution into armed 
revolt, the security apparatus was forced to move throughout the country when rebels took 
territory because they lacked the manpower to defend and hold areas (Spyer 2013, 9; Khaddour 
182 
 
2016).   “Beginning in late 2011, the opposition and Free Syrian Army began to occupy ground, 
taking control of a number of towns and villages in Idlib province…[however, the Syrian 
military] was unable to muster the required number of reliable troops to mount a classic 
campaign of counterinsurgency” (Spyer 2012, 9). When the Baathist regime would retake a town 
from the opposition, the rebels would reemerge as soon as Syrian troops would leave (Spyer 
2012, 10). Figure 5.1 shows Syria’s elite parallel military organizations at the time of unrest in 
2011. The lack of manpower forced the Baathist regime to retain conscripts already in service for 
an additional five years of military service as a result of rebel gains and a shortage of troops 
(Khaddour 2016).   Furthermore, the amount of casualties taken by regime soldiers was 
unsustainable in the long term once the protests evolved into armed uprising.  For example, 
“Although the army had been on the front lines during the early stages of the conflict, this ended 
after the battle of Baba Amr in Homs in 2012, where the army experienced heavy casualties” 
(Khaddour 2016).  Republican Guard units attached to the regular army for extend periods of 
time incurred massive casualties that led to the under-manning of many Republican Guard 
brigades when they were reconstituted to fight on other fronts (Waters 2018a, 2). From 2011 to 
2012 most constituted Republican Guard Brigades fought in the capital of Damascus to preserve 
regime stakeholders (Waters 2018a, 2). The Republican Guard in the capital were able to 
withstand multiples attacks on different axes from the West and East by rebel forces (Eboer 
2017). The Republican Guard was also able to defend the strategic locations of Mazzeh Airbase 
and Damascus International Airport, allowing the parallel military force to conduct limited 
offensives against rebels in western and eastern Ghouta in Damascus (Eboer 2017).  The 104th 
brigade of the Republican Guard was sent to Deir ez Zor to shore up regime support in 
northeastern Syria (Eboer 2017; Waters 2018a, 8). Rebel offensives on the city of Aleppo led to 
183 
 
the deployment of large contingents of the Republican Guard that staved off rebel advances, just 
enough to prevent a full capture of the city by opposition forces (Eboer 2017). By July most of 
the eastern part of Aleppo city fell to rebels, Menagh Airbase was besieged, and most rural areas 
in Aleppo province had fallen to rebels.428 By the end of 2012, the Republican Guard was 
suffering serious manpower issues from attrition and desertions that led the parallel security 
structure of the Special Forces to be absorbed into the Republican Guard to shore up its 
manpower issues (Waters 2018a, iii, 2). The surviving Republican Guard units were broken 
down to battalion size units or even smaller from attrition (Waters 2018a, 2).  
From July to August 2012, the Syrian military ceded territory to the opposition as a result 
of a high amount of casualties incurred and “[established] new defensive lines further south” 
(Spyer 2013, 10).  The Syrian Army at this point was almost completely decimated as a fighting 
force (Pro-Government Paramilitary Force 2013).  Despite the Special Forces being rolled up 
into the Republican Guard, casualties sustained were becoming unsustainable.  The Shabiha 
force, which incurred casualties of its own, was a significantly smaller size force compared to the 
Baath Party’s Popular Army that was raised to fight the Muslim Brotherhood during the late 70s 
and early 80s.  In addition the 4th Armored Division which not only suffered attrition from 
combating rebels, the force also suffered from defections during the 2011 to 2012 period.  This 
led to Iran and Lebanon’s Hezbollah to provide troops to Syria to assist in protecting the Syrian 
Baathist regime (Terrill 2015, 233-234).  Iran sent soldiers of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard to 
Syria and coopted various Shiite militias in Iraq to intervene in the conflict (Terrill 2015, 233-
234).429  After ceding territory to the opposition, the Syrian Baathist regime decided to create a 
                                                          
428 Timeline: The Battle for Aleppo, Reuters, 14 December 2016. 




new force within government strongholds called the National Defense Forces (NDF).  The 
difference between the NDF and the Syrian Army was the ability of males of conscription age to 
serve locally in their communities (Pro-Government Paramilitary Force 2013; Lund 2015).  The 
NDF was able to form in the Syrian provinces of Homs, Hama, Damascus, Suwayda (Sweida), 
Latakia, Aleppo, and Tartous as shown in Figure 5.2 (Pro-Government Paramilitary Force 2013; 
Lund 2015).  While some NDF have been deployed outside of their home regions, they have for 
the most part been utilized in their local areas to halt rebel incursions into regime territory (Pro-
Government Paramilitary Force 2013; Lund 2015).  
 
Figure 5.2 – National Defense Forces by Province 
 




The success in the creation of NDF was entirely done with the support and assistance of 
Syria’s military logistical and administrative apparatus in a decentralized framework known as 
the qutaa system (Khaddour 2016). The initial establishment of the qutaa system was the result 
of Rifaat al-Assad’s coup attempt in 1984, which created a decentralized structure that allowed 
commanders to make any decision without restraint or permission from the Ministry of Defense 
in Damascus to ensure the security and stability of the regions they presided over (Khaddour 
2016). The qutaa system functions with the assignment of an army division which provides all 
the logistical and administrative support units to create essentially an independent and self-reliant 
force. For Syria’s qutaa system the breakdown of region and assigned division appears as 
follows: the Fifth and Ninth Divisions reside in the city of Deraa and administer most areas of 
that province, the Fifteenth Division is located in the Druze province of Suwayda (Sweida), there 
are six divisions in Damascus province, while the Eleventh and Eighteenth Divisions are in 
Homs province (Khaddour 2016).  This essentially represents the areas the Syrian army retreated 
to after 2012 to defend against rebel incursions.  The only qutaa system to have been destroyed 
was the Seventeenth Division in Raqqa which was destroyed by the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) in 2014 (Khaddour 2016).   The NDF as a militia base force is not a parallel security 
structure; the force falls under the Ministry of Defense and subsequently the command of the 
Syrian Army (Pro-Government Paramilitary Force 2013). The Syrian Army, which continues its 
operational offensives alongside Syria’s parallel security structures, has been bolstered by 
support from the NDF, which guard various government strongholds from rebel incursions. 
The Republican Guard - 2013 to 2018 
 From 2013 to 2018, the Republican Guard became an important parallel military 
organization in protecting the Syrian Baathist regime.  In this case, Republican Guard Units of 
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the 101st Commando Regiment, elements from the 104th Brigade, and 105th Brigade in 2013 were 
fighting rebels in the areas of East Ghouta, Adra, Daraya, and Wadi Barada (Waters 2018a, 3). 
Parts of the 104th Brigade of the Republican Guard were also sent to Deir ez Zor in 2013 and the 
106th Republican Guard Brigade was sent to Aleppo during that same year to fend off rebel 
advances in the city and countryside (Waters 2018a, 2).  Sections of the Republican Guard 
known as the 124th Brigade guarded the Ithriya-Khanasser highway connecting government 
controlled Hama province to the city of Aleppo, ensuring supplies made it to the besieged city 
(Eboer 2017). However, rebels managed to cut the highway completely besieging government 
held Aleppo in 2013.430 From 2014 to 2015, the Baathist regime saw steady advances by rebels 
on government held positions leading to multiple deployments of Syria’s parallel military 
organization of the Republican Guard to stem the bleeding.  Elements of the 101st Commando 
Regiment, 102nd Commando Regiment, 104th Brigade, and 105th Brigade of the Republican 
Guard were deployed to different parts of Damascus from 2014 to 2015 (Waters 2018a, 3-4).  
Parts of the 102nd Commando Regiment and 106th Brigade as well as smaller battalion size 
formations of the Republican Guard were deployed to Aleppo during this same period (Waters 
2018a, 3-4).  Other elements of these same Republican Guard forces and smaller company and 
battalion size remnants of the Republican Guard were deployed to Deir ez Zor, Homs, and 
Latakia during the years of 2014 to 2015 (Waters 2018a, 3-4).   
Due to attrition, NDF militias and other units were rolled into Republican Guard units to 
provide additional manpower (Lund 2015).  This includes the Iraqi militia Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-
Abbas which was integrated into the 105th Republican Guard Brigade for various offensive 
operations in Damascus around 2015 (Al-Tamimi  2018b; Waters 2018a, 8).  Others NDF 
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militias include Dara‘ al-Qalamoun (Qalamoun Shield Forces) and Dara‘ al-Sahel (Coastal 
Shield Forces) which were deployed to Deir ez Zor and eventually integrated into the 104th 
Brigade of the Republican Guard there (Khaddour 2018). From 2016 to 2017, what remained of 
the 101st Commando Regiment and 105th Brigade were permanently stationed in Damascus to 
fight rebels in the capital (Waters 2018a, 5-6).  Most of what remained of the 102nd Commando 
Regiment, 104th Brigade, and 106th Brigade were in Aleppo defending regime strongholds from 
rebel incursions as well as for various offensives south of Aleppo (Waters 2018a, 5-6).  Sections 
of the 106th Brigade were also deployed to Damascus during periods of heavy fighting in the 
capital (Waters 2018a, 6).  Smaller sized units such as the 103rd Brigade 46th Battalion, Coastal 
Shield Brigade, 800th Commando Battalion, and 124th Brigade were deployed to Homs, Latakia, 
Deir ez Zor, and Raqqa for various government offensives and pushes into rebel held positions 
(Waters 2018a, 5-6).  Later in 2016, more NDF militias were absorbed into the Republican 
Guard to shore up manpower issues, which include: Liwa Sayf al-Haq Assad Allah al-Ghalib 
(The Sword of Truth Brigade: The Conquering Lion of God) in the Damascus area, the Fawj al-
Karbala'i (The Karbala'i Regiment) and NDF militias established under the “Republican Guard 
Umbrella” of   'Ittihad Jaysh al-Asha'ir (Union of the Army of the Tribes) in Aleppo, NDF 
militias under the banner of Jaysh al-Asha'ir (Army of the Tribes) in Deraa, and the Quwat al-
Difa' al-Sha'abi (the Popular Defense Forces) in the Qalamoun near the Lebanese border (Al-
Tamimi 2016c; Al-Tamimi 2018a).  In 2017, the Union of the Army of the Tribes under the 
Republican Guard was utilized heavily in fighting ISIS in the east of Syria as well as along the 
Hama-Idlib front with rebels (Al-Tamimi 2018a).  ISIS emerged as a significant threat to the 
Baathist regime in 2014, taking control of roughly a third of territory in Syria from rebels and the 
Syrian Baathist government.431 
                                                          
431 Mona Yacoubian, Report: Syria Timeline - Since the Uprising Against Assad, United States Institute of Peace, 12 
188 
 
Most of the Republican Guard units deployed to Aleppo in 2016 were placed under the 
administrative control of the 30th Division and received additional support from various NDF 
militias, including Qadesh (Popular Security and Support Forces) based out in Aleppo province 
(Waters 2018a, 8). In 2016, the Republican Guard was crucial towards spearheading the 
offensive for Operation Dawn of Victory to recapture all of Aleppo from rebels in the city (Eboer 
2017).432 The 800th Commando Battalion during this offensive fended off Salafist rebels of al-
Nusra from their offensive south of the city to recapture lost areas (Eboer 2017). In February of 
2016, the Republican Guard and Syrian Army encircled Aleppo during Operation Dawn of 
victory, recapturing Menagh Airbase and cutting off rebel held east Aleppo from the rest of rebel 
held territory in Aleppo province.433 The help of the Russian Air Force, which intervened in 
2015, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias that were part of the Republican Guard as well as the NDF 
were crucial to the sieging of Aleppo.434435 By December, the Republican Guard and allies forced 
the rebels to a ceasefire and evacuated remaining rebels out of Aleppo city.436 
 In 2016, the Republican Guard was also crucial towards offensives in Latakia province 
and Homs to recover Palmyra the first time from ISIS (Eboer 2017). Sections of the 104th 
Brigade of the Republican Guard served entirely in Deir ez Zor ensuring the airbase and crucial 
parts of the city were never captured first from Ahrar al Sham rebels and then later from ISIS 
(Eboer 2017). After the war turned in favor of the government, most of the Republican Guard 
was redeployed to Damascus for various offensives against besieged rebel held areas.  These 
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included remnants of the 101st Commando Regiment, 104th Brigade, 105th Brigade, and 106th 
Brigade (Waters 2018a, 7).  Elements of the 104th Brigade were deployed to Deir ez Zor and 
sections of the 105th Brigade were deployed to Deraa province (Waters 2018a, 7).   The 
Republican Guard was never utilized during the Syrian Civil War to hold frontlines as the force 
was too valuable for the regime to lose entirely in an enemy attack (Eboer 2017). Instead the 
Republican Guard when broken down into smaller units were used to support various regular 
army units and militias forces along the frontlines to break through rebel and ISIS defenses and 
counterattack in the event of opposition breaches to government held lines (Eboer 2017). 
The 4th Armored Division from Protests to Uprising 
Another valuable parallel military force in the Syrian Civil War has been the 4th Armored 
Division, sometimes referred to as Assad’s 4th Division.  The force is comprised of about 15,000 
soldiers who are distributed among three armored brigades, one mechanized brigade, and one 
Special Forces regiment.  The 4th Armored Division is geared towards combating internal threats 
to protect the Syrian Baathist regime (The 4th Armoured Division 2017). Unlike in other military 
units, soldiers in the 4th Armored Division are career soldiers as opposed to conscripts fulfilling 
their mandatory military obligation (The 4th Armoured Division 2017). During the protests of 
2011, the 4th Armored Division was deployed to Deraa province, and Rastan and Talbiseh in 
Homs province to crush the uprising and “restore order” (The 4th Armoured Division 2017).  As 
protests led to eventual conflict, the 4th Armored Division, which is normally stationed in 
Damascus, was redeployed to Deraa this time to fight rebel gains (The 4th Armoured Division 
2017).  The 4th Armored Division was successful during this initial stage in restoring control of 
large parts of Deraa province (The 4th Armoured Division 2017).  In addition, parts of the 4th 
Armored Division in 2012 were sent to Hama province, where it restored control over the 
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countryside, and Idlib province where the parallel military force suffered massive losses in 
attempting to recover the countryside but were only able to capture the provincial capital (The 
4th Armoured Division 2017).  Due to large rebel assaults occurring in Damascus in 2012, the 4th 
Armored Division was redeployed to Damascus to support the units of the Republican Guard 
there to safeguard the Baathist regime for the rest of the war (The 4th Armoured Division 2017).   
Like the Republican Guard, heavy losses incurred by the 4th Armored Division led to the 
absorption of NDF militias to shore up manpower issues within the parallel military force.  In 
this case, these NDF militias include Liwa Sayf al-Mahdi and the Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein (The 
Imam al-Hussein Brigade) (Al-Tamimi 2016c; Al-Tamimi 2018b). The Imam al-Hussein 
Brigade is composed of both Iraqis and Syrians and fight under the 4th Armored Division in the 
same areas of operation as their parent unit the 4th Armored Division, which includes the areas of 
Darayya, al-Darkhabiya, Khan al-Shih, Wadi Barada, al-Qabwan, Harasta, al-Hajar al-Aswad, 
and Yarmouk in Damascus, and the provinces of Deraa and Idlib in the North and South of the 
counry.437 The 4th Armored Division was mostly deployed in western Damascus and the north of 
the capital in 2012 that led to the isolation of rebel movements and the creation of pockets of 
resistance within the capital (The 4th Armoured Division 2017).  From 2013 to 2014, the 4th 
Armored Division laid siege to these rebel pockets, forcing some such as Babbila and Yalda to 
reconcile with the Baathist regime (The 4th Armoured Division 2017).   Once Russian 
intervention occurred in 2015, the 4th Armored Division, in support of military units and the 
Republican Guard in Damascus, began a process of emptying rebel held pockets within the 
capital (The 4th Armoured Division 2017).  The 4th Armored Division from 2015 to 2017 was 
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able to recover rebel pockets such as Moadamiyah, Khan Al-Sheh, Wadi Barada, and Darayya in 
the capital reducing the rebel threat to the Baathist regime (The 4th Armoured Division 2017). 
Syria’s Intelligence Services during the Civil War 
 After protests turned to armed conflict, Syria’s intelligence agencies began a process of 
militarization wherein collapsing security enforcement institutions and a diminishing monopoly 
on violence within the country led to the expansion of militia type forces under Syria’s various 
intelligence agencies.  The Air Force Intelligence as a parallel security structure evolved as the 
deadly crisis unfolded.  Intelligence agents were not enough to combat the losses stemming from 
the military and parallel military organizations.  The parallel intelligence organization of the Air 
Force Intelligence began a process of cultivating militia networks that involved localized Air 
Force Intelligence troops called “flex units”; and a permanent mobile force of 4,000 or more 
soldiers that included artillery and armored units, as well as an ability to obtain close air support 
from the Syrian Air Force and later in 2015 from the Russian Air Force (Waters 2018b, 1).438 
During the 2011 protests, General Suheil Hasan, was commander of the special operations 
branch, a mobile armed force, of the Air Force Intelligence (Waters 2018b, 1).  General Suheil 
Hasan first gained prominence from his role in the Air Force Intelligence with regard to missions 
in 2005 and 2006 where he infiltrated Al-Qaeda networks in eastern Syria leading to numerous 
arrests, and the elimination of several cells from operating within Syria.439 General Hasan was 
dispatched to several locations during 2011 to suppress protests including the provinces of 
Hama, Deraa, and finally Damascus (Waters 2018b, 1).   In these same locations, General Hasan 
ordered the torture and killing of many protesters, resulting in the deaths of hundreds (Waters 
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2018b, 2). In 2012, as his area of operations expanded in Hama, he was able to consolidate 
military assets in the Hama area to operate under his orders to suppress the rebellion (Waters 
2018b, 2).   For example, General Hasan brought under his control the 11th Armored Divisions of 
the Syrian Army, absorbed various NDF militias, rolled up the Shabiha units into the Air Force 
Intelligence, and incorporated various remnants of Special Forces units to create a larger militia 
extension of the Air Force Intelligence called the Tiger Forces (Khaddour 2016; Schneider 2016; 
Waters 2018b, 2). In addition, helicopters and planes based out at Hama Airbase were utilized by 
General Hasan to provide close air support for his forces, soften up enemy positions in his area 
of operation, and provide combined arms for any future offensives against rebels (Waters 2018b, 
2).  
 The Air Force Intelligence with this new force began offensive operations in the summer 
of 2012, in Ariha and Jabal Arba’in in Idlib province (Waters 2018b, 2).  In late 2013, the Tiger 
Forces were used in conjunction with the Republican Guard to reopen the Ithriya-Khanasser 
highway to reestablish the supply line between Damascus and Aleppo (Waters 2018b, 2).   In 
2014, the Air Force Intelligence’s Tiger Forces were utilized to capture the Shaer gas fields in 
Homs province from ISIS, a vital source of revenue for the regime (Waters 2018b, 2).  Once 
Russia entered the conflict in 2015, the “Air Intelligence-backed militia” received heavy support 
from Russian air assets in Syria in their operations against opposition groups across the country 
(Waters 2018b, 3). 440  In 2015, a rebel alliance called Jaish al-Fatah unveiled a large offensive 
against regime held positions (Waters 2018b, 3).  Rebel forces captured large swathes of territory 
in Idlib and most of northern Hama province (Waters 2018b, 3).  Idlib City, the provincial 
capital, and Jisr al-Shughur which had been under regime control before the offensive fell to 
                                                          




rebel forces (Waters 2018b, 3).  Despite three weeks of fierce fighting, the Tiger Forces were 
unable to stop the rebel advance and incurred serious losses to its force (Waters 2018b, 3).  
Similar to the Republican Guard and 4th Armored Division, the Air Force Intelligence 
replenished its militia by absorbing NDF militias from Alawite communities, predominantly in 
Hama province (Waters 2018b, 3-4). However, not all fighters came from the NDF, the parallel 
military forces of the Republican Guard, the 4th Armored Division, and armed militias of the 
Intelligence Apparatus as well as the Syrian Army were forced to recruit from not only foreign 
fighters but from within the regime’s own prison system.  Prisoners convicted of criminal or 
political crimes serving sentences of five years or more would be granted amnesty if they took up 
arms to serve in one of the regime’s security apparatus along the frontlines.441442443  The dire 
conditions of Syria’s prisons and the potential for torture led many to join the ranks of the 
government.444445 In 2015, the Air Force Intelligence unit was sent to the Aleppo front to combat 
al-Nusra offensive in the area.446  In March 2018, during the eastern Ghouta offensive, Russia 
provided material and air support that was crucial for the Air Intelligence backed militia to break 
through rebel lines allowing the regime to bring Damascus back under government control 
(Waters 2018b, 3).  In 2018, the Air Intelligence backed militia engaged in conflict with rebels in 
                                                          
441 MEE Staff, Syrian prisoners offered freedom if they fight for government on frontlines, Middle East Eye, 2 June 
2016. 
442Raja Abdulrahim, Syria Regime Drafts Prisoners, Teachers to Bolster Depleted Army, Wall Street Journal, 5 
August 2016. 
443 Louisa Loveluck, New Recruitment Drive Indicates Deep Manpower Problems in Syria’s Army, Washington 
Post, 22 November 2016. 
444 MEE Staff, Syrian prisoners offered freedom if they fight for government on frontlines, Middle East Eye, 2 June 
2016. 
445 Raja Abdulrahim, Syria Regime Drafts Prisoners, Teachers to Bolster Depleted Army, Wall Street Journal, 5 
August 2016. 
446 Leith Fadel, Who Is Colonel Suheil Al-Hassan of the Tiger Forces?, Al-Masdar News, 26 February 2015. 
194 
 
Deraa province bringing many areas back under regime control in conjunction with units of the 
Republican Guard and NDF.447448 
 The General Security Directorate for most of the Syrian conflict utilized its own agents, 
operatives, and informants to crack down on internal dissent and infiltrate suspected opposition 
cells in regime controlled areas.  However in Deir ez Zor, where the regime lost most of its land 
holdings to rebel forces and later ISIS, the General Security Directorate needed additional 
manpower once the provincial capital became surrounded by ISIS and the countryside of Deir ez 
Zor was in opposition hands (Al-Tamimi 2016b).  In this case, the General Security Directorate 
absorbed the NDF militia called Lions of the Euphrates to act as their main protection arm within 
the besieged city of Deir ez Zor (Al-Tamimi 2016b).  Similar to the General Security 
Directorate, Syria’s Military Intelligence absorbed various NDF militias into its ranks due to 
manpower shortages from the internal conflict in the country.  The NDF militias, Syria’s Military 
Intelligence include: Lions of the Eternal Leader, Fawj Maghawir al-Badiya (The Desert 
Commandos Regiment), and Quwat Dir' al-Amn al-Askari (The Military Security Shield Forces) 
(Al-Tamimi 2016b; Al-Tamimi 2016a; Al-Tamimi 2016d).  The Desert Commandos Regiment 
has been utilized by the Military Intelligence Branch to attack ISIS positions in Homs province, 
most notably Shaer Gas Field and Palmyra in 2015, as well as rebels in Aleppo province in that 
same year (Al-Tamimi 2016a). The militia forces under the Military Intelligence Branch has 
offered higher pay and amnesty for draft dodgers in order to bolster the force’s ranks (Al-
Tamimi 2016a). Another militia, the Military Security Shield Forces were utilized by Syria’s 
Military Intelligence to launch attacks against rebels in Latakia province in February to March of 
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2016 (Al-Tamimi 2016d).  The force was also utilized in March of 2016 against ISIS to 
recapture Palmyra in Homs province (Al-Tamimi 2016d).  The force remained in Palmyra 
through much of spring and summer of 2016 with the exception of one offensive in 2016 to push 
ISIS out of Raqqa province (Al-Tamimi 2016d). Later, the Military Security Shield Forces were 
utilized against rebels in July of 2016 in Aleppo as well as against ISIS in Deir ez Zor (Al-
Tamimi 2016d). Syria’s intelligence services were crucial to breaking down opposition networks 
in areas recovered by the Syrian Baathist regime and in regime controlled areas throughout the 
civil war.  In addition, they provided another element to shore up support for the Syrian Baathist 
regime by providing armed elements of their organization to fend off rebel and ISIS attacks 
against regime held territories.  
Conclusion: Syria’s Parallel Security Structures under Bashar al-Assad 
 In line with their institutional mission of preserving the Syrian Baathist regime; Syria’s 
parallel security structures preserved not only Hafez al-Assad’s government but also Bashar al-
Assad’s regime after protests in 2011 led to internal conflict. As of 2019, the Civil War in Syria 
continues, but the possibility of regime change is now out of reach for the opposition.  The 
government manpower issues that were significant after 2012 have been rectified with the 
recapture of lost territory by the Syrian regime.  This is quite clear due to the Syrian regime 
feeling comfortable enough to begin a process of demobilization, beginning with the unofficial 
“Class of 2010.”449,450,451 For Syria’s government under Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad, the 
institutional framework of Syria’s parallel security institutions provided a counter to open 
insurrection that prevented the complete takeover of the Syrian Baathist regime at various points 
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over the last 40 years. The consolidation of Syria’s parallel security structures provided the 
Syrian Baathist regime with a large scale and reliable security force to combat opposition and 



















From the Reign of the Shah to the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
The case of Iran examined from 1957 to 2018, observes the parallel security structures 
under Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlevi and later under the Islamic Republic of Ayatollah 
Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei.  Insurgencies and external conflict will be traced to 
determine the effectiveness of the parallel security structures hold on combating those threats 
while under the political regimes of the Shah and the Islamic Republic.  In addition, Institutional 
continuity will be examined to determine if events and outcomes affect regime survival and 
institutional demise of those parallel security structures tasked with protecting the regimes under 
the Shah and later the Islamic Republic.  The parallel security apparatus as a concept is further 
extended by tracing the development of the parallel security structures under the political 
regimes of the Shah and the regime of the Islamic Republic in how they defend both regimes 
from internal and external threats.  By tracing the impact parallel security structures hold on 
regime preservation, one can better understand their unique utilization across Middle Eastern 
authoritarian regimes.  
Parallel Security Structures under the Shah of Iran 
 Iran, looking at the timeframe of 1957 to 2018 has been ruled by two separate regimes.  
The first is the Pahlevi Dynasty during the period of 1957 to 1979 and the other has been the 
Islamic Republic from 1979 to the present.  Both authoritarian regimes have utilized parallel 
security structures to ensure political durability of their respective regimes.  The Pahlevi Dynasty 
created the SAVAK in 1956 over a coup and regime change occurrence in 1953 (Moravej 2011, 
71-74).  The 1953 regime change under Mohammed Mosaddegh and his allied leftist Tudeh 
198 
 
Party underscored the importance and need for a parallel security structure in Iran to protect the 
monarchy and Pahlevi Dynasty from future coup attempts.   Elements within the military and 
officers dismissed by Mossadegh, eventually restored to power the Shah of Iran;452 however the 
need for a counter-coup force to obstruct coup attempts such as the one carried out by 
Mosaddegh was ever present (Moravej 2011, 71-74).  The eventual culminating regime change 
that would take place in 1979, overthrowing the Pahlevi Dynasty once again and ushering in a 
new regime would signal the expansion of parallel security structures in the country under the 
need to protect the revolution from counter-revolutionists.  Under the Islamic Republic, internal 
control has mostly been sustained by Iran’s parallel security structures. 
 Iran under the Shah had four parallel security structures which included the SAVAK or 
Sazman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar, created in 1957, the Imperial Inspectorate 
Organization, created in 1958, and the Special Information Bureau, created in 1959, and the 
Imperial Guard (Stratfor: Iranian Intelligence and Regime Preservation 2010; Moravej 2011, 75). 
453454  The SAVAK as an organization spawned from the United States whom advised the Shah of 
Iran in 1956 to create two similar organizations that modeled themselves off of the U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation so that the successful coup by 
Mossadegh in 1953 would not come to fruition a second time (Moravej 2011, 74).  After 1953, 
the Shah instituted several coup-proofing measures.  One was the separation of commands 
among the military branches, so that the army, navy, and air force had distinct chains of 
command.455 This prevented the easy coordination among coup factions within each branch that 
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was pervasive and led to the overthrow of the Shah in 1953.456  The second measure enacted by 
the Shah included restricted communications among officers of different units within the military 
and promotions to top ranking positions in the security apparatus were undertaken by the Shah 
himself.457   “The Shah’s armed forces had an over-centralized and dysfunctional command 
structure, officers were appointed and promoted on the basis of loyalty to the imperial regime 
rather than professional competence” (Hughes 2016). While these measures were effective at the 
prevention and detection of coups within the military it made it difficult for the military to 
respond to internal crises or events in order to preserve the regime.458 The third measure was the 
creation of the Imperial Inspectorate Organization and Special Information Bureau were created 
in 1958 and 1959 respectively (Moravej 2011, 75).  The Imperial Inspectorate Organization was 
created as a result of a 1958 military coup attempt and was tasked with surveilling the military 
and Iran’s provinces, while the Special Information Bureau (SIB) was tasked with studying 
various national groups and ministries as well as the intelligence services and security services 
within the country (Moravej 2011, 75). The SIB had five departments, each with different 
responsibilities towards regime protection.459 The First Department would look after 
administrative and financial affairs, the Second Department handled state affairs and compiled 
reports to be submitted to the Shah, the Third Department was tasked with surveilling political 
groups to determine their loyalty to the regime, the Fourth Department surveilled the military 
and police, and the Firth Department was in charge of investigations on matters of the other four 
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departments.460  The SIB had a vast intelligence network of informants recruiting low level 
members from both the army and police to detect dissent within the ranks.461 Most agents were 
brought in from the military and retained their service and rank identification as agents of the 
SIB.462 However the issue with the SIB and Imperial Inspectorate Organization was their lack of 
strong enforcement capacity, in which they would often have to rely on the SAVAK or the 
Imperial Army in order to tackle opposition elements (Moravej 2011, 75).  
Prior to 1953, Iran’s two intelligence organizations were Army Intelligence and the 
Political Directorate of the National Police (Moravej 2011, 75).  Iran’s Army Intelligence 
provided targeting information for the military and surveilled the general population for any 
potential dissent (Moravej 2011, 75).  The Political Directorate of the National Police similar to 
Iran’s Army Intelligence also surveilled the population, passing on the information to local 
police stations to investigate and tackle any form of dissent within the population (Moravej 2011, 
75). The internal strategy of the Shah’s regime at the time was to have a strong military that 
could suppress any rebellion from intelligence provided by the regime’s other security organs, 
rather than relying on a large parallel military structure to act as enforcement for tackling dissent 
(Wehrey et al 2009, 21).463  The compromise, in this case, was detection by the Imperial 
Inspectorate Organization, Special Information Bureau, and the SAVAK, and enforcement by 
both the SAVAK and Army.  The only parallel military organization the Shah possessed was an 
Imperial Guard, which protected him, regime officials, the royal palace, and the royal family; 
and it was the only unit from the army allowed to be stationed in Tehran (Stratfor: Iranian 
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Intelligence and Regime Preservation 2010). The Imperial Guard numbered around 8,000 
soldiers and had an elite unit within the Imperial Guard called the Javidan (Eternal/Immortal) 
Imperial Guard, numbering around 3,000 (Abrahamian 1983, 435).464,465  This was in contrast to 
the largely conscript based force of the 200,000 to 220,000 soldiers in the Imperial Army of Iran 
(Abrahamian 1983, 435). In addition, those recruited into the Javidan Imperial Guard underwent 
extensive training and were largely recruited from rural areas because they were perceived not to 
pose a threat to the regime and acted as the Shah’s own personal bodyguard anywhere he 
went.466,467 The Javidan Imperial Guard had to swear an oath to protect the Shah and his family 
until their last drop of blood (Smith 1980, 9). The Imperial Guard only answered to the royal 
family and in the event of war fell under the Imperial Iranian Ground Forces Command (Smith 
1980, 3). A section of the Special Information Bureau operated out of the palace with that section 
primarily focused on threats directly to the Shah himself and to a degree overlapped  the 
responsibilities of the SAVAK and Imperial Inspectorate Organization (Stratfor: Iranian 
Intelligence and Regime Preservation 2010).  The Special Information Bureau would often 
summarize to the Shah daily reports compiled by Army Intelligence, the police, and the SAVAK 
on issues pertaining to the security of the regime.468 
 The SAVAK being one of the more extensive parallel security structures at the disposal of 
the Shah had ten directorates utilized for both domestic and foreign surveillance and intelligence 
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gathering (Moravej 2011, 77-78).  The SAVAK focused primarily on domestic threats such as 
leftists and communists, but also had external operations outside the borders of Iran.469 The 3rd 
Directorate or Security Directorate was the largest of the ten directorates and was quite pervasive 
in duties of regime preservation (Moravej 2011, 78).  Most citizens of Iran were quite aware of 
this directorate due to its contact with the populace as opposed to the SAVAK’s other directorates 
(Moravej 2011, 78). Groups and institutions of interest to the SAVAK and placed under 
surveillance included: communist and leftists groups, ethnic and religious minorities, 
government ministries, political parties, the police, the media, labor organizations, and the 
military (Moravej 2011, 78).470  The Tudeh Party was of particular concern to the SAVAK since it 
had been instrumental in overthrowing the Shah in 1953.471 Provincial and district directorates of 
the SAVAK would forward information to the 3rd Directorate which would then be forwarded to 
regime stakeholders in order to make decisions regarding potential threats (Moravej 2011, 78).  
The SAVAK’s 2nd and 7th Directorates were utilized for foreign intelligence gathering to gather 
threats on outside opposition groups trying to affect the internal stability in Iran or foreign state 
threats (Moravej 2011, 78-79, 81-82).  One of the targets of the SAVAK was Iraq to prevent the 
emergence of a strong Arab nationalist country; the SAVAK would carry out operations and 
provide support to Iraqi dissident groups that were predominantly Shia and Kurdish (Moravej 
2011, 83).  The primary concerns of the Shah of Iran were Arab Nationalist movements, 
Communism, and Soviet expansion throughout the Middle East (Moravej 2011, 84).   Fear over 
Iraq stirring up tension in Iran’s Arab dominated Khuzestan province, led Iran and its parallel 
security structure of the SAVAK to intervene in Iraq from the 1950s to the mid-1970s (Moravej 
2011, 85).  The SAVAK’s 8th Directorate focused on counterintelligence, surveilling potential 
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Soviet agents and Arab agents within Iran that may be assisting opposition elements within the 
country (Moravej 2011, 87-88). The 8th Directorate was also in charge of interceptions at border 
points especially targets that could be identified as assisting with internal opposition elements 
within Iran (Moravej 2011, 89).  
The SAVAK had 15,000 agents and thousands of informants that assisted in impeding and 
eliminating internal dissent within the country.472  The SAVAK had direct communication to the 
office of prime minister and often times would exercise their authority outside of the parameters 
of laws within the country.473  The SAVAK created a police state through its vast informant 
network and surveillance operations throughout the country and made Evin prison the infamous 
SAVAK facility for torture and indefinite detention of political prisoners (Stratfor: Iranian 
Intelligence and Regime Preservation 2010). While the director of the SAVAK was nominally 
under the Prime Minister, the director provided daily briefs related to national security to the 
Shah every morning (Stratfor: Iranian Intelligence and Regime Preservation 2010). The SAVAK 
along with the other parallel security structure safeguarded regime officials from assassinations, 
coup attempts, and cracked down on dissent throughout the country. Table 6.1 displays the 
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Table 6.1 – The Parallel Security Apparatus under the Shah 
The Shah’s Parallel Security Structures 
The SAVAK  15,000 Agents 
Imperial Guard  8,000 Soldiers 
Imperial Inspectorate Organization  Number of Personnel Unknown 
Special Information Bureau  Number of Personnel Unknown 
Source: Ervand Abrahamian. 1983. Iran between Two Revolutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Iran’s 
Ministry of Intelligence and Security, Library of Congress, 2012; Stratfor. 2010. “Special Series: Iranian 
Intelligence and Regime Preservation.” Available at: (https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/special-series-iranian-
intelligence-and-regime-preservation); Created by the Author. 
 
SAVAK Activities in Iraq and Internal Insurrection in Iran – 1958 to 1969 
 The rise of the Qasim regime in Iraq in 1958 and his support for Iranian communists in 
the country led Iran’s SAVAK to intervene in Iraq’s internal affairs (Moravej 2011, 131-132). In 
meetings infiltrated by the SAVAK in Iraq, names of members would be forwarded to the 3rd 
Directorate of the SAVAK to intercept Iranian communist agents within the country (Moravej 
2011, 132).  Plans revealed by dissident Iranian communists included protests and disruptive 
activities in Iran’s Azerbaijan region and in Abadan (Moravej 2011, 132).  Prior to 1958, the 
National Resistance Movement that was backed by Mossadegh conducted propaganda activities 
that were anti-Shah in nature and were leading to events to the forceful removal of the Shah.474  
The SAVAK prevented the disinformation of anyone within the royal family or his regime (Boini 
1978, 51). The SAVAK would infiltrate opposition groups espousing anti-regime rhetoric which 
would lead to a series of arrests, weakening opposition within the country of Iran.475 The SAVAK 
carried out massive arrests in September of 1957 in the cities of Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, and 
Meshed to round up and arrest suspected National Resistance Movement members in those 
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cities.476  The intelligence gathered in the Azerbaijan region of Iran and Abadan allowed the 
SAVAK to intercept key targets of Iran’s communist groups and other opposition groups to 
prevent such disruptive activities from occurring (Moravej 2011, 132).  
In 1959, Iraq’s Qasim Regime was providing support to anti-Shah Kurdish opposition 
groups (Moravej 2011, 133).  Iran responded by utilizing the 2nd Directorate of the SAVAK to 
provide support to Iraqi Kurdish guerillas facing a military offensive by Iraq’s military in the 
North (Moravej 2011, 133). In that same year, the SAVAK was utilized to counter Iraqi Turkmen 
spreading anti-Shah propaganda in Iran’s Azerbaijan region and around 200 armed Iraqi 
communists in Kermanshah province (Moravej 2011, 134). In addition, the Tudeh Party (Iranian 
communists) members were identified as working in Iraq’s Army Intelligence in their Iran 
section for subversive activities of overthrowing the Shah in 1959 (Moravej 2011, 135). Many 
members of Iran’s Tudeh Party were arrested in massive sweeps across the country in 1959 over 
the support they received from Iraq for subversive activities (Moravej 2011, 135).   In terms of 
the domestic makeup and alignment of the Tudeh Party as an opposition group, its membership 
and support is mostly comprised of ethnic Persians, whom are university educated from 
aristocratic backgrounds and hold a pragmatic approach to working with other opposition groups 
in their quest to overthrow the Shah.477  Another opposition group that was active during the 
1950s and 1960s in Iran was the People’s Sacrifice Guerillas, which held a leftist orientation.478 
Their religious basis for their socialist tenets and extreme actions led to no communication or 
coordination with other anti-Shah opposition groups including the Tudeh Party in their aims to 
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overthrow the Shah.479  Thus limiting the effectiveness of anti-Shah opposition groups in 
combating the Shah’s security apparatus and parallel security structures. 
In Iraq during the late 1950s, economic conditions under Qasim’s socialist system grew 
worse, and the security situation was deteriorating (Moravej 2011, 136).  Soldiers in Iraq’s Army 
were deserting and police forces could not maintain control on law and order throughout the 
country (Moravej 2011, 136).   Iran’s SAVAK attempted to utilize the deteriorating situation to 
make inroads among Iraq’s disaffected officers, which led to intelligence that the Soviet Union 
was attempting to engineer a coup against the Shah through Iraqi and Kurdish communists 
entering Iran (Moravej 2011, 137). The SAVAK further intercepted weapons shipments from Iraq 
to communists in Iran in 1959 (Moravej 2011, 138).   After reports of communists disrupting 
religious sermons from Islamic clerics in Iraq and occupying their space for public use, the 
SAVAK attempted to make connections with Iraq’s religious section in order to ferment unrest in 
Iraq (Moravej 2011, 138). The SAVAK held a series of meetings with Mustafa Barzani in order to 
provide support to him and his Kurdish Democratic Party in their attempt to overthrow the 
Qasim Regime in Iraq (Moravej 2011, 138). The SAVAK’s goal was to replace the Qasim 
Regime with the reestablishment of the Iraqi monarchy facilitated by Shia and Kurdish dissidents 
within the country (Moravej 2011, 139-140).  
 In 1960, the SAVAK put their plan into action by utilizing Syria as a conduit to supply 
arms to Shia tribes in the South with weapons and Kurds in the North with arms to begin attacks 
on Iraq’s security forces (Moravej 2011, 145).  In addition, clashes between the Iraqi military 
and Iraqi communists were becoming more prevalent as discord in the ranks of the Iraqi military 
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over the direction of the Qasim Regime were gaining traction (Moravej 2011, 146).  In 1963, 
based upon the stable security situation from various reports of the Shah’s parallel security 
apparatus, it was decided that new elections would be held in the Majlis (Iranian Parliament), 
which had been essentially suspended since the 1953 coup.480 The National Front participating in 
the new elections of 1963 were cracked down upon by the police and SAVAK over their demands 
for the Shah to return to constitutional rule.481 After 1963, many student protestors joined armed 
opposition groups that would wage guerilla warfare against the regime’s security apparatus.482  
Further in 1963, the Qasim Regime was overthrown by the Ba’ath Party, for which the 
Ba’ath Party began targeting communists, Iranians, and Kurds throughout the country (Moravej 
2011, 149). Iraq’s military deployed alongside police forces in urban centers of Iraq to suppress 
protests against the Arif Regime and the Ba’ath Party (Moravej 2011, 150). As a result of 
crackdowns on communists in Iraq, many Iraqi communists fled to Iran where the SAVAK 
subsequently arrested them or monitored them for subversive activities within the country 
(Moravej 2011, 152).  “Although it had been planned for the arrests to be undertaken by the 
police force, it was soon decided that for security reasons the SAVAK’s Tehran branch would be 
better suited for the operation” (Moravej 2011, 152). The SAVAK’s Azerbaijan station was 
utilized to intercept Iraqi communists attempting to make it into the Soviet Union (Moravej 
2011, 152).  As a result of the persecution of Iraq’s communists, the Soviet Union was unwilling 
to supply the Arif Regime with armaments and as a result was forced to acquire limited supplies 
from Syria to fight the Kurdish guerillas in the North (Moravej 2011, 153).  Under the Arif 
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Regime, Ba’ath Party members were ousted in 1963 over alleged plots against his government 
and recruitment in 1964 focused on bringing in Sunnis within the security services over that of 
Shiites, allowing the SAVAK to make inroads among Shia opposition groups within country 
(Moravej 2011, 158-159). The Arif Regime also during the 1960s began a process of facilitating 
unrest in Iran by providing weapons and support to Iranian Arabs along Iran’s western border, 
leading to unrest in those regions (Moravej 2011, 161).  Throughout the mid to late 1960s, the 
SAVAK facilitated support to Iraqi Kurds to keep Iraq’s Army bogged down in the North for the 
primary purpose of facilitating the overthrow of the Arif Regime as well as limit Iraq’s 
interference in supporting Iranian opposition groups (Moravej 2011, 170). External balancing 
and support for opposition groups in Iraq limited and diminished the effectiveness of opposition 
group activity in Iran. In addition the pervasiveness of the parallel security structures in Iran, 
most notably the SAVAK, prevented opposition groups based in Iraq from gaining a significant 
foothold within Iran or disrupting the Shah’s regime.  
1970s –Iranian Intervention in Oman and the SAVAK 
 From 1972 to 1979, the Shah of Iran deployed the Imperial Iranian Armed forces called 
the Imperial Iranian Brigade Group to Oman (Hughes 2016).  Around 15,000 soldiers, airmen, 
and sailors served in Oman from 1972 to 1979 with around only 4,000 service members in 
theater at any given time (Goode 2014, 451; Hugest 2016).  The Iranian troops deployed 
supported the royal forces in Oman against the Marxist-Leninist Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Oman (PFLO) (Goode 2014; Hughes 2016).  Special Forces and regular troops of the Army 
were deployed to the western part of Oman, called Dhufar, where there were the heaviest 
concentrations of the PFLO (Hughes 2016). The Iranian Imperial Armed Forces, a part of the 
internal mechanism of regime preservation were very rarely deployed in large contingents 
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outside of Iran’s borders.  However in the case of Oman, the Shah not only viewed the conflict in 
Oman as battling radicalism in the Gulf, but utilized Oman as a means to test his troops in an 
asymmetric environment in case such an occurrence would emerge within Iran itself (Goode 
2014, 451).  Actions in Oman were highly regulated by the Military’s central command, officers 
never took their own initiative when creating plans, and the Shah was in constant contact with 
General Azhari, the ranking general officer on the ground in Oman (Goode 2014, 452).   
Despite being well equipped, Iran’s forces performed poorly during the early years of 
deployment to Oman, often bunching up when under fire, lack of fire control among soldiers, the 
absence of fortified positions, and many soldiers lacked basic infantry skills necessary to combat 
enemy forces in the area (Hughes 2016). General Azhari, in accordance with the Shah’s desire to 
oversee every step of progress in Oman, would often make decisions of strategy and troop 
positions after consultations with the Shah (Goode 2014, 452).  When the Shah would obtain 
reports about poor engagements with the enemy he would become infuriated (Goode 2014, 453).  
In one particular report of a poor engagement, General Azhari attempted to explain to the Shah 
that their forces faced difficult terrain and heavy forested vegetation, with the Shah replying 
“‘Didn’t the enemy face the same terrain!’” (Goode 2014, 453).  As the conflict progressed 
throughout the 1970s, the Iranian forces’ combat ability in an asymmetric environment 
improved, improving the prospects if any full-fledged insurgency ever occurred in Iran the 
Shah’s Imperial Army would be prepared to suppress it (Goode 2014; Hughes 2016). 
Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, many Iranian opposition groups lay dormant 
as a result of the Shah’s security services and more specifically the SAVAK suppression of their 
210 
 
movements within the country.483 However in 1973 demonstrations by students in Kermanshah 
and Tabriz took place, leading to police and the SAVAK responding leading to the deaths of 
several students.484 In 1974, the SAVAK executed around 200 political prisoners viewed as a 
threat to the regime.485 Despite the 1973 demonstrations and the execution of political prisoners 
the country remained relatively calm.  By 1975 the relative calm throughout the country began to 
change as Students began engaging in anti-government demonstrations against the Shah’s regime 
and leftist and religious opposition groups began a wave attacks against the Shah’s security 
forces.486  Despite these more widespread attacks and demonstrations, student groups as well as 
armed internal opposition groups still lacked widespread support from the populace in Iran.487  
The three armed groups to carry out attacks against the SAVAK and police in 1975 were the 
People’s Sacrifice Guerillas, a communist group, and the People’s Strugglers (Mujahedin-e 
Khalq), an extremist religious organization, and the Organization of People’s Crusaders. 488,489,490  
Those arrested by the Police or SAVAK were tortured in order to gather information regarding 
both group’s organizations and cells.491  On March 17th 1975, General Zandipur, a member of the 
anti-dissidence committee was assassinated by the People’s Sacrifice Guerillas with literature 
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left at the scene claiming the General had been tried by the “People’s Court.”492,493  Student 
protests continued to be a problem with protests even occurring in Qom by religious adherents 
over the arrest of several religious figures and students within the city over a planned attack on a 
local SAVAK office.494  In 1975 alone, around 2,158 members of opposition groups were arrested 
by the SAVAK.495 Despite these arrests, assassinations and attacks were still occurring with most 
taking place during daylight hours throughout the country. 496,497 Throughout the mid to late-
1970s unrest throughout Iran grew only to boil over in 1978.   
The Iranian Revolution 
In November of 1978, the Tudeh Party led demonstrations against the Shah at the 
University of Tehran.498 Other anti-Shah activities were followed by the National Resistance 
Movement in 1978, drawing mostly from its middle class support such as traders, the clergy, 
intellectuals, students, and liberals to protest against the Shah and the oppressive force of the 
SAVAK.499  As protests continued throughout 1978, the Shah attempted to compromise with the 
religious establishment by appointing a traditional prime minister, Jafar Sharif-Emami as well as 
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the removal of the head of the SAVAK, General Nematollah Nasiri, for its hardline approach to 
dissidents and protestors.500  The Shah at the time, prior to massive protests, was under the 
impression that economic development could balance out issues of corruption and a repressive 
authoritarian regime (Terrill 2014, 85).   As protests expanded, the military was deployed to 
Tehran and eleven different cities in Iran to quell the protests in September of 1978.501 The 
regime declared martial law and soldiers fired into a crowd of demonstrators in Jaleh Square in 
Tehran, killing 87.502  The shooting completely radicalized the opposition to where concessions 
would no longer matter and regime change became the goal.503 After Jaleh Square, the military 
had orders not to shoot at protestors but to shoot into the air in order to avoid overreactions by 
the security forces (Terrill 2014, 86).  
 In November of 1978, National Front leader, Karim Sanjabi, met with Khomeini to 
organize opposition efforts in Iran.504  From exile, Khomeini coordinated opposition efforts to 
overthrow the Pahlevi Dynasty and criticized clerics in Iran that compromised with the Shah’s 
regime (Terrilll 2014, 86). Each mosque acted as a mobilizing force to bring people out to the 
streets to protest against the Shah’s reign.505  After violent demonstrations in Iran, Prime 
Minister Emami was replaced by the Shah with General Gholam Reza Azhari, commander of the 
Imperial Guard.506  To placate the protests, the Shah ordered reforms, arrested former cabinet 
members including SAVAK officials, and released 1,000 political prisoners.507 Khomeini 
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responded by calling for more protests across the country.508  Clashes between protestors and 
government troops became a daily occurrence, leading to desertions amongst the rank and file of 
the military.509  The Military Command after massive desertions ordered its troops to stay neutral 
in the conflict between the Shah and protestors protesting against the regime (Terrill 2014, 86).  
In addition, soldiers had received flowers from the demonstrators which demoralized their will to 
suppress them, with soldiers often placing the flowers they received in the barrels of their guns 
as they patrolled the streets (Roberts 1996, 6). Within the opposition, audiotapes of Ayatollah 
Khomeini sermons were distributed throughout the country (Terrill 2014, 86).  “Shortly before 
his arrest and exile to Iraq in 1963, [Ayatollah Khomeini] stated ‘Let the American President 
know that in the eyes of the Iranian people, he is the most repellent member of the human race’” 
(Terrill 2014, 86).   The Tudeh Party’s exiled leader Iraj Eskandari began to coordinate with 
Khomeini in opposition efforts to topple the Shah, praising Khomenei and his supporters in their 
active opposition to the Shah’s regime.510   
The Shah in 1978 began talks with the moderate opposition that led to the ascendance of 
one of the National Front leaders, Shapour Bakhtiar, to form a government on the condition the 
Shah left the country.511  The Cabinet was presented to the Shah and survived a vote of no 
confidence from both chambers of the Majlis.512  Bakhtiar pledged to release all remaining 
political prisoners, dissolve the SAVAK, hold free and fair elections, and end martial law.513  
While this placated some of the opposition, Khomeini and the rest of the opposition continued on 
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with their plans to end the monarchy.514  The National Front expelled Bakhtiar and Khomeini 
declared the new government illegitimate.515   
In January of 1979 Khomeini declared demonstrations against the new government and in 
February he returned to Iran to coordinate opposition activity.516  As government services began 
to wither to the control of the opposition, revolutionary committees took their place to provide 
services and security to areas under their control.517  Ministers within government were unable to 
assert their authority and the military was rapidly disintegrating to opposition protests.518  In 
February of 1979, Air Force personnel at Doshan Tappeh Air Base mutinied and the air base’s 
arsenal was opened and weapons distributed to the opposition.519  Soon revolutionaries seized 
military bases, police barracks, prisons, and public buildings.520  A SAVAK Headquarters was 
overrun in February 1979, with its security files confiscated and SAVAK agents either executed 
or arrested (Stratfor: Iranian Intelligence and Regime Preservation 2010). On February 10, 1979, 
pro-Khomeini protests broke out at Farahabad Air Force base from uniformed civilian 
technicians under a military contract with the military rank of Homafar (Warrant Officer) (Smith 
1980, 102; Roberts 1996, 8).  A confrontation between the Imperial Army soldiers and military 
technicians ensued leading to around 20 to 70 protestors being killed after Imperial Army 
soldiers fired into the crowd (Roberts 1996, 8).  The Imperial Guard, equipped with tanks and 
helicopters were brought in but were unable to dislodge the Air Force civilian technicians 
(Roberts 1996, 8). The Imperial Guard suffered heavy casualties and several attack helicopters 
that were dispatched to support them were shot down by the rebelling Air Force technicians and 
                                                          
514 Iran: A Country Study, Library of Congress, 2008. 
515 Iran: A Country Study, Library of Congress, 2008. 
516 Iran: A Country Study, Library of Congress, 2008. 
517 Iran: A Country Study, Library of Congress, 2008. 
518 Iran: A Country Study, Library of Congress, 2008. 
519 Iran: A Country Study, Library of Congress, 2008. 
520 Iran: A Country Study, Library of Congress, 2008. 
215 
 
other armed protestors (Smith 1980, 102-103).  After the incident, word spread of how a mob of 
civilians was able to defeat the Shah’s most loyal Imperial Guard, further undermining and 
diminishing the regime’s power over that of the protestors (Roberts 1996, 9). In addition, the 
military withdrew from the streets, leading to a complete collapse of the Bakhtiar government 
and dissolution of the monarchy by February 11, 1979.521  Even while the government began to 
collapse the SIB and SAVAK continued to send reports to each other on the protests, even 
sending reports to the Imperial Guard in hopes they would suppress the protestors.522  According 
to former General Hussein Fardust, “the army could not be relied upon and the ‘Imperial Guard’ 
was not powerful enough to defuse the situation.”523  The Javidan Imperial Guard never wavered 
in their support of the Shah or the regime; they battled revolutionaries and sustained high 
casualties doing so (Smith 1980, 9).  They continued to battle protestors even after ordered back 
to their compound, their compound finally fell on February 12, 1979 with their commander 
General Abdol-Ali Badrai killed in the ensuing hostilities (Smith 1980, 9).   
The Collapse of the Parallel Security Apparatus of the Shah 
 In line with historical institutionalism and organizational theory, the Shah created four 
parallel security structures which included the SAVAK, Imperial Guard, Imperial Inspectorate 
Organization, and Special Information Bureau tasked with preserving the Shah’s regime.  The 
Imperial Inspectorate Organization and Special Information Bureau as parallel security structures 
were primarily limited to surveillance and detection of dissent, utilizing the police, Imperial 
Army and SAVAK to act as enforcement to threats to the regime.  The Imperial Guard was 
                                                          
521 Iran: A Country Study, Library of Congress, 2008. 
522 Hussein Fardust, The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty: Memoirs of Former General Hussein Fardust, pgs. 
411-412. 




predominantly utilized in the role of protecting the Shah and his family as well as the capital of 
Tehran in the event of revolt within the Imperial Army.  The SAVAK in contrast to the previous 
three aforementioned parallel security structures was by far more pervasive in tackling some of 
the most dominant threats such as the National Front, National Resistance Movement, People’s 
Sacrifice Guerillas, the Tudeh Party, and other opposition elements within the country.  
Throughout the late 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s the utility of utilizing a strong national army 
in conjunction with the Shah’s four parallel security structures proved effective.  In fact the 
Imperial Army had been battle tested in Oman to withstand potential insurrection by insurgent 
forces leading to the impression amongst stakeholders of the regime if internal conflict were to 
emerge in the country, the Imperial Army along with the country’s parallel security structures 
would be up to the task to tackle any threat.  However, by the late 1970s large public dissent and 
fear over cracking down on peaceful demonstrators led to the collapse of the Iranian Imperial 
Army as the rank and file defected to the opposition.  While the Special Information Bureau and 
Imperial Inspectorate Organization could report on issues of dissent and on protestors 
themselves, their lack of enforcement capacity limited their ability to suppress popular protests.  
In fact limited use of the Imperial Guard witnessed massive casualties amongst the force making 
it ineffective at crushing any form of dissent by early 1979.  In addition, as protestors ransacked 
SAVAK offices throughout the country, it became clear that the SAVAK would not be able to put 
down the popular protests occurring throughout Iran.  The most significant issue of the Shah’s 
parallel security structures was not only a lack of a pervasive and large parallel military 
organization but the lack of evolution amongst the Shah’s parallel security structures from their 
initial establishment and strong reliance on the Iranian Imperial Army which evidently collapsed 
in the face of strong popular protests. 
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The Islamic Republic 
 The first prime minister of the new revolutionary regime was Mehdi Bazargan.  He was 
instated in February 1979 after the Bakhtiar government and Shah were overthrown.524  However 
his government neither controlled the bureaucratic apparatus, nor the country.525  These functions 
continued to be carried out by the revolutionary committees that ranged from the extreme left to 
the extreme right.526 They guarded government buildings, ran prisons, policed neighborhoods, 
made unauthorized arrests, and executed many former regime officials and supporters through 
revolutionary tribunals (Wehrey et al 2009, 23).527  Governors and military commanders charged 
with running the country were often ignored or were deemed illegitimate by the revolutionary 
committees.528  Ayatollah Khomeini at this time was creating new government institutions and 
policy pronouncements as he did not view himself bound to the new government or felt a need to 
consult with his own prime minister in running the country.529 The Revolutionary Council, 
Khomeini created, shared power with the Prime Minister of Iran, however, the Revolutionary 
Council exercised supreme decision-making authority as well as supreme legislative authority 
over matters pertaining to the executive and the Majlis.530  In addition, with the ousting of the 
Shah, the limited contingent of soldiers still deployed to Oman was brought back in 1979 by the 
newly created Islamic Republic (Hughes 2016).  Around 700 service members lost their lives 
from operations stemming from 1972 to 1979 in a conflict widely associated as the Shah’s own 
personal intervention in a foreign country (Hughes 2016).  
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While in exile, Ayatollah Khomeini cultivated relationships with SAVAK agents in order 
to revive the 8th Directorate to focus on new threats to the incoming revolutionary regime.531 
Throughout February of 1979, daily executions occurred amongst former members of the Shah’s 
regime including generals, police commanders, government officials, representatives of the 
Majlis, and SAVAK officers.532  On February 17th, 1979, the Imperial Guard and Javidan Guard 
were disbanded with members incorporated into the army, retired off, or arrested and handed 
over to the revolutionary committees for trial (Roberts 1996, 3). Bazargan’s disdain for 
revolutionary committees led to a disagreement between him and the Revolutionary Council, 
leading to Bazargan to resign from his post of prime minister in November of 1979.533  The 
disagreement involved the Revolutionary Council wanting to control the revolutionary 
committees, whereas Bazargan wanted to disband them to bring back normalcy to the country.534  
Ayatollah Khomeini sought control over the revolutionary committees because of their loyalty to 
the revolution and his perception of the police as being disloyal and unable to conform to Islamic 
norms.535   The revolutionary committees were more effective than Ayatollah Khomeini could 
have hoped for.  They arrested hundreds of dissidents and opposition elements from information 
obtained from their own organization’s intelligence section.536 Each revolutionary committee had 
an intelligence section that would spy on neighbors and other potential individuals that may 
attempt to rebel against the new regime, leading to numerous arrests and crackdowns on 
dissidents.537  
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To further cement control of his new Islamic regime, Ayatollah Khomeini in May of 
1979 created the Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Islami (The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps).538  
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps along with the revolutionary committees and control 
over the revolutionary courts allowed clerics to consolidate power around an Islamic Republic 
and coopt or eliminate former allies of the opposition including the Mujahedin-e Khalq and 
National Front.539  “The IRGC was concerned that the liberals led by Bani Sadr, secular leftist 
and Islamic-Marxist groups and guerilla movements, and those still loyal to the Shah would seek 
opportunities to delegitimize the Islamic revolutionaries to consolidate power for themselves” 
(Pinkley 2018, 12). Ayatollah Khomeini always viewed moderate elements and non-religious 
segments of the opposition as a temporary alignment, to be discarded at the earliest possible 
convenience (Terrill 2014, 86). For Khomeini these groups could never be trusted (Terrill 2014, 
86). The new constitution that was created replaced the post of prime minister with the office of 
presidency and further cemented clerical domination of the state in 1979.540  While the post of 
prime minister existed under the president, its duties were limited and its office was officially 
taken over completely by the president in 1989 when the office was abolished.541 
The Islamic Republic’s Parallel Security Structures 
 To preserve this new order, the religious elite in the new regime created parallel security 
structures to ensure their hold on power.  Many military generals from the Shah era were purged, 
executed, or fled the country when Ayatollah Khomeini took power.542  However the potential 
threat stemming from the military and other armed opposition groups led to the legitimization of 
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existing and the creation of new counter-revolutionary and counter-coup forces loyal to Islamic 
regime. 543  The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was legitimized in May of 1979 as 
an official state security organ.544  The IRGC’s primary mission was the internal defense of the 
regime, while its secondary mission was fending off external forces alongside Iran’s Army 
(Belstad 2010, 30). Many revolutionary committees were absorbed into the IRGC after the 
revolution and during the Iran-Iraq War (Belstad 2010, 33). Many early IRGC members had 
belonged to the Mojahedin-e Khalq but turned away from the group closer to the revolution as a 
result of its emphasis of Marxism over Islamic ideology (Belstad 2010, 34). Many of these 
former Mojahedin-e Khalq fighters would join the Mujahedin of the Islamic Revolution, a group 
loyal to Khomenei, and then subsequently become rebranded as the IRGC and defenders of the 
revolution (Belstad 2010, 34). The IRGC suppressed former aligned armed opposition groups 
such as Fedayan-e Khalq (People’s Warriors), Peykar, and the Mojahedin-e Khalq and armed 
ethnic groups such as the Kurdish Komela, Turkmens, Azeris, the Baluch, and the Kurdish 
Peshmerga (Byman et al 2001, 33).545  The IRGC’s close ties to the ruling clerical establishment 
allowed them a significant degree of freedom in the conducting of internal and external 
operations within Iran (Byman et al 2001, 34).  Within the IRGC an elite force was created 
called the Quds Force.546  The Quds Force primarily focused on operations outside’s Iran’s 
borders which included cultivating internal forces within a country, infiltrating opposition 
groups, assassinations, sabotage, and espionage.547  The Quds Force was instrumental in 
cultivating resistance in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War as well as other countries in the broader 
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Middle East, supplying them with weapons and training.548  The force gained elite status within 
the IRGC in 1990.549   The Quds Force also holds Saberin units, limited operational Special 
Forces units, attached to provincial corps that rotate in and out of northwest Iran to combat the 
Kurdish Free Life Party (PJAK) and southeast Iran to combat Jundallah.550 
The IRGC also possesses its own intelligence unit, which reports on developments both 
within and outside of the country, reporting these events to the Supreme Leader of Iran.551  Both 
the Quds force and IRGC intelligence have access to the Supreme leader of Iran and are utilized 
to counter domestic opposition within the country.552  After the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 
IRGC was provided with internal enforcement duties, ran prisons, protected government 
buildings, and “served as bodyguards for regime leaders” (Wehrey et al 2009, 21; Belstad 2010, 
49).  The IRGC with its close links with the ruling establishment often operates outside the 
parameters of laws set forth by the ruling regime; laws regular security organs and police forces 
must follow within the country (Wehrey et al 2009, 22-23). While original members of the IRGC 
were originally from urban areas, new recruits are mostly drawn from rural areas which for the 
most part are heavily conservative (Belstad 2010, 62). In the rural areas, the IRGC has garnered 
the loyalty of agrarian communities through the implementation of construction projects and the 
promise of upward mobility in the ranks of the IRGC (Belstad 2010, 67-68).  Table 6.2 shows 
the expansion of the IRGC from 1979 to 1987.   
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During the Iran-Iraq War, many were attracted to service in the IRGC because the 
parallel military organization offered better benefits and a higher salary compared to the regular 
armed forces, incentivizing many, including non-ideological individuals, to join (Belstad 2010, 
63).  In this case, the IRGC was able to recruit non-religious revolutionary committees and other 
non-ideological groups as well as recruits from universities, high schools, and the urban poor to 
fill the organization’s ranks during the war (Belstad 2010, 64).  For potential conscripts, the 
IRGC is one of five organizations one can be conscripted into after a male turns 18 in Iran.553 
The police and army are often the hardest and most strict for training and service, whereas the 
least strict are the navy, air force, and IRGC and are often desired by potential conscripts.554  
However, it’s normally necessary to have some sort of connection to get into the IRGC as a 
conscript.555 
 







Source: Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Jerrold Green. 2001. Iran's 
Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
  
Another parallel security structure created by the new Islamic Republic was the Sazman-e 
basij-e mostazafan (Basij) (Golkar 2010, 1). The organization was formed in late 1979 as a result 
of Ayatollah Khomeini believing the United States may invade the country to overthrow his 
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regime.556  The force numbered about 550,000 men by the 1980s and drew mostly young, low-
income volunteers, especially those who did not complete their secondary school education.557 
The creation of the Basij is widely believed to be based off Ayatollah Khomeini’s 14 year exile 
in Iraq before being kicked out of the country at the request of the Shah in 1978.558 There the 
Ayatollah saw firsthand the Baath Party and Popular Army in use throughout society and as a 
result wanted to create a similar model with the creation of the Basij (Golkar 2015, 4-5).559   
During the 1980s, the Basij was used mainly for domestic missions of nighttime 
patrolling, policing various areas, and enforcing the Islamization of society.560  Later the Basij 
was integrated into Iran’s law enforcement structure allowing them to monitor areas and arrest 
anyone believed to be suspicious or conducting activities that would warrant attention to the 
regime.561  In addition, the Basij as a parallel military organization is utilized to counter Iran’s 
armed forces and in the event of an attack from an outside state-actor, the force would be utilized 
to repel enemy armies.562  By 1990, the Basij had a million men under arms (Byman et al 2001, 
38). The Basij as a popular mass militia force holds all cross-sections of society within the 
organization, including units for university students, factory workers, tribes, farmers, civil 
servants, and even professors (Wehrey et al 2009, 28; Ostovar 2013). However professors often 
wrote publications for the Basij in order to maintain their membership rather than frequenting 
Basij installations in their local area (Ostovar 2013, 352).  
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Much like the IRGC, the Basij have bases in many urban and rural areas of Iran (Wehrey 
et al 2009, 28). Basij members that undergo certain Basij training garner various social benefits 
such as loans, university scholarships, and subsidies that assist part-time members in their daily 
lives (Wehrey et al 2009, 28). According to a 24 year old Basij member, the reason he stays in 
the Basij is for financial benefits of the monthly salary of 95,000 toman per month for being a 
member, otherwise his support for the regime along with his other friends in the Basij would be 
non-existent.563  There is also a rural-urban divide in terms of the Basij.  The Basij like the IRGC 
receive more support and members in the rural areas, whereas in the urban areas they are seen as 
oppressors arresting dissidents, quashing civil society, and confronting reformist student groups 
on campuses (Wehrey et al 2009, 29).   The Basij and its member regularly conduct military 
training drills in order to maintain preparedness for internal unrest or external defense (Wehrey 
et al 2009, 44). However the organization is only lightly armed (Wehrey et al 2009, 46).  
The Basij is pervasive throughout society and quick to mobilize in the event of internal 
insurrection as the force has 50,000 bases spread across the country, from which to utilize in 
order to suppress unrest.564  The Basij is divided into three membership groups: the first are 
regular members, the most numerous out of the three, the second are active members, and the 
last are special members (Golkar 2012, 627; Ostovar 2013, 345).  Each member groups is 
assigned to one of the 50,000 Basij bases in Iran (Golkar 2012, 627). “They are then grouped 
into combat battalions and incorporated with the IRGC ground’s forces” (Golkar 2012, 627).  
Regular Basij members receive limited ideological and military training, whereas active 
members must undergo a 45 day ideological and training program in order to gain that status and 
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incur certain benefits from the regime (Golkar 2012, 627).  Special members of the Basij 
undergo full IRGC military training and become de-facto IRGC members in the Basij or are 
IRGC members attached to Basij units (Golkar 2012, 627; Ostovar 2013, 345). Some estimates 
hold there are 200,000 special members in the Basij (Golkar 2012, 627; Ostovar 2013, 345).  
 Another parallel security structure is the Ministry of Intelligence and Security. After the 
dissolution of the SAVAK, the Islamic regime created their own intelligence organization called 
the Sazman-e Ettelaat Va Amniat Meli Iran (SAVAMA), however the organization was later 
rebranded as the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) during the early 1980s.565,566   The 
SAVAMA took over all ongoing investigations of the SAVAK and absorbed most SAVAK officers 
and staff into the new organization (Gil-White 2006).567  The head of the SAVAMA after the 
revolution was General Hussein Fardust, former deputy Chief of the SAVAK (Gil-White 2006).  
“In fact, with the exception of the bureau chiefs [who ran the individual sections of SAVAK] the 
whole organization seems to be intact.”568 All of the directorates under the SAVAK were 
maintained under the new Islamic regime (Gil-White 2006).  In addition General Fardust’s 
deputy at SAVAMA was General Ali Mohammed Kaveh, a former SAVAK bureau head in the 
organization (Gil-White 2006). The SAVAMA and later MOIS gathered intelligence on various 
domestic threats such as coup attempts, uprisings, insurgencies and various other forms of 
dissent as well as gathering of intelligence on external threats from neighboring state actors in 
order to preserve the Islamic regime (Byman et al 2001, 32).   The MOIS infiltrated various 
opposition groups within the country and expatriate groups outside of the country, arresting 
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dissidents and alleged spies within the country.569 The MOIS receives information from all 
organizations in Iran and works closely with the IRGC both inside and outside the country.570  
MOIS agents are known in the country as “Unknown Soldiers of Imam Zaman,” a name given 
by Ayatollah Khomeini. 571  The MOIS in addition to their surveillance activities gather 
intelligence on state-actor threats alongside their duties of monitoring international threats.572  
However MOIS operations primarily target internal threats unless needed for external 
operations.573   
MOIS agents brought into the organization are vetted for ideological conformity but do 
not have to necessarily have hardline views similar to top officials within the regime.574   The 
MOIS reports directly to the Ayatollah regarding all matters of national security.575  While the 
organization holds strong religious undertones, it’s not bound by Shia beliefs.576  The MOIS 
recruits Arabs and Jews as agents for the organization, including former deputy minister of 
MOIS, Saeed Emami, born to Jewish Iranian parents.577  The MOIS reports directly to the 
Supreme leader in order to provide current updates on threats emanating within the borders of 
Iran and outside of the country.578   
The MOIS has 15 directorates with primary emphasis on the security and 
counterintelligence directorate that provides surveillance on domestic dissident groups.579  
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“MOIS has a secret budget and is not accountable to other governmental organizations, including 
the cabinet or the Majlis (parliament). It remains above the law, accountable only to the Supreme 
Leader, at present Ayatollah Khamenei.”580  The size of the MOIS is around 30,000 agents and 
many more informants.581  Syrian Intelligence organizations work closely with the MOIS and 
share information and targets with the organization.582  While the MOIS has both cyber 
intelligence and signals intelligence capabilities, it continues to heavily rely on the domain of 
human intelligence to breakup opposition groups or gather targeting information on enemy 
states.583  The MOIS has supported a number of regional proxy groups to include Hamas and 
Hezbollah as well at times Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda in Iraq as alliances of convenience. 584 The 
MOIS has had contacts with Osama Bin Laden and his associates since the 1990s and Osama Bin 
Laden even broached the subject of joining forces in order to combat the U.S. presence in the 
Middle East.585  Al-Qaeda’s liaison for the IRGC and MOIS was Seif al-Adl, a top ranking 
leader within Al-Qaeda.586  However this alliance of convenience most likely ended with the 
death of Osama Bin Laden in 2011.587 
 Other intelligence gathering organizations include the Judicial Intelligence Organization 
and the Supreme Council for Intelligence Affairs.588  Less is known about these two 
organizations, the Judicial Intelligence Organization was created in 1997 over the Supreme 
Leader’s doubts to the emergence of a more liberal president and the Supreme Council for 
Intelligence Affairs was created in 1996 with 20,000 employees and 12 departments that can 
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only be assumed to be another intelligence gathering organization.589 In addition the Islamic 
regime instituted internal intelligence sections within the armed forces to provide a check on the 
military in order to detect dissent within the ranks as a coup-proofing measure.  This intelligence 
organization within the military is the Intelligence Protection Organization of Islamic Republic 
of Iran Army or SAHEFAJA.590,591    The organization performs duties that include the 
prevention of espionage, spying, subversion, sabotage, dissatisfaction, and dissent that could 
impede the mission order of Iran’s regular armed forces as well as the uncovering and defusing 
plots and coups stemming from the armed forces.592   
Iran’s Various Organs of Government Impacting the Security Establishment 
 This section will examine various government organs that affect the security 
establishment in Iran.  Due to the complex nature of the authoritarian regime in Iran, it’s 
necessary to examine these organizations briefly. However this section does not provide a 
comprehensive understanding of these individual organizations or how they interact on a day to 
day basis.  Instead, this section briefly outlines their duties as they pertain to or affect the 
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Supreme Leader and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) 
 The Supreme Leader is the ruling leader of Iran with uncontested authority.593 The 
Supreme Leader is chosen by the Assembly of Experts and this body technically has the power to 
remove the Supreme Leader in the event that he or she is going against the will of the 
revolution.594 However, the security organs at the disposal of the Supreme Leader would prevent 
any form of removal, making the Assembly of Expert’s constitutional power of removal 
doubtful.595  The Supreme Leader’s position is the only position that can approve or deny various 
policies in government and veto any position that makes its way from the Majilis.596  There is no 
branch of government that can provide a check on decisions made by the Supreme Leader, 
making his or her position de facto authoritarian.597  The Supreme Leader appoints five out of the 
nine seats on the Supreme National Security Council, which makes decisions on matters on the 
security of the state.598  The president chairs the Supreme National Security Council, but does 
not have final say on decisions made by the council.599 All decisions must be approved by the 
Supreme Leader (Stratfor: Iranian Intelligence and Regime Preservation 2010).  
Council of Guardians 
 The twelve member council holds six Islamic jurists appointed by the Supreme Leader 
and six that are appointed by the Majilis.600  Each member of the council serves for a six year 
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term that is staggered so that half the council turns over every three years.601  A bill passed by the 
Majilis must be reviewed by the Council of Guardians, ensuring it conforms to Islamic law, 
before it becomes law within the country.602 In addition, the Council of Guardians vets election 
candidates, above the municipal level, to determine their knowledge of Islam and how loyal they 
are to the regime, expelling candidates that are in doubt of those credentials.603 To put this into 
perspective, in 2005 out of the 1,014 candidates that filed to run for the office of president, the 
Council of Guardians only allowed 8 of those candidates to run.604 The Council of Guardians 
also certifies election results, allowing for the approval or discarding of results regardless of 
votes.605 
Expediency Council 
The council was established in 1988 to resolve disputes between the Majilis and the 
Council of Guardians.606  It has 45 members, each serving a five year term, including many 
Ayatollahs serving on the council, reviewing legislative disputes between the Majilis and the 
Council of Guardians.607 The council’s role has evolved to not only resolve disputes between the 
two legislative chambers but also to oversee the performance of the president and his cabinet, 
reporting back to the Supreme Leader.608 
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Grand Ayatollahs and Bonyads 
 The senior clerics or Grand Ayatollahs claim to refrain from politics and study religious 
materials in Qom but provide a baseline of support and authority on matters of the state with 
regard to laws and policies following Islamic tenets.609  The Bonyads are religious foundations 
such as “Martyr’s Foundation, the Foundation for the Oppressed and Disabled, the Astan Qods 
Razavi Foundation, and the Fifteen Khordad Foundation.”610  These religious foundations are 
controlled by religious clerics and own various businesses and vast amounts of property, many of 
which were assets left behind by the Shah and his allies.611  They provide support to the Islamic 
regime by controlling various aspects of the economy.   
Assembly of Experts 
 The Assembly of Experts is an 88 member body that interprets Islamic law and is 
charged with choosing the next Supreme Leader when the Supreme Leader passes away.612  Each 
assembly member serves a term to 8 to 10 years when elections are held on a provincial basis.613 
However the Supreme Leader retains large power over this body.  Case in point, Ayatollah Ali 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was the chairmen of the Assembly Experts but was removed by 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei for his opposition to the crackdown of protests in 2009.614 
Iran from 1980 to 1988 – The War Years 
Prior to the Iran-Iraq War, during the beginning years of the Islamic Republic, several 
attempted coups stemming from the military had occurred.  In December of 1979, several ethnic 
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Azerbaijani officers in Tabriz were apprehended in a plot to overthrow the regime.615 Six other 
coup attempts were foiled in January of 1980 as well.616 The most significant coup attempt that 
occurred was the Nojeh coup attempt.  Air Force Officers from Shahroki Airbase were planning 
to take off and bomb Bani-Sadr’s office, Qom Seminary, the IRGC Headquarters, and Ayatollah 
Khomeini’s home before being apprehended by the SAVAMA. 617618 The air attacks were to be 
followed by ground attacks on the same targets with the goal to reinstall the Shah and former 
Prime Minister Bakhtiar to power.619 After the coup attempt, around 12,000 military members 
were purged from the armed forces through either retirement, prison, or execution (Pinkley 2018, 
4).  Members of the Tudeh in the military helped in uncovering the plot leading to its discovery 
and arrest of the perpetrators by the SAVAMA.620  
The Nojeh coup attempt led to the creation of the Daftar-e- Ettela’at Nokhostvaziri 
(Prime Minister’s Intelligence Office) in 1981 to counter future coups stemming from the 
military.621 The regime’s intelligence apparatus in 1981 was then divided between the IRGC, 
Army, police, the SAVAMA, Revolutionary Committees, and the Prime Minister’s Intelligence 
Office.622 In 1983, the Maljilis approved the consolidation of four intelligence organizations into 
the newly created MOIS.623  These included the IRGC intelligence, SAVAMA, Revolutionary 
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Committees Intelligence Sections, and the Prime Minister’s Intelligence Office.624 However, the 
IRGC did maintain an intelligence directorate independent of the MOIS which would expand 
after the war.625  
By 1981, Ayatollah Khomeini had consolidated his power, by putting into strategic 
offices his loyalists from Qom seminary, religious clerics, to assist in governing his regime 
(Terrill 2014, 86).  Many SAVAK agents were granted amnesty by the new Islamic regime, 
especially once the war with Iraq broke out in order to utilize their skills and experience in 
operations within the country.626 The only strategic office not in the hands of one of his loyalists 
was the office of prime minister (Terrill 2014, 86).  During the war, the IRGC and religious 
establishment utilized the war to undermine and silence critics, including the presidential 
administration under Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr (Belstad 2010, 48). Bani-Sadr had been a close 
associate of Ayatollah Khomeini while in exile; however his political leanings often swung to the 
left, mixing Marxist tenets with Islamic ideology (Belstad 2010, 50).   The Islamic Republican 
Party (IRP), which formed the core of the revolutionary supporters of the Ayatollah and the 
IRGC undermined the presidency of Bani-Sadr by ransacking opposition party’s headquarters 
and suppressing pro-Bani Sadr demonstrations (Belstad 2010, 50).  When Bani-Sadr called for a 
ceasefire between the regime in Tehran and Kurdish opposition groups, the IRGC stepped up its 
fight against Kurdish opposition groups in northwestern Iran (Belstad 2010, 50).  
Once the war began, the IRGC and the Islamic regime utilized the conflict as a pretext to 
further suppress internal opposition (Belstad 2010, 50-51).  Bani-Sadr attempted to mobilize the 
Iranian Army to fend off attacks from Iraq, since he had no control over the IRGC (Belstad 2010, 
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51). This particular relationship was viewed by the Islamic Regime under Ayatollah Khomeini 
with suspicion and his administration was put under surveillance to determine if Bani-Sadr 
would attempt to utilize the Iranian Army to instigate a coup (Belstad 2010, 51).  According to 
Bani-Sadr, “‘[the] mullahs had access to the radio, the newspapers, and the Friday prayers. We 
had to do without all of that.’ Regarding the IRP’s aims, Bani-Sadr asserted that ‘[the] objective, 
among other things, was to dominate the army, then disband it and replace it with the 
Revolutionary Guards’” (Belstad 2010, 51).  This was further compounded by the Basij which 
would arrest officers of the military, including the head of the Army, because they didn’t have 
the right papers, leading to the office of the president having to intervene on their behalf to 
secure their release (Belstad 2010, 51-52).   In addition since the IRP dominated the Maljilis, 
they created laws that essentially moved young men from the military to the Basij (Belstad 2010, 
52).  Ayatollah Khomeini would alternate support between Bani-Sadr and the Islamic Regime 
dominated by the IRP and religious clerics, hoping both parties could reach a compromise 
(Belstad 2010, 52). However in 1981, after Bani-Sadr criticized Ayatollah Khomeini, the 
Supreme Leader removed him from his post as president citing the lack of progress in the war as 
the reason (Belstad 2010, 52).  After being removed, Bani-Sadr fled the country and allied 
himself with the Mujahedin-e Khalq (Belstad 2010, 52). After Bani-Sadr was removed the 
military suffered a round of new purges due to the possibility that officers and service members 
within the organization might lead to an uprising (Belstad 2010, 52).  
Despite control of most levers of government, many armed groups allied to the Islamic 
revolutionaries during the 1979 revolution still roamed the country, including the Fedayan-e 
Khalq and the Mojahedin-e Khalq which had around 15,000 to 20,000 fighters (Belstad 2010, 
53).   The Tudeh Party had around 7,000 armed fighters in Iran (Belstad 2010, 53). These leftist 
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forces opted to support the Ayatollah and the Islamic regime in the initial suppression of liberals 
after the revolution (Belstad 2010, 54). However that began to change in the summer of 1980 
when the Mojahedin-e Khalq began to resent fundamentalist dominance of the political 
landscape and held demonstrations in Tehran drawing around 150,000 people.627 Leaders of the 
Mojahedin-e Khalq even met with Ayatollah Khomeini daily in order to garner legitimacy for the 
group and its actions.628 During the initial stage of the war with Iraq, Mojahedin-e Khalq units 
went to the front where they were tolerated by the IRGC for a short period of time before being 
expelled from the front.629 In the summer of 1981, witnessing what occurred with Bani-Sadr, the 
Mojahedin-e Khalq called for demonstrations and the overthrow of the Islamic regime (Belstad 
2010, 54).630  Demonstrators were brutally suppressed by the IRGC and Islamic revolutionary 
committees with many protestors killed, arrested, or executed (Belstad 2010, 54). After the 
Mojahedin-e Khalq’s protests were violently suppressed they turned to guerilla warfare to 
overthrow the regime (Belstad 2010, 54).   In June of 1981, a bomb ripped through the 
headquarters of the IRP, killing over 70 people including its founder Ayatollah Behesti, in 
addition to twenty-seven parliament members, and six deputy ministers (Belstad 2010, 54).631 
After the bomb attack, street battles occurred; regime authorities shut down any form of leftist 
press, and executed opposition members (Belstad 2010, 54).  Around 6,000 opponents to the 
regime had been executed within a year of the bomb attack (Belstad 2010, 54). The Mujahedin-e 
Khalq suffered a huge loss when its secret headquarters and base was discovered in Tehran with 
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many of its commanders killed in the attack on the secret base (Belstad 2010, 54). Masud Rajavi, 
the leader of the Mujahedin-e Khalq and many of its members fled Iran, fighting the regime in 
exile (Belstad 2010, 55).    
After 1983, the Tudeh Party and Fedayan-e Khalq became the next targets of the Islamic 
regime, prominent members were arrested and members within the military were purged or 
executed (Belstad 2010, 55).632 Membership in Tudeh Party and Fedayan-e Khalq after 1983 
became outlawed with both accused of attempting to overthrow the Islamic regime (Belstad 
2010, 55).  As a result of the crackdown, all three groups of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, Tudeh 
Party, and Fedayan-e Khalq formed cells to attack the regime within the country (Belstad 2010, 
55).   The IRGC was instrumental in eliminating the Fedayan-e Khalq, the Tudeh Communist 
Party, vast networks of the Mojahedin-e Khalq, and even an emerging threat from the clerical 
establishment itself, a Shia opposition Islamic group called Forghan (Wehrey et al 2009, 30). 
Mobile units of the IRGC called the alghare’eh were quite effective at stamping out perceived 
counter-revolutionary opposition groups during the 1980s (Wehrey et al 2009, 30).  In 1983, the 
IRGC ceded most of its internal intelligence collection units to the MOIS (Wehrey et al 2009, 
30).  After Bani-Sadr’s dismissal, Ayatollah Khamenei took over as President of Iran, serving 
from 1981 to 1989 and utilizing the IRGC to eliminate resistance and perceived counter-
revolutionary movements across Iran (Alfoneh 2008).  
Clerical dominance during the 1980s within the new Islamic regime had been an issue as 
a result of factionalism both within and outside of the government.633  Clerics not holding official 
state positions would often times act on their own accord, fermenting policy in opposition to 
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measures enacted by the government itself.634  Factionalism within the ruling clerical 
establishment was ever present, as clerics within government divided themselves among 
reformists, religious-cultural radicals, and conservatives that all opposed each other’s agendas 
for social policy and economic reform as well as religious influence of the state on society.635  In 
addition, competing power centers and personal rivalries all drove the religious clerics in Iran to 
attempt to gain the attention of Ayatollah Khomeini in order to further their objectives.636   
The clerical establishment’s relationship with the IRGC, Basij, and revolutionary 
committees has also created problems. Religious devotees in all three organizations have been 
influenced not only by misguided aims on the frontlines by clerics but the interpretation of the 
spread of the revolution, started by Ayatollah Khomeini, to be espoused in other countries across 
the Middle East.637 Additionally, the clerical establishment in order to cement their control over 
the security apparatus created Sazman-e Ideolog (Sazman) units within the army, navy, and air 
force in order to root out dissent and disseminate propaganda and Islamic tenets to service 
members of the Iranian Armed Forces.638  In each Sazman unit, a cleric appointed by Tehran 
normally oversees these ideological units attached to the military, but sometimes trusted military 
officers oversee the unit and its surveillance and dissemination duties.639  The Sazman unit 
normally has members from the IRGC, Basij, or revolutionary committees as well as low level 
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clerics that oversee surveillance and Islamic dissemination to members within the military.640 
Once someone is detected, the Sazman unit or military police arrest and try the individual in a 
revolutionary court with the purported crimes laid out before them, before a punishment is 
handed down.641  The Sazman units normally have several informants that often times lead to 
discord between officers and enlisted and warrant officers and commissioned officer.642 In 
addition, reports sent to Tehran can also forward findings of performance issues of commanding 
officers that can often lead to arrests, demotions, or punishments within the military, 
undermining readiness and operational effectiveness.643  In 1983, alone 300 officers and enlisted 
were in the process of being removed due to their perceived lack of loyalty to the regime and 
questionable political beliefs.644 Many others removed have also been executed, depending on 
their purported crime submitted by these embedded clerical units within the military.645  In order 
for officers to be promoted, a cleric in a unit must give his approval before moving upward to a 
higher position within the military.646  Officers purged during the Shah era have often been 
reinstated or promoted because of their family’s close connections to a religious cleric within the 
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country.647  Most of these initiatives have been carried out due to the fact that the military has 
been perceived to be extremely close to the Shah during his reign and the military is viewed as a 
potential hotbed for counter-revolutionary activity.648 
Similar to Sazman units in the military, the Basij and IRGC hold a Directorate of 
Ideological and Political Affairs that functions very much to the same extent as Sazman units in 
the Iranian Armed Forces.649 Clerics provide ideological training to IRGC and Basij members 
and have thousands of informants that provide information on the questionable loyalty of 
members within both forces.650  Issues with the chain of command become problems in both 
forces as junior officers and non-commissioned officers would disobey orders when they knew 
they had the backing of the clerical military advisors in the Sazman units and the Directorate of 
Ideological and Political Affairs.651 However, this occurred more among the regular military 
units than in the IRGC or Basij.652 
Discord on the home front had been a problem for the Islamic regime.  In June of 1982, a 
shootout occurred on an Army base in Isfahan, where twenty IRGC members were killed in 
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clashes with army personnel assigned to the installation.653  In 1984, the IRGC was utilized to 
put down a mutiny by an Army unit that was refusing to leave for the front in the city of 
Shiraz.654  Despite large numbers of the IRGC and revolutionary committees sent to the front, 
large formations of both forces have rotated in and out of the frontlines to act as enforcement for 
the Islamic regime on the home front due to their loyalty to the regime. Revolutionary 
committees and the IRGC on the home front patrol streets, enforce Islamic norms, and look for 
potential dissidents to the regime, and serve under the IRGC when rotated back to the front 
(Belstad 2010, 56).  To ensure domestic unrest didn’t spread during the 1980s, most cities and 
towns were provided with an IRGC installation to quickly mobilize and suppress internal 
dissent.655 In May of 1982, the clerical establishment decided to utilize the Quds Force of the 
IRGC beyond Iraq’s borders, sending the force to Lebanon where they created a proxy group 
called Hezbollah to serve the regime’s interests in southern Lebanon (Belstad 2010, 36).  
Competing interests of the clerical establishment led to a series of factional disputes eventually 
leading to the dissolution of the original mobilizing force for the Islamic regime, the IRP. Torn 
by factional disputes the IRP dissolved in 1987, succeeded by other Islamic parties loyal to the 
Islamic regime (Belstad 2010, 57-58).  The IRP had been instrumental in solidifying the control 
of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic regime during the 1980s, stamping out any form of 
opposition that manifested to the new regime.   
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The “Imposed War” 
Once war broke between Iran and Iraq in 1980, Iraq swept through most of Iran’s border 
areas facing primarily Basij units as most of Iran’s Army were deployed along the border of the 
Soviet Union as it had been during the Shah’s rule (Pinkley 2018, 4).  The military was severely 
hampered as a result of the new regime’s distrust of the various branches of the armed forces 
(Belstad 2010, 29).  The Army had around 150,000 soldiers and its officer Corps had essentially 
been gutted from the Nojeh coup attempt from the ranks of major to colonel (Belstad 2010, 29).  
This led to a large part of the military leadership to have inexperienced officers leading the war 
against Iraq once hostilities began (Belstad 2010, 29). Military equipment lay in disrepair from 
the revolutionary regime’s shutting down of military installations over fear they may rise up and 
reinstall the Shah (Belstad 2010, 29).   In addition, the IRGC was mostly deployed in 
northwestern Iran fighting Kurdish opposition groups and in urban areas combating opposition 
groups opposed to the new regime (Pinkley 2018, 4). During that same year, the IRGC was 
reorganized and expanded into military units to fend off Iraqi attacks (Byman et al 2001, 34). 
The Iran-Iraq War was the last conventional war to date fought by the Islamic Republic and 
became known as the “Imposed War” from its view that such a conflict was imposed upon the 
country (Belstad 2010, 51; Pinkley 2018, 2).  Saddam Hussein, leader of Iraq, hoped that quick 
territorial gains would lead to peace with Iran illustrating a point that the Shatt-al-Arab waterway 
and certain southwestern areas of Iran belonged to Iraq (Belstad 2010, 37).  However, the new 
Islamic regime viewed the war in a different light.  They viewed the war with Iraq as a “sacred 
defense,” and necessary to preserve the revolution in Iran (Belstad 2010, 37).  
The initial stages of the war had the Iranian Army bear the brunt of the attacks until the 
IRGC could be expanded enough to occupy frontline positions (Byman et al 2001, 35).  During 
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the war, differences between Iran’s Army and the IRGC formed as the military focused on a 
strategy of military planning and organization of operations, whereas the IRGC claimed 
determination, zeal, and “superiority in numbers” mattered more than planning and coordination 
(Belstad 2010, 31). This caused a lack of communication at the front between the two Iranian 
security institutions, leading to heavy losses (Belstad 2010, 31). The IRGC viewed itself as 
guardians of the revolution and the will of the people in Iran and saw the army as a “‘culturally 
contaminated’” security organization from the Shah’s era (Belstad 2010, 31). The IRGC 
disregarded more conventional and mechanized tactics of the army in place of large infantry 
based wave attacks (Belstad 2010, 31).  As a result of the rivalry, joint combat operations 
between the army and IRGC were difficult to implement (Belstad 2010, 31-32).  
From 1980 to 1981, the Iranian Army attempted to halt Iraq’s advance and dislodge them 
from the country (Pinkley 2018, 8). Their failure led to an increasing dependence of the IRGC on 
the frontlines to dislodge Iraqi forces from urban areas and areas they occupied in Iran (Pinkley 
2018, 8). The IRGC’s first successful offensive was breaking the siege of Abadan in late 1981 
(Belstad 2010, 38).  The success led to a budget by the Islamic regime to further expand the force 
(Belstad 2010, 38). In addition, in 1981, the Basij was subordinated under the command of the 
IRGC during the war, providing “a reserve pool of manpower for the IRGC” (Belstad 2010, 36). 
In 1982, due to its growing importance during the war, the IRGC was given a ministry that 
mirrored that of the defense ministry making it a comparable parallel military organization to the 
Iranian military (Byman et al 2001, 35).  In that same year, the IRGC incorporated many Basij 
units into its offensive capabilities along the frontlines (Pinkley 2018, 46). Irregular 
counteroffensives by the IRGC and Basij coupled with conventional tactics of the Iranian Army 
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were instrumental in pushing Iraqi forces out of Iran in 1982 (Belstad 2010, 38).   Table 6.3 
shows the strength of Iranian ground forces by 1983. 
 
Table 6.3 – Iranian Ground Forces in 1983 
  Ground Forces Strength (Personnel) 
Revolutionary Committees 100,000 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 150,000 
Basij 400,000 - 2,500,000 
Army 235,000 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency. 1983. Iran: Military Manpower Problems Limit War Options. Directorate of 
Intelligence, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, pgs. 2-3; Daniel Byman, Shahram Chubin, 
Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Jerrold Green. 2001. Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era. Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
 
Despite the Iranian Army’s success in expelling Iraqi forces out of Iran, in light of 
extensive purges and mistrust of the institution by the new regime authorities, the Islamic regime 
decided to provide leadership of the continued war effort to the IRGC (Belstad 2010, 38). In July 
of 1982, the Islamic regime decided to enter into Iraqi territory in order to overthrow the Baathist 
regime in Iraq (Belstad 2010, 38). From 1982 to 1983, Iran attempted to exploit Iraq’s Shiites to 
support their cause as Iraq was hoping to gain the support of Iran’s Khuzestan’s Arabs, both to 
no avail (Pinkley 2018, 47). In addition, during the early phases of the war the lack of 
coordination amongst Iran’s security institutions led to disjointed attacks and the senseless loss 
of life (Belstad 2010, 37; Pinkley 2018, 56). At the annoyance of the Iranian Armed Forces, the 
IRGC would send lightly armed Basij in human wave attacks to clear minefields and soften up 
enemy positions, before more heavily armed IRGC were sent to attack (Belstad 2010, 38).  
However, the lack of sufficient armored forces, artillery, and air cover usually led these attacks 
on fortified positions to fail, sustaining heavy casualties in the process (Belstad 2010, 38-39). 
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Despite these communication issues between the IRGC and Basij with the Iranian Army, 
coordination between all three forces would improve later in the war (Pinkley 2018, 56).  
Preference in all operations was given to the IRGC and Basij over that of Iran’s Army, it 
was only when attacks failed that the army was brought in to rectify issues at the front (Belstad 
2010, 39). From 1982 to 1985, the war remained a stalemate with little changes to the frontline 
(Belstad 2010, 39). Figure 6.1 shows the battle lines with Iraq in 1983, terrain, and areas held by 
either side. Issues with desertions were a problem for the Iranian Army, IRGC and Basij forces 
in 1983 and 1984 as low morale and a reduced will to fight affected many soldiers across the 
frontlines.656,657 Other issues occurred where despite a combined command each force would 
operate independently of one another.658 In addition, the Basij would often refuse to obey orders 
from the Iranian Army at the front, leading to several failures.659 This was ever clear when Basij 
troops attacking Iraqi lines would panic as a result of a lack of fire support from army units, due 
to the decision to not communicate with Artesh (Iranian Army) units at the front.660 Furthermore, 
despite a lack of communication, both the IRGC and Basij were entirely dependent upon the 
Iranian Army’s logistics chain to supply them with weapons and ammunition, leading to 
animosities where IRGC Commanders whom believed the Iranian Army purposely supplied 
them with outdated equipment or delayed equipment reaching the front as a result of rivalries 
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between the two forces.661 To further illustrate this division, the Iranian Army would often delay 
their own forces’ attacks to limit their own losses and let the burden fall upon the IRGC and 
Basij.662 Part of the reason for this tactic was the military command feared a complete takeover 
by the IRGC, despite Ayatollah Khomeini dispelling those rumors, and the military command 
also hoped to maintain institutional integrity with limited losses incurred at the front.663 While 
the IRGC and Basij viewed the regular military with suspicion and questionable loyalty to the 
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   Figure 6.1 – Map of Iranian Battle Lines in 1983  
 
Source: Central Intelligence Agency. 1983. Iran: Military Manpower Problems Limit War Options. Directorate of 





In 1984, Iranian offensives north of Al-Basra in Iraq ended in failure and heavy 
casualties, around 30,000 to 40,000 deaths incurred.665  This included the “Badr” offensive, 
where the IRGC and Basij attempted to cut the road from Baghdad to Basra leading to the deaths 
of thousands of Basij and IRGC members.666 The lack of fire support in the marshes and absence 
of air defense, left Iranian forces of the IRGC, Basij, and Iranian Army exposed to aerial 
bombardment.667 In addition there was no coordination between the IRGC and the army with 
regard to military movements at the front.668 After an investigation by the Islamic regime, a 
decision was made that select army personnel would be transferred to the IRGC to improve 
coordination so that the defeats that occurred in the marshes would not occur again during the 
war.669 The stalemate that ensued from 1982 to 1985 took on a new dynamic called the “war of 
the cities” and the “tanker war,” where Iran targeted oil facilities, economic infrastructure, 
population centers, oil tankers in the Gulf, and pipelines in order to economically hamper Iraq 
and psychologically affect the will of the Iraqi people (Belstad 2010, 39). 
In 1985, the IRGC was given the authority by Ayatollah Khomeini the task of 
establishing its own air force, navy, and army (Byman et al 2001, 35).  The IRGC was also to 
control Iran’s surface to surface missile units and were given priority over Iran’s dwindling 
military hardware during the war,  including battlefield acquisitions such as Iraqi tanks and 
armored vehicles (Byman et al 2001, 35).  The IRGC Air Force during the war had air defense 
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units and surface to surface missile units that were used extensively during the conflict (Belstad 
2010, 36).  The IRGC Navy gained notoriety during the 1986 Faw offensive and naval 
operations in the Gulf from 1987 to 1988 (Belstad 2010, 36).  
In 1986, Iran secured major victories with the al-Faw campaign, where the army, IRGC, 
and Basij worked closely together to gain a significant foothold within Iraq (Belstad 2010, 39).  
The IRGC and army utilized the marshes to their advantage by limiting movement of enemy 
armored vehicles, conducting night attacks, and coordinating military operations along the front 
between all three forces.670 Iranian frogman (armed divers) attacked and seized key observation 
posts and strategic points that disrupted Iraqi communications, allowing for the main forces to 
conduct surprise attacks on Iraqi defenders.671 Many Iraqi troops abandoned their positions and 
fled to rear areas once the attacks took place.672 In contrast to 1985, coordination in the al-Faw 
campaign allowed for Iranian forces to confuse Iraqi forces by attacking an area north of their 
main thrust allowing the IRGC forces and Iranian Army to take territory in Iraq.673 One such 
strategy was attacking Iraqi forces near Khorramshahr, diverting their attention to that location, 
allowing for Iranian forces to launch their main attack into al-Faw peninsula.674  
The use of IRGC artillery units, the presence of air defense, and a unified command 
allowed Iran to capture the al-Faw peninsula in 1986 from Iraq.675 However, despite coordination 
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between the Iranian Army and IRGC, friction was still an ever present problem between the two 
forces that led to missed opportunities and defeats during the war.676  In late 1986, the tide was 
turning towards Iraq once again (Belstad 2010, 40). After the IRGC and other Iranian forces took 
heavy losses by Iraq in the southern sector in attempt to capture Basra, the Ramazan 
headquarters allowed the IRGC to shift fighting from the South to the North where they could 
utilize terrain and Kurdish guerillas against Iraqi forces (Pinkley 2018, 48). 
Diminishing supplies of armaments and spares because of an arms embargo were 
beginning to take a toll as well as the heavy use of human wave attacks throughout the war 
(Belstad 2010, 40).677 From April to summer 1988, Iraq was able to recapture many areas in the 
South and once again bring the war back onto Iranian soil with Iran sustaining many battlefield 
defeats (Belstad 2010, 40; Ostovar 2017, 131).   As the war became unpopular, pressure mounted 
against the religious establishment controlling the country to accept UN Resolution 598 to end 
the war (Belstad 2010, 40).  In addition, “by 1988 many of the [Islamic Revolutionary] Guards 
and basijis eager to die for Islam and the Revolution had already done so, and the high Iranian 
casualty-rate could [no longer] be sustained [by the regime in Tehran]” (Belstad 2010, 40).  
Many of the IRGC and Basij during the early phases of the war were volunteers but as the war 
dragged on devoted volunteers began to dwindle as many had died during the initial years of the 
conflict leading to both forces being heavily composed of conscripts by 1987 (Byman et al 2001, 
35-36; Belstad 2010, 64).678  
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The difficulty to recruit conscripts and volunteers in 1988 became indicative of the 
political authorities of the Islamic regime to accept the ceasefire and end the war in 1988 
(Belstad 2010, 42). Issues with rivalry and lack of planning between the clerical establishment’s 
security institutions were partly to blame for the significant losses incurred during the war 
(Belstad 2010, 43).  As it stood towards the end of the war the IRGC as a parallel security 
structure heavily outnumbered the Iranian Army; the IRGC numbered 450,000 while the army 
numbered only 200,000 soldiers (Belstad 2010, 46).  It was from this mistrust that led to missed 
opportunities in the conflict by not only the commands of the parallel security structures but the 
religious establishment itself. The result of the war was the reestablishment of territorial 
boundaries before the war began under the agreed ceasefire of UN Resolution 598 in 1988 
(Belstad 2010, 40).  
Iran’s Parallel Security Structures - Effectiveness from 1979 to the Iran-Iraq War 
 In the same vein of historical institutionalism and organization theory, the Islamic 
Republic created several parallel security institutions to preserve the regime.  Among the three 
dominant armed parallel military organizations were the IRGC, Basij, and the revolutionary 
committees that stamped out internal unrest and later cracked down on leftist revolutionaries of 
the revolution.  In addition all three forces were instrumental in providing security for both 
internal and external defense.  As the war expanded and new threats emerged in the 1980s, the 
institutional role of the IRGC, Basij and revolutionary committees shifted and expanded to meet 
those threats.  For one, the IRGC became a frontline military organization during the Iran-Iraq 
war, outstripping its parallel regular force of the Iranian Army by hundreds of thousands of 
soldiers.   
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Moreover, the force was granted capabilities on par with the regular military to provide 
increased military capabilities for the preservation of the regime in Tehran.  The Basij further 
complemented the IRGC by creating an even greater force for ground operations during the Iran-
Iraq War as well as a large internal force for the suppression of dissent within Iran.  Similar to 
the Basij, the revolutionary committees were instrumental in providing another armed force that 
assisted in providing both internal and external defense of the regime. However, one of its most 
important capabilities was its intelligence sections which provided information to enforcers of 
the regime to crack down on counter-revolutionary behavior throughout Iran.  In addition with 
the need of various intelligence components, the Islamic regime created the SAVAMA, 
successor of the SAVAK, and the Prime Minister’s Intelligence Officer as well as an intelligence 
section within the IRGC all tasked with uncovering dissent and opposition within the country.  
During the Iran-Iraq War many of these functions were absorbed into the MOIS providing a 
more streamlined form of detection by combining resources from the previous intelligence 
gathering organizations created under the Islamic regime.  Furthermore most of these parallel 
security structures had a direct line of communication to the Supreme Leader ensuring any 
information with regard to dissent or opposition could be coordinated amongst all of Iran’s 
security organs.  As a result, the Islamic regime’s parallel security structures ensured the 
regime’s survival from both internal dissent and from external invasion during the years of 1979 
to 1988. 
Post-War Period 1988-2000 
After the war, the IRGC was reorganized into “21 infantry divisions, 15 independent 
infantry brigades, 21 air defense brigades, three engineering divisions, and 42 armored, artillery, 
and chemical defense brigades” (Byman et al 2001, 36).  The IRGC Ministry was also scrapped 
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and folded into a joint security ministry called the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces 
Logistics (MODAFL) in 1989, yet the IRGC still remained separate from the rest of the armed 
forces (Byman et al 2001, 37). After the election of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1989, 
Rafsanjani utilized the Basij and IRGC similar to his predecessor, former President Ayatollah 
Khamenei, to suppress and eliminate political opposition throughout the country (Alfoneh 2008). 
Rafsanjani would serve as President of Iran from 1989 to 1997, until a more liberal leader was 
chosen by Iran’s populace in 1997 (Alfoneh 2008). With the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 
1989, former President Ayatollah Khamenei was chosen by the Assembly of Experts to take over 
the reins of power in Iran as Supreme Leader (Alfoneh 2008).  His conservative policy-making 
and perspective towards the office of Supreme Leader was markedly similar to Ayatollah 
Khomeini, sustaining authoritarianism in Iran with his emergence as Supreme Leader of the state 
(Alfoneh 2008). 
In 1990, the Basij became one of the five main divisions of the IRGC by order of 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the other divisions of the IRGC being the ground forces, 
navy, air force, and Quds force (Golkar 2012, 627). After the war, the Basij no longer 
conscripted members but became an entirely all volunteer force and utilized incentives to attract 
members to the organization (Ostovar 2013, 351-353). These include exemptions from 
conscription and higher progression in one’s civilian profession all from being a member of the 
Basij (Ostovar 2013, 353). Other benefits included subsidized housing and subsidized food 
(Ostovar 2013, 353). Basij members during the 1990s patrolled the streets of Iran enforcing 
Islamic norms and targeted civilians wearing Western fashion, reformists, and those that 
consumed alcohol (Ostovar 2013, 349). Due to their chain of command going directly to the 
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Supreme Leader, unofficial operations not approved by the regime were tolerated (Ostovar 2013, 
357-358).  
The MOIS after the Iran-Iraq War during the 1990s received training from the Russian 
Foreign Intelligence Service or SVR, which trained personnel on techniques of intelligence 
collection and old KGB methods of disinformation (Wege 2015, 65).  From 1988 to 1998, the 
MOIS targeted 22 notable dissidents to the Islamic Republic assassinating them to prevent the 
emergence of a successful opposition or discord within the regime from hardline factions 
opposed to current policies of the regime.679  Some of these included: Kazem Sami, leader of the 
Revolutionary Movement of the Iranian People; Zohreh Izadi, a political activist; Ahmad 
Khomeini, son of Ayatollah Khomeini and critical of the regime after the Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
death in 1989; and Abdolaziz Kazemi, “a Sunni cleric who advocated for the rights of ethnic and 
religious minorities.”680   
The revolutionary committees continued to exist throughout the 1980s with many being 
absorbed into the IRGC (Belstad 2010, 56). However the revolutionary committees that were not 
absorbed by the IRGC during the war were merged into a new organization called the Law 
Enforcement Forces along with the organizations of the police and gendarmerie, dissolving all 
three organizations (Belstad 2010, 56; Golkar 2018b, 2). The Law Enforcement Forces along 
with many of Iran’s security institutions have their own internal security department for 
detecting dissent; for the Law Enforcement Forces it was the Ideological Political Organization 
(Golkar 2018b, 2). In 1991, after the Law Enforcement Forces creation, many former police and 
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gendarmerie officers in high positions were replaced with former IRGC members to better align 
the organization with the clerical establishment’s goals (Golkar 2018b, 3).   
Police in the Law Enforcement Forces fell into two categories: conscripts performing 
their two year mandatory military service which represent around half of the force and the other 
being full-time career professionals (Golkar 2018b, 4). The Law Enforcement Forces have four 
conditions for internal control.  These are condition white, condition gray, condition yellow, and 
condition red (Golkar 2018a). Condition white means normal public order with no disturbances 
and condition gray is unorganized opposition without the destruction of property (Golkar 2018a). 
Once condition yellow is invoked, the Basij accompany police patrols and step up patrols 
themselves to suppress protests (Golkar 2018a).  If condition red ever occurs, where mass 
uprising or a revolt has occurred and the opposition is armed with weapons, all internal forces 
such as the Basij and Law Enforcement Forces fall under the direct control of the IRGC to 
suppress internal dissent (Golkar 2018a).  
From 1993 to 1995, protests occurred in Mashhad, Ghazvin, Akbarabad, and Islamshahr 
in Iran over high inflation (Golkar 2018b, 3).  In Mashad, some police stations were overrun and 
the IRGC and Basij had to restore order within the city (Golkar 2018b, 3).  After these incidents, 
the Law Enforcement Forces in 1996 created an anti-riot control team called niroo-ye vizhe 
pasdar-e velayat or the Supreme Leader’s Guardian Special Forces in order to suppress future 
protests, potential uprisings, and maintain order throughout Iran (Golkar 2018b, 3). In 1994, 
there were riots in city of Qazvin as a result of ethnic tensions (Wehrey et al 2009, 82-83). The 
local IRGC force, drawn from that particular community, was dispatched to put down the unrest 
(Wehrey et al 2009, 82-83). However, the commander and rank and file refused to fire on the 
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unarmed rioters, leading to the Islamic regime having to airlift in Basij units and IRGC from 
other areas and provinces of Iran to put down the unrest (Wehrey et al 2009, 83).  
In 1997, when Muhammed Khatami became president, serving as president from 1997 to 
2005, there was a lack of trust between Khatami’s liberal views and Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei’s hardline perspective which led to the creation of Judicial Intelligence to keep tabs on 
the Khatami administration (Alfoneh 2008).681  In that same year, the IRGC regained its role of 
internal intelligence collection with the election of President Khatami at the behest of Ayatollah 
Khamenei (Wehrey et al 2009, 30). Despite elites within the Islamic regime displeased with the 
election of the reformist Khatami, 73% of the IRGC and Basij members voted for him during the 
1997 presidential elections (Golkar 2010, 1). Regardless of the election of Khatami, internal 
unrest only abated for a short period of time before resuming once again in 1998. 
In 1998, the Basij were utilized to put down protests in Khorsan in northeastern Iran and 
subsequently took control of the border between Iran and Afghanistan in order to bring back the 
border region under the control of the regime (Golkar 2015, 95). In an effort to counter 
reformists elected alongside President Khatami, the counterintelligence section under the 
direction of the clerical establishment ordered the Law Enforcement Forces to harass local 
officials in Tehran and even arrested and allegedly tortured the local mayor of that city (Golkar 
2018b, 3). Prior to 2000, the law enforcement forces in Iran were undisciplined and lacked 
professionalism and performed poorly in the student demonstrations of 1999, until the 
appointment of former IRGC Air Force Commander, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, which 
improved the force (Wehrey et al 2009, 11). Despite the use of the special forces of the Law 
Enforcement Forces, their inability to put down the protests led to the use of Basij and IRGC 
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units to put down the student protests occurring in the country in 1999 (Ostovar 2013, 349; 
Golkar 2018b, 3).   The reforms enacted by General Qalibaf helped to maintain public order and 
suppress dissent within the country (Golkar 2018b, 4).  
 In contrast to the protests, the Mujahedin-e Khalq from 1992 to 1999 committed a series 
of bombings and armed assaults on various government buildings and military installations. The 
presence of other inclusive and leftist armed groups seems to have been eliminated during the 
1980s by the IRGC, Basij and revolutionary committees.682  The Mujahedin-e Khalq is the 
exception because of their transition from resistance inside Iran to operating out of bases in 
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The Green Movement, Protests, Unrest, and Challenges to the Regime – 2000 to 2018 
Figure 6.2- Iran’s Security Establishment in 2009 
 
Source: Frederic Wehrey, Jerrold Green, Brian Nichiporuk, Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, Rasool Nafisi, S. R. 
Bohandy. 2009. The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
Corps. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation; Organized by the author. 
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 In contrast to the protests of 1999, student protests in 2001 to 2003 were easily 
suppressed by the Law Enforcement Forces as a result of reorganization by General Qalibaf 
(Golkar 2018b, 4). No Basij were deployed to suppress the student protests that were occurring 
from 2001 to 2003 (Golkar 2018b, 4). In 2004, a constitutional amendment was made for males 
wishing to avoid conscription into the active military to serve their conscription obligation in the 
Basij (Wehrey et al 2009, 46).   In 2007, after international sanctions were affecting Iran, 
President Ahmadinejad instituted a cut in subsidies and the rationing of fuel (Golkar 2018b, 5).  
Some protests occurred, but the utilization of police special forces suppressed the protests from 
becoming widespread (Golkar 2018b, 5).  
In 2007, the Basij was fully subordinated under the command of the IRGC to provide the 
force with both the manpower for internal and external defense of the regime as it did during the 
Iran-Iraq War, in contrast to 1990 when it retained command authority separate from the IRGC 
(Wehrey et al 2009, 25; Golkar 2012, 627). The IRGC in 2009 had an estimated force of 120,000 
troops with installations in every major city to provide a quick reaction force in the case of unrest 
(Wehrey et al 2009, 8). The IRGC also had rural bases to assist local security forces in counter-
narcotics, border patrol, and disaster relief (Wehrey et al 2009, 8). Figure 6.2 shows Iran’s 
security establishment and personnel strength in 2009. The IRGC having been a necessary armed 
force in countering armed opposition groups throughout the country have been instrumental in 
combating groups such as Mujahedin-e Khalq, the Jundallah, a Baluchi separatist group, 
Kurdish KDP-I and Kurdish PJAK, and Ahwaz Arab separatists.683  The Mujahedin-e Khalq 
attacks began to diminish by 2001 and were more infrequent as a result of the loss of their bases 
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in Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003.684 Jundallah and other Buluch groups have attacked 
various regime targets including IRGC bases and government installations, but most attacks have 
been limited to southeastern Iran from 2000 to 2018, the only exception being a December 2010 
attack which took place in Tehran.685 Some of the attacks Jundallah committed have been the 
bombing of a mosque in Zahedan, Iran in May of 2009 and killing five IRGC personnel in 
Baluchistan province in October 2009.686  Similar to Buluch separatist groups, anti-regime 
Kurdish groups such as Komala, the Kurdistan Workers Party, and PJAK have mostly confined 
their attacks to IRGC bases and government institutions in northwest Iran from 2000 to 
2018.687688  In July of 2016 after 25 years of non-violence, the KDP-I decided to resume 
hostilities with the Islamic regime.689  Attacks by the Al-Ahwaz Arab People's Democratic Front 
have been sporadic throughout the 2000s with significant periods of inactivity as a result of 
regime suppression by the IRGC and Basij; however their most famous attack occurred in 2018 
when Ahwaz Arab separatists attacked a military parade in the city of Ahwaz killing 25, mostly 
IRGC personnel. 690691 
Protests and Opposition activity continued from 2009 to 2018.  One of the most 
significant protests movements to take place in Iran took place in 2009 just two years prior to the 
Arab Spring.  In 2009, an opposition group called the Green Movement protested against the 
Islamic regime, when elections were disputed between the reformist Mir Hossein Mousavi and 
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hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.692 Two hours after the polls closed, the Interior Ministry 
pronounced Ahmadinejad as the winner.693 This led to large anti-government demonstrations 
across the country.694  Security forces including Basij shot into crowds of demonstrators that 
killed 100 protestors across the country.695 This included a 19-year-old woman, Neda Soltani, 
who became the face of uprising for the Green Movement of Hope and Change.696 From June 13 
to June 19th 2009, demonstrations occurred across the country in predominantly urban areas with 
some protests groups overwhelming security forces in the capital of Tehran in December of 
2009.697,698 During the 2009 protests, the Basij were instrumental in acting as riot control and 
suppressing protestors in Iran (Pinkley 2018, 60). They worked alongside the police or 
independently to suppress protestors.699 However, the regime eventually suppressed protests by 
February of 2010.700   
During the election period, soldiers in barracks that put up posters of Mousavi were 
ordered by the Intelligence Protection Organization of Islamic Republic of Iran Army 
(SAHEFAJA) to take them down.701 Thousands of demonstrates that came out to protest were 
arrested by both the Basij and IRGC during the 2009 protests and hundreds more tortured in 
Kahrizak prison (Safshekan and Sabet 2010, 556; Golkar 2018b, 5). Many of those tortured were 
perceived by the Basij and police forces as being from the middle and upper class, leading to 
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their disdain for what they saw as privilege (Golkar 2018b, 5). The IRGC destroyed private 
property, store fronts, and vehicles during the protests in 2009 and those arrested were often put 
on show trials in order to discredit the protests (Safshekan and Sabet 2010, 556). 
 By 2010, the IRGC ground forces had 130,000 personnel divided into infantry, armored, 
and commando divisions, airborne brigades, and artillery groups as well as 31 provincial corps 
with two specifically in Tehran.702,703 Each corps is comprised of infantry, artillery, and armored 
brigades and each brigade are allocated ten Basij battalions to support combat operations in the 
event of internal unrest or external defense.704  The IRGC Navy has around 20,000 personnel and 
is comparable in size and capabilities of the Iranian Navy with 18,000 personnel.705 The IRGC 
Air Force is significantly smaller than the regular air force, but its assets are primarily dedicated 
to transportation and close air support for the IRGC ground forces in combat operations.706 In 
that same year, Iran captured the leader of a Sunni militant Baluchi separatist group called 
Jundullah.707  After his confession of attacks his group committed against the security apparatus 
and working with foreign intelligence organizations, Abdolmalek Rigi, was executed by the 
Islamic regime.708  However, the group continued to attack the Islamic regime with a bombing in 
Zahedan, Iran in July 2010 killing 28 people, including IRGC personnel, and the bombing of a 
mosque in Chahbahar in December 2010, killing 38.709  During the Arab Spring in 2011, Iran 
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sent units of the Quds force to Syria to support the Bashar al-Assad regime (CFR: Iran’s 
Revolutionary Guards 2019).  Their initial mission was limited to protecting shrines and 
providing advisors to Syrian government forces (CFR: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards 2019). As 
the uprising turned to civil war in Syria, the Quds force expanded their deployment and were 
fighting along the frontlines in a limited capacity in Syria.  Many IRGC forces in Syria belonged 
to foreign legions such as IRGC recruits from Afghan refugee communities in Iran, as well as the 
deployment of proxy forces from Iraq and Lebanon to shore up support for Bashar al-Assad’s 
regime in Syria (CFR: Iran’s Revolutionary Guards 2019). This was done so the majority of 
Iran’s parallel security institutions remain in Iran for internal suppression of opposition. 
In 2012, Ahmadinejad attempted to limited clerical authority by promoting his own 
version of nationalist Islam, which led him into conflict with Supreme Leader Ayatollah 
Khamenei.710  In March of 2012, Khamenei’s bloc of candidates won a significant portion of 
seats in the Majilis weakening Ahmadinejad.711 From December 2017 to February 2018, large 
scale demonstrations came out against the Islamic regime citing economic reasons, enforcement 
of certain Islamic dress codes, interventions in the Middle East, and corruption which led to 
protests.712  The protests were widespread occurring in 80 different cities across Iran and have 
been the largest since 1979 (Nader 2018).713  The protests first started in the conservative city of 
Mashad and from there the holy cities of Qom and Isfahan and then to many other cities across 
Iran (Nader 2018). In the smaller cities of Izeh, Dezful, Shahinshahr, Kermanshah, and Sanandaj, 
government offices, banks, and religious foundations tied to the regime were ransacked, and 
Basij facilities and police stations set ablaze by the protestors (Nader 2018). All across Iran, 
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protestors tore down the images and posters of Khamenei (Nader 2018).  The wider issue of the 
protests was the enrichment of upper class families in Iran with the cuts in subsidies for the poor 
and the general corruption surrounding Islamic foundations tied to the regime (Nader 2018). In 
some smaller cities unemployment was around 40 to 60% even with the lifting of economic 
sanctions under President Rouhani (Nader 2018).  In addition the population was unhappy with 
Iran’s continued foreign interventions overseas in places such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon (Nader 
2018). The Basij and other security forces were instrumental in putting down the unrest, with 
very minimal deaths to the protestors.714 Only 25 protestors were killed and around 4,000 
arrested.715 However future challenges may become problematic as many of the IRGC are 
conscripts and those in the Basij face the same hardships as the people that are protesting (Nader 
2018).   
During the protests, many Basij burned their membership cards and refused to mobilize 
in order to suppress the protests (Nader 2018). Among the Basij there are only around 10% who 
join the force for ideological reasons compared to the 1980s when it was closer to 90% (Golkar 
2015, 182). For most it’s the material benefits and privileges one receives as being a member of 
the Basij (Golkar 2015, 181-182). Basij members from the lower classes feel a sense of 
entitlement when they control checkpoints in middle class and higher class areas, having the 
authority to stop cars and question the occupants in the vehicles (Golkar 2015, 183-184). In 
addition to financial incentives, Basij membership cards prevent one from getting arrested or 
harassed by other security institutions such as the morality police or other Basij themselves 
(Golkar 2015, 187). For one Basij member, he carried satellite equipment in his vehicle which is 
illegal in Iran, however when he was stopped all he had to do was to show his Basij membership 
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card to prevent whoever stopped him from having his car searched (Golkar 2015, 187).  In 
another case, “A young Basiji put it this way: ‘I joined the Basij only because I wanted to get its 
membership card. So when I am going outside with my girlfriend, if authorities want to bother 
me about my relationship with her, I can show them my membership card and then they don’t 
bother me anymore’” (Golkar 2015, 186-187).  For others the Basij provides protection in lower 
socioeconomic status neighborhoods (Golkar 2015, 185). In this case, “As a widow living in a 
suburb northeast of Tehran explained, ‘I joined the Basij to protect myself and my sons from the 
intrusive thugs in my neighborhood’” (Golkar 2015, 186). Many Basij during the 2009 Green 
Movement feared how they would be perceived by other Iranians in their use in suppression of 
protests because many Basij use the organization for opportunistic purposes such as access to 
government jobs, upward mobility in their jobs, benefits for universities, extra money, subsidized 
food, and cheap travel to pilgrimage sites (Golkar 2015, 181-188).  As a result many Basij are 
not loyal to the regime, but the institution and the benefits it bestows helping in their own 
personal lives fosters a sense of commitment to the regime.   
Similar to the Basij, most of the rank and file of the IRGC for example don’t share the 
views of the higher brass, who they claim are fanatics to the regime.716 Instead most conscripts 
bide their time, smuggling in banned and prohibited items into the barracks and attempt to 
survive conscription duty, especially if one is based in the northwest of the country where regular 
attacks occur by the PJAK and other Kurdish opposition groups.717  For the most part the rank 
and file of the IRGC are not overly religious or even political, they just play the part “(wear the 
uniform, have short hair, have a beard, be there on time) and almost everything else is 
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overlooked in Sepah [IRGC].”718  The IRGC as an organization is purported to be ideological 
and extremely devoted to the regime, however the reality is the rank and file of the IRGC break 
even the simplest of rules that go against the clerical interpretation of Islam. For example, one 
IRGC conscript claimed:  
It is forbidden to have cellphones, it is forbidden to smoke, it is forbidden to listen to 
music, but we smuggle in everything. [yet] I have a cellphone, I have my MP3 player, I 
bring in all the books that I want… after the cadre leaves, the base is left to the conscripts 
and a few supervising officers, and so the mood changes; you can wear regular clothes, 
go for a free walk around the large compound, and so on… Every regulation can be bent 
or broken if you have the right connections; you need connections with the cadre for the 
formal part of the day and connections with the conscripts in strategic parts of the base 
for the informal part. Almost everybody needs a favor, and if you can scratch their backs, 
yours will be scratched in turn. I haven't directly bribed anyone but I have provided my 
commander with free insurance for his car and now I have it easier. He even helped me to 
get a transfer - I am being sent to a unit in my hometown for the rest of my service. As 
for the conscripts, knowing someone in the kitchen gets you extra rations and fresh fruit, 
knowing one of the MPs (military police -- dezhban) means you can smuggle things 
inside, knowing a guy in the infirmary means visits to the city and getting out of the base 
whenever you want, and the list goes on. 719 
While both the IRGC and Basij represents a bulwark against insurrection and a coup emanating 
within the military, it’s the institutional capacity rather than ideological alignment of individual 
members of the IRGC and Basij that lead the institution to operate effectively during periods of 
insurrection or periods of crisis.  
Conclusion: Iran’s Parallel Security Structures under the Islamic Republic 
 In line with the theoretical frames of historical institutionalism and organization theory, 
the Islamic regime’s parallel security apparatus has fulfilled its institutional purpose of 
safeguarding the regime from being overthrown by armed internal opposition groups or popular 
protests.  Protests in the 1990s, the 2009 Green Movement, and 2018 protests were all 
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suppressed by the IRGC and Basij units working in conjunction with Law Enforcement Forces.  
In addition, despite opposition to the regime’s ideology, soldiers and members in the IRGC and 
Basij fulfill their institutional mission as a result of selective incentives bestowed by the regime.  
Even in more hostile locations such as northwestern and southeastern Iran, where the IRGC faces 
ethnic armed groups, Iran’s parallel security structures have evolved to limit and debilitate those 
ethnic armed opposition groups to ensure they don’t pose a threat to the regime or its 
stakeholders.  During the Iran-Iraq War the parallel security institutions of the Islamic Republic 
were expanded to fulfill their institutional requirement of stamping out unrest within Iran and 
provide a force for the external defense of the country. While the Shah’s parallel security 
institutions did not evolve to meet internal threats to the regime, the parallel security institutions 
of the Islamic Republic have evolved from their initial foundations established in 1979 to 
effectively tackle internal dissent within the country up to the present.  The Islamic regime’s 
parallel security apparatus as a result fulfilled their primary mission as parallel security 





















The parallel security structures in the cases of Baathist Iraq, Syria, and Iran were 
examined to better understand the phenomena of the parallel security apparatus and its effect 
with regard to preserving the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. While parallel security 
structures are not limited to the region of the Middle East, the cases of Baathist Iraq, Syria, and 
Iran represent a departure as all three cases hold well institutionalized and extensive parallel 
security structures.  In many other authoritarian regimes, such as Oman, Jordan, and Morocco 
parallel security structures are often limited to a presidential and royal guard with the possibility 
of a redundant intelligence gathering organization.  However in the cases of this dissertation the 
parallel security structures are often comprised of five or more parallel security institutions 
where they truly parallel the conventional security apparatus in almost every security function.  
In the case of Baathist Iraq, a new parallel security structure or its subdivision was created every 
few years under the reign of Saddam Hussein.  
In Syria, parallel security structures were implemented and expanded under Hafez al-
Assad and later consolidated under Bashar al-Assad.  In Iran, parallel security structures greatly 
expanded under the Islamic regimes led by Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei.  The 
ability to trace these parallel security structures over time demonstrates the pervasiveness and 




Utilizing the analytical lens of historical institutionalism and organizational theory, each 
case was traced from their foundations as a parallel security structure to their position within the 
parallel security apparatus to better understand how each institutional mission over time 
impacted regime decisions or ensured proper stable governance in the countries each regime 
presided over.  Using the framework of historical institutionalism and organizational theory, the 
evolution of missions of parallel security structures were examined to better illuminate how 
regime preservation was implemented over time.  For example, the Republican Guard of Iraq 
under Saddam Hussein was expanded during the Iran-Iraq War and took on an additional role of 
external defense to preserve the Baathist regime in Baghdad from internal insurrection as well as 
Iranian forces from forcefully removing the Baathist regime from power.  Likewise, the Iranian 
Basij and IRGC were expanded during that same conflict for the purpose of regime preservation 
of the Islamic regime in Iran and to provide a loyal combatant force on the battlefield due to the 
Iranian Army still being viewed as loyal to the Shah. In Syria, the intelligence gathering 
organizations created enforcement arms during the period of unrest from 2011 to 2018 to better 
tackle internal threats posed to the regime.  In all three cases parallel security structures evolved 
from their initial institutional mission through either the emergence of new threats or by direction 
of regime leaders to ensure the stability and continuity of their respective authoritarian regimes. 
The original research question for this dissertation inquired how effective are parallel 
security structures at ensuring regime stability and when do parallel security structures stop 
performing their duties to safeguard the regime.   Examining the case of Baathist Iraq from 1968 
to 1979 under Al-Bakr and later from 1979 to 2003 under Saddam Hussein Iraq’s parallel 
security structures fundamentally grew and expanded from the prior Arif Regime of the 1960s.  
The Republican Guard expanded under the Al-Bakr Baathist regime and new formations such as 
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the Popular Army were created to provide another layer of protection for the regime against 
potential coup attempts and internal unrest within the country.  The Iraqi Intelligence Service, 
General Security Service, and Baathist Party Security Unit during the late 1960s and 1970s 
monitored the local populace for dissent and also kept tabs on the military to root out the 
potential of dissent within the ranks of the security services.  During the 1970s, coup attempts 
such as the 1970 coup led by Major General Abd al-Ghani al-Rawi and Colonel Salih Mahdi al-
Samarrai were detected by the parallel intelligence gathering organizations under Al-Bakr’s 
Baathist regime while others such as the 1973 coup attempt by General Nadhim Kazzar led to the 
further expansion of parallel security structures to further insulate the regime from future coup 
attempts. This included the expansion of the Popular Army to every village in Iraq. In addition 
during period of Kurdish unrest, the regular armed forces were deployed along with limited 
contingents of the parallel intelligence gathering organizations in order to root out and dislodge 
Kurdish guerillas in the North.   
The parallel security structures of the Popular Army and Republican Guard during this 
period of time maintained their presence near vital regime institutions in order to safeguard them 
from internal opposition elements, fulfilling their institutional mission as a parallel security 
structure. However in 1979 the parallel security structures stopped performing their duties to 
safeguard the regime of Al-Bakr when his health began to fail.  Instead they maintained 
institutional continuity by supporting a high ranking member within the regime, Saddam 
Hussein, to replace Al-Bakr.  
 During the 1980s, the parallel security structures under the Baathist regime 
predominantly resided in Iraq to ensure coup attempts and opposition groups in the North and 
South couldn’t overthrew the regime.  The parallel military organizations such as the Popular 
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Army and Republican Guard for the most part were utilized to stamp out Shia opposition groups 
such as the Da’wa Party and Badr Corps in the South and the Kurdish KDP and PUK opposition 
groups in the North.  In addition, the Popular Army was utilized as check on the military at the 
frontlines so soldiers would not attempt to march back and overthrow the Baathist regime in 
Baghdad.  Later during the war, the Republican Guard was expanded and utilized against enemy 
Iranian forces to capture strategic points.  Part of the reason for the Republican Guard’s 
expansion and use during the Iran-Iraq War by the Baathist regime is the fact that the Republican 
Guard was provided with better training and more resources than their regular military 
counterparts.  As a result, they represented an elite force that could not only be utilized to defeat 
the regular army in a coup attempt but could also be utilized for its secondary mission of external 
defense in preserving the Baathist regime.   
In this case, they were utilized to dislodge Iranian forces from various difficult and 
strategic locations throughout the war. During the 1980s, Iraq’s parallel intelligence gathering 
organizations detected numerous coups.  However in a few cases, assassinations and coup 
attempts made it past the planning stages and as a result the Baathist regime decided to create 
another parallel intelligence gathering organization called the office of Special Security to 
provide a check on not only the military but also on the other parallel intelligence gathering 
organizations to better safeguard the regime in Baghdad.  As a result of the war with Iran, Iraq’s 
parallel intelligence gathering organizations were not solely focused on internal issues with 
regard to opposition but also gathered intelligence on enemy military movements by Iran that 
could impact troops along the frontlines.  Therefore, Iraq’s parallel security apparatus during the 
1980s were effective at not only ensuring regime stability by rooting out internal opposition and 
dissent but also evolved to safeguard the Baathist regime from an external threat. 
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 During the 1991 revolts, Iraq’s regular military and parallel military organizations such 
as the Popular Army collapsed in the face of popular uprisings in the North and South of the 
country.  The Baathist regime was reliant upon its parallel intelligence gathering organizations, 
most notably the office of Special Security, and the parallel military of the organization of the 
Republican Guard to bring back Baathist control over the areas of northern and southern Iraq. 
After 1992, the Baathist regime created several new organizations to combat dissent throughout 
the 1990s.  These included an intelligence gathering organization called Military Security, the 
creation of another parallel security structure called the Fedayeen Saddam, and a sub-division 
within the Republican Guard called the Special Republican Guard.  While these parallel security 
institutions as well as the Baathist regime’s other security institutions of the parallel security 
apparatus were able to suppress dissent and internal opposition throughout the 1990s, their 
ability to defend against an external force in 2003 was limited.  As a result due to the 
overwhelming force of the coalition in 2003, many parallel security institutions collapsed facing 
widespread desertions when loss seemed all but inevitable for the Baathist regime.  
While the Baathist regime was able to sustain internal control when they had monopoly 
on violence, against overwhelming force the parallel security institutions stop performing their 
duties of safeguarding the regime.  In addition, when the health of the leader began to fail for the 
Baathist leader of Al-Bakr, the parallel security institutions decided to sustain institutional 
continuity by allowing a palace coup to occur where their institutions could continue to operate 
under the new leader. Overall Iraq’s parallel security apparatus evolved from its initial 
foundations by expanding its institutional role to tackle international opposition and surveil the 




 Examining the case of Syria from 1976 to 2018 under both the Baathist regime of Hafez 
al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad, the parallel security apparatus was instrumental in preserving 
authoritarianism in Syria predominantly from internal insurrection.  During the 1980s, the 
Muslim Brotherhood and Fighting Vanguard, two Sunni opposition groups, plagued 
northwestern Syria.  The regular military was unable to quell the unrest as a result of desertions.  
It was Syria’s parallel security structures of the 3rd Armored Division, Defense Companies, 
Baath Party Militia, and Special Forces that were utilized to suppress the unrest in the North and 
ensure the Baathist regime in Syria did not face a significant rebellion that could potentially 
overthrow the regime.    Syria’s parallel intelligence gathering organizations were also 
fundamental at infiltrating and dismantling oppositions groups during the 1980s.  In 1984, 
Syria’s Military Intelligence attempted to diminish the power of Hafez al-Assad’s brother Rifaat 
al-Assad and his parallel security structure of the Defense Companies.  This led to a coup 
attempt by Rifaat al-Assad, however the coup attempt failed as Syria’s parallel security 
structures united against Rifaat in line with their institutional purpose of safeguarding the Syrian 
Baathist regime. Syria’s parallel security structures preserved institutional continuity by ensuring 
the regime of Hafez al-Assad endured. The Defense Companies were disbanded and the 
Republican Guard expanded to provide a strong parallel military organization to take on the role 
of security of the Baathist regime, formerly undertaken by the Defense Companies. 
 Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, the Syrian Baathist regime faced no strong forms 
of protest or internal insurrection until 2011. During the protests Syria’s parallel intelligence 
gathering organizations were mobilized to suppress protests by directing regular military units to 
fire into crowds of protestors and running various temporary detention facilities for the arrest of 
protestors.  In addition, the parallel military organizations of the Republican Guard, Special 
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Forces, and 4th Armored Division were actively used to suppress protests and later utilized to 
confront armed opposition groups as protests evolved into civil war.  While the regular military 
suffered from massive desertions and attrition, Syria’s parallel military organizations maintained 
their institutional integrity during the protests and suffered minimal desertions from their 
organizations.  The only parallel military organization that proved to be ineffective was the 
Popular Army which only spawned predominantly in areas of Syria that were staunchly loyal to 
the regime as opposed to the 1980s when the Popular Army was heavily relied upon to close the 
spaces of movement for internal armed groups in northwestern Syria. As a result of attrition, 
many parallel security structures were consolidated or expanded. In the case of the Popular Army 
and Special Forces, both organizations ceased to exist as independent entities later in the civil 
war.  For Syria’s parallel intelligence gathering organizations such as the Air Force Intelligence, 
Political Security Directorate, Military Intelligence, and General Security Directorate, their 
institutional mission evolved to incorporate an armed enforcement apparatus during the civil war 
to preserve the Syrian Baathist regime and curtail Syrian opposition groups.   
While the civil war is still ongoing and the intervention by Russia in 2015 has greatly 
aided in the preservation of the Syrian Baathist regime, Syria’s parallel security apparatus has 
been crucial in the sustainment of authoritarianism within the country.  From Hafez al-Assad to 
Bashar al-Assad the Baathist regime and its stakeholders have been safeguarded by the regime’s 
parallel security structures.  As a result, Syria’s parallel security apparatus maintained 
institutional continuity by performing their institutional mission of safeguarding the Baathist 
regime from being toppled by internal opposition groups. 
 Observing the case of Iran from 1957 to 1979 under the Shah and from 1979 to 2018 
under the Islamic regime, the parallel security apparatus under Islamic regime has demonstrated 
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success while the parallel security apparatus under the Shah has demonstrated failure at 
preserving and sustaining authoritarian rule in Iran. The Shah’s parallel security apparatus of the 
SAVAK, Imperial Guard, Imperial Inspectorate Organization, and Special Information Bureau 
had mixed results in preserving the Shah’s authoritarian regime in Iran.  In the 1950s, 1960s, and 
early 1970s, Iran’s parallel security apparatus under the Shah was quite successful at stamping 
out opposition within the country and suppressing protests against his reign.  Many of the 
parallel security structures under the Shah worked in tandem with the regular security apparatus 
to apprehend dissidents and eliminate opposition elements within the country.  However this 
reliance on the regular security apparatus as an enforcement arm with Iran’s intelligence 
gathering parallel security structures began to fail during the mid to late 1970s.  Once the army 
began to disintegrate to popular protests, the Shah’s regime was unable to curtail the tide of 
revolution and regime change that was about to occur.   
While all four parallel security structures performed their functions until the collapse of 
the regime, the SAVAK began to stop performing its institutional mission once Ayatollah 
Khomeini reached out to several members of the organization.  Once this occurred, members of 
the organization in an attempt to preserve institutional continuity stayed along the sidelines 
during the unrest.  The Shah’s decision to rely on a strong national army instead of expanding the 
Imperial Guard or creating a large parallel military organization opened the way for a strong 
opposition to topple his regime, once the armed forces began to desert in the wave of popular 
protests. 
 The protests that led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979 facilitated the emergence of 
Ayatollah Khomeini and the creation of an Islamic regime in Iran. To secure his rule, Ayatollah 
Khomeini and other regime stakeholders established the IRGC and Basij or in the case of the 
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revolutionary committees, coopted them. During the early 1980s these groups along with the 
intelligence gathering organization of the MOIS stamped out opposition elements that were 
liberal, monarchist, or leftist in nature to cement the rule of the Islamic regime.  Once war broke 
out between Iraq and Iran, the parallel security structures under the Islamic regime were not only 
utilized for internal security but were also utilized for their secondary mission of external 
defense. Throughout the 1980s, the IRGC, Basij, revolutionary committees, and MOIS were 
utilized both on the war front and at home to suppress internal dissent and defend the country 
against an external force.  As a result the parallel security apparatus under the Islamic regime 
ensured the sustainment of authoritarianism by safeguarding the regime from opposition, dissent, 
and an external enemy force.  The parallel security apparatus of the Islamic regime has evolved 
from its institutional foundations in order to better safeguard the regime and sustain authoritarian 
rule in Iran.  This was clearly witnessed in the 1980s when parallel security structures such as the 
IRGC, the SAVAMA, Revolutionary Committees, and the Prime Minister’s Intelligence Office 
were consolidated under the MOIS for intelligence gathering activities.  During the 1990s the 
IRGC and a newly formed parallel intelligence organization called Judicial Intelligence were 
utilized to gather intelligence on internal opposition and members within the government in 
order to detect dissent.   
In addition, the Basij was subordinated under the IRGC and the revolutionary committees 
were disbanded and absorbed into either the IRGC or Law Enforcement Forces.  It’s from these 
parallel security institutions and the evolution of their institutional structures that have allowed 
Iran’s parallel security apparatus to safeguard the Islamic regime from such events as protests in 
2009 with the Green Movement and 2018 protests occurring throughout the country.  The 
Islamic regime’s parallel security structures have also safeguarded the regime from coup 
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attempts and internal opposition elements such as the MEK, Jundallah, and Kurdish opposition 
groups.  From this the parallel security apparatus in Iran has protected the Islamic regime from 
internal and external opposition.  
 Overall parallel security structures in the cases of Baathist Iraq under Saddam Hussein, 
Syria under Hafez al-Assad and later Bashar al-Assad, and Iran under Ayatollahs Khomeini and 
Khamenei have safeguarded those regimes from being overthrown by their well-entrenched 
parallel security structures that they hold.  Each regime employs multiple parallel intelligence 
gathering organizations that often have a direct line of communication to the authoritarian leader 
in power. In addition they hold a large enforcement force through parallel military organizations.   
The failure of the Shah to sustain his regime was the lack of a large parallel military 
organization.  The Imperial Guard was too small to suppress widespread and popular protests in 
1979.  Once the regime no longer held a monopoly on violence with the desertion of the armed 
forces, the regime was quickly overrun by protestors and internal armed groups.  In Iraq under 
Al-Bakr, leader removal occurred only to sustain institutional continuity of those existing 
parallel security structures.  While Al-Bakr would be removed, a member of that same regime, 
Saddam Hussein, would take his place and continue to utilize the parallel security apparatus in 
place and even expand those institutions to safeguard the regime.  In Syria the transfer of power 
from father to son did not lead to those parallel security structures to abandon the regime with 
the new successor as Bashar al-Assad, as in the case of Saddam Hussein, belonged to that same 
regime that was in power.  As a result institutional continuity was maintained.   
Key Findings 
 There are several key findings emerge from this study. 
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 First, across the cases of this study there existed wide and extensive parallel security 
structures tasked with safeguarding the regime and ensuring institutional survival. 
 Second, there was the existence of three or more parallel military oraganizations across 
the regimes of Baathist Iraq, Syria, and the Islamic Republic.  The Shah’s regime was the 
only regime to have one parallel military organization. 
 Third, in every case, each regime had a mass militia and at least one elite parallel military 
organization.   
 Fourth, each regime had four or more parallel intelligence gathering organizations.  The 
Shah’s regime had three parallel intelligence gathering organizations. This led to the 
survival of regime institutions across the study cases. 
 Fifth, institutional conformity and selective incentives garnered by members of the 
parallel security apparatus preserved regime mechanisms of control in the safeguarding 
of regime stakeholders and regime institutions. 
Across the cases of this dissertation, the findings for this study include various 
commanlities.  Part of these commonalities can be attributed to contagion effect and the 
existence of diverse communities that reside within each of these countries.  However in all three 
cases there existed a wide and extensive parallel security apparatus that was utilized to preserve 
the regime.  Amongst each regime in Baathist Iraq, Syria, and once the Islamic Republic 
emerged in Iran were the existence of three or more parallel military organizations with the 
combined strength of over 100,000 troops.  This number is significant as it demonstrates a 
potential reason these regimes were able to offset internal unrest when the Shah of Iran with his 
8,000 member Imperial Guard was unable to suppress protests with his parallel military 
organization during the Islamic Revolution.   Futhermore, the institutional composition of these 
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parallel military organizations significantly mirrored one another across cases.  In Baathist Iraq, 
Syria, and the Islamic Republic of Iran each regime had a mass militia and at least one elite 
parallel military organization acting as a counterweight to the regular security services. However 
in the case of Syria, its mass militia force of the Popular Army was only a paper force and 
appeared to be affected by Arab Spring of 2011 once protests set in, whereas in Baathist Iraq and 
the Islamic regime of Iran had active mass militias such as the Popular Army in Iraq and the 
Basij in Iran which could mobilize a significant number of those member forces as they required 
active participation throughout the year to maintain readiness.  
In addition to parallel military organizations, across cases, each regime possessed around 
four or more parallel intelligence gathering organizations with large informant networks utilized 
for the purposes of detecting dissent within the populace and also within the security services.  
This detection greatly enhanced the regime’s ability to prevent coups and unrest by closing the 
spaces for the emergence of a strong opposition to challenge those regimes. While each 
intelligence organization possessed minimal enforcement capabilities across cases, in Syria these 
enforcement capabilities were greatly enhanced and expanded through the use of militia forces 
which fell under the branches of Syria’s parallel intelligence directorates.  In this case, they 
became a dual parallel security structure encompassing not only detection capabilities but 
parallel military organizational capabilities once protests evolved into an armed uprising during 
the Arab Spring of 2011. Futhermore, loyalty was cemented in the parallel security apparatus 
across cases from ideological indoctrination to selective incentives afforded to members of these 
institutions.  Regime mechanisms of control also provided room for conformity with regard to 
the creation of loyal parallel security structures. Members could navigate and survive regime 
repression more readily as members of the parallel security structures.  In addition selective 
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incentives from benefits in the case of Iran’s Basij, luxuries such as a car or apartment allowing 
one to marry from membership in one of Syria’s parallel security structures, or exemption of 
mandatory conscription and rewards afforded in Iraq’s part-time parallel military organizations 
incentivized members of those organizations to fulfill institutional missions.  The pervasiveness 
of the parallel security apparatus and its institutional effectiveness at sustaining authoritarian 
governance holds a potential connection to institutional survival as a regime’s parallel security 
structures combat internal unrest by detecting dissent and by preventing the emergence of an 
aggressive opposition posing a threat to that same regime in power. 
Authoritarian regimes have a parallel security apparatus to ensure regime stability and 
survival. In many cases they have multiple parallel security structures in the event those parallel 
security structures collapse or fold.  This became evident the case in Iraq under Saddam Hussein 
in 1991, both parallel security structures and the regular security forces disintegrated with the 
uprisings in the North and South of the country. The Republican Guard and office of Special 
Security became the parallel security structures to preserve the Baathist regime during that 
period of unrest.   By tracing these three case studies over time it is clear the importance of 
parallel security structures in authoritarian regimes is to preserve the governments from being 
toppled.  In divided societies such as the cases of this dissertation it becomes easy for varying 
political identities to take hold, leading to an internal opposition. The pervasiveness of parallel 
security structures in the cases of Baathist Iraq, Syria, and Iran highlight a dimension of potential 
stability in that these three cases and possibly the wider Middle East require a parallel security 
apparatus to sustain authoritarian governance. Only through wider research of the phenomenon 
of the parallel security apparatus and parallel security structures can we determine if these 
institutions truly have an impact on regime stability and institutional survival.   
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While this dissertation explores the phenomena of the parallel security apparatus within 
authoritarian regimes, its research holds methodological limitations and limitations with regard 
to the absence of positivist research.  These limitations are further compounded by the small 
number of cases examined in this descriptive case study research of the parallel security 
apparatus and a lack of access to official government documents for each case of this 
dissertation.  In Iran, for example, archives on the Iran-Iraq War are still not accessible to the 
public for the purpose of research.  The readily available reason for this lack of access is the 
regime in power considers tactics and maneuvers during the war to be still sensitive information.  
In addition, many current and formers regime officials fear speaking about different sensitive 
materials or organizational processes of regime institutions will land them or their family in 
prison.  In the case of Iraq, while the coalition after 2003 obtained hundreds of thousands of 
documents that were translated into English many of these documents were destroyed when the 
Conflict Records Research Center didn’t receive funding from the U.S. Congress.  In addition I 
primarily rely upon translated sources from Arabic and Farsi for my cases in this dissertation.  
Moreover, in the case of Syria, Russian intervention greatly aided the Syrian regime, possibly 
even preventing institutional collapse of the regime’s own own parallel security apparatus. 
However while this contribution was significant it only supplemented the capabilities that existed 
amongst Syria’s own security institutions, rather than provide a clear and definitive result of 
victory over opposition elements within the country. Further research can expand on the 
phenomena of the parallel security apparatus of authoritarian regimes by the use of both 
methodologies to see if parallel security structures have an impact on the durability of 
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